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 This dissertation examines the experiences of New Yorkers during the American Civil 
War as they participated in mobilization while striving to preserve their own autonomy and that 
of their state and communities. At the war’s beginning in 1861, New York State was preeminent 
for having the largest population and strongest economy of the United States, and Governor 
Edwin D. Morgan had an influential role in the Republican Party. The federal government 
assigned manpower quotas and other directives but relied on—and often deferred to—state 
governments and their citizens in military recruitment. In a society of small government 
infrastructure, Morgan and other leaders depended on the support of ordinary citizens, their 
communities, and associational culture to raise manpower. New Yorkers saw the war effort as 
voluntary—even after the advent of conscription in late 1862—and tried to mitigate the 
conflict’s drastic social and economic effects by securing enough volunteers to avoid drafting, 
opening the military’s ranks to nearly anyone willing to serve, and debating the terms of their 
obligations to the cause. The second half of the war saw widespread recruitment fraud and 
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Six weeks after the outbreak of the American Civil War, John J. Peck—an Onondaga 
County, New York, native destined for high rank in the Union Army—passionately defended his 
state’s right to appoint generals to command its own troops. The issue had become a sticking 
point for New Yorkers as they wrestled commitment to the national cause with their own local 
and state interests. Peck’s argument rested on the sacrifices New Yorkers had made and would 
continue making for the Union. “Now we are told that the Empire State is to have but one 
general,” Peck complained to the superintendent of the state’s Banking Department. “New York 
is to bear the brunt of this mighty conflict of arms,” he continued. “Her trade and commerce will 
be paralyzed, and her citizens made bankrupt. She will keep up national credit by taking the 
government loans. Already more than 25,000 of her best sons are in the field,” and three million 
dollars of state funds pledged for their needs. Residents of Onondaga, he continued, urged 
Governor Edwin D. Morgan to fight for their state’s sovereignty in the matter of the generals. 
New York deserved nothing less, given its current and future commitment. “When further calls 
are made,” Peck maintained, “she will respond with the same alacrity, and the same spirit of 
patriotism, already evinced by her people.”1  
New Yorkers would indeed answer every call made upon them for troops, money, and 
other vital resources. But Peck’s state pride and the war’s massive scale led him into some faulty 
predictions. The war’s financial costs would indeed skyrocket, but most New Yorkers would not 
be bankrupted. Furthermore, they were not destined to feel the “brunt” of the war’s effects 
despite the sacrifices of many individuals. A good many of them, in fact, would experience 
                                                 
1 John J. Peck to H. H. Van Dyck, May 27, 1861, box 10, Edwin D. Morgan Papers, New York State Library 
(hereafter EDM Papers, NYSL). 
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America’s deadliest conflict as only a distraction from local and personal concerns.2 But Peck’s 
letter to an important financial official demonstrates how the war for the Union provoked smaller 
conflicts of autonomy between Lincoln’s administration and the states. Stemming from localism 
and small federal infrastructure, squabbles over states’ rights hindered mobilization at a time 
when the Union desperately relied on support from the loyal states. That state-level assistance 
itself grew out of patriotic efforts by communities and individuals across New York and the 
North. Peck’s words summarized New Yorkers’ belief that their monumental efforts on behalf of 
the Union earned them more respect and consideration from federal authorities—this, in fact, 
was one of few notions having virtually total support among residents of the deeply divided 
Empire State. Peck’s prediction of enormous economic hardship and additional calls for men 
also echoed a common refrain: The conflict engulfing America would likely be sustained and 
dreadful, requiring near-total commitment from Union loyalists. This idealistic concept of 
common sacrifice, never universally popular, would fade as the war ground on. By its third year, 
many New Yorkers looked to their leaders and communities to save them from having to 
sacrifice for the cause. The question of state authority in appointing generals that so captivated 
Peck was short-lived—the War Department soon cemented its right to select generals for federal 
forces—but the larger issues of state mobilization he connected to it did not. From first to last, 
recruitment of manpower formed a particularly inescapable and defining aspect of the war years. 
Arguments 
This dissertation looks at military recruitment—how legislators and officers planned it, 
how it happened at town rallies and provost marshal offices, and how it guided northern efforts 
                                                 
2 Thomas Summerhill, Harvest of Dissent: Agrarianism in Nineteenth-Century New York (Urbana-Champaign: 
University of Illinois Press, 2005), 4; J. Matthew Gallman, Defining Duty in the Civil War: Personal Choice, 
Popular Culture, and the Union Home Front (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 128. 
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to win the war—through the prism of the Union’s richest, most populous state. Recruitment is 
considered here as the most vital component in wartime mobilization. During the Civil War era, 
“mobilization” almost always referred to preparing and moving forces on campaign.3 I use the 
term in its most common current definition as a nation’s process of gathering resources, 
especially troops, for war. I examine recruitment in New York State to argue that northerners 
saw the war effort as a voluntary endeavor from beginning to end. Raising manpower depended 
on the support of citizens and state leaders who jealously guarded their rights of democracy and 
choice; greater federal direction during the war reflected this reality. To a large extent, 
mobilization rested on popular support and non-governmental associations. 
My dissertation employs New Yorkers’ war experiences as a means and an end, 
presenting both a case study and a specific history of the state’s mobilization during the war 
years. In the early 1980’s, Jerome Mushkat studied Democratic Party membership in New York 
during the era to draw conclusions “beyond its borders” about the national party’s attempt at a 
comeback.4 Examining struggles to raise troops in New York similarly helps us come to grips 
with the procedures and significance of mobilization in the entire North. Recruitment is one of 
the first and most vital components in a nation’s preparation and conduct in a long, large-scale 
conflict like the Civil War. Wartime recruitment opens windows onto a government and public’s 
war aims, expectations, levels of support for the conflict in the face of setbacks, and how the 
nation succeeds or fails in its efforts for victory.  
                                                 
3 Based on textual searches in the compiled orders and reports of commanders during the war, digitized by Cornell 
University Library staff. Cornell University Library, Making of America, http://ebooks.library.cornell.edu/m/ 
moawar/index.html (accessed November 18, 2016). 
4 Jerome Mushkat, The Reconstruction of the New York Democracy, 1861-1874 (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh 
Dickinson University Press, 1981), 9. 
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The Civil War occurred in a worldwide era when nationalism was overtaking older, 
localized forms of political allegiance. Benedict Anderson argued that nationalism emerged in 
the Industrial Revolution as mass media and other unifying forces prompted people to form 
“imagined communities.” 5 While Anderson did not discuss the United States in any depth in his 
most important work, nationalist language from newspaper editors and speechmakers during the 
Civil War supports an interpretation of the Union and Confederacy—and each of their states—as 
imagined communities in which citizens did not all know each other but felt bonded by language, 
government, and the printed word. A theme running throughout Anderson’s Imagined 
Communities is the question of how nationalism convinced people to sacrifice themselves in 
large-scale people’s conflicts such as the American Civil War; his work provides no definitive 
answers. Historians of the mid-nineteenth-century United States and the Civil War bring us 
closer to understanding why two sections of the United States went to war and how they 
sustained themselves in the fight.6 Those who sought greater public loyalty and commitment to 
national efforts contended with localism—Americans’ tendency to privilege their local 
communities over the nation—yet also relied on it. By the mid-nineteenth century, Americans 
most often tackled public and national movements through small communities and voluntary 
associations. This community and associational culture encouraged participation in politics and 
devotion to American democracy while taking the place of weak national authority.7 Melinda 
Lawson has shown that northern political and community leaders relied partly on localism to 
                                                 
5 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism, rev. ed. 
(London: Verso, 2006) 
6 For an examination of scholarship on American nationalism placing it in the context of Anderson’s work, see 
Jennifer Rose Mercieca, “Choice, Loyalty, and Safety in the Construction of a Distinctly American Imagined 
Nationalism,” Rhetoric and Public Affairs 9 (2006): 279-302. 
7 Brian Balogh, A Government Out of Sight: The Mystery of National Authority in Nineteenth-Century America 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 219-264; Phillip Shaw Paludan, “A People’s Contest”: The Union 
and Civil War, 1861-1865, 2nd ed. (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1996), 10, 14. 
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“forge a new American nationalism” and encourage their people onward to victory.8 These 
efforts to preserve the Union belonged to a longer process of constructing an American sense of 
nationhood.9 
In the context of the great struggle that gripped America in the 1860’s, narrowing one’s 
focus to a particular state—and through the state to its smaller communities—brings these 
matters into clearer view. As many scholars have shown, the majority of New Yorkers and other 
Americans were devout republicans who treasured individual liberty and expected government to 
preserve it even in times of national crisis.10 Thanks to republicanism, states and their 
governments often loomed just as large or larger than national authority in both the Union and 
Confederacy. Presidents Abraham Lincoln, Jefferson Davis, and their war departments appealed 
directly to governors and state populations repeatedly over the course of the war for manpower 
and political support. States’ rights, a concept most often associated with the South, proved a 
potent force in the North’s war.11 John J. Peck demonstrated how state and community pride 
jockeyed with devotion to country in the minds of Americans and enhanced it. Citizens believed 
their efforts on behalf of the national cause brought honor upon their states and smaller 
communities, and they expected national authorities to recognize and reward these contributions. 
                                                 
8 Melinda Lawson, Patriot Fires: Forging a New American Nationalism in the Civil War North (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2002). 
9 See John M. Murrin, “A Roof Without Walls: The Dilemma of American National Identity,” in Beyond 
Confederation: Origins of the Constitution and American National Identity, ed. Stephen Botein, Richard R. Beeman, 
and Edward Carlos Carter (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1987), 333-348. 
10 Discussions of scholarship on American republicanism are found in Robert E. Shalhope, “Toward a Republican 
Synthesis: The Emergence of an Understanding of Republicanism in American Historiography,” William and Mary 
Quarterly 29 (1972): 49-80; Daniel T. Rodgers, “Republicanism: The Career of a Concept,” Journal of American 
History 79 (1992): 11-38. For the endurance of republicanism in the Civil War era, see Donald K. Pickens, “The 
Republican Synthesis and Thaddeus Stevens,” Civil War History 31 (1985): 57-73; Andrew F. Lang, 
“Republicanism, Race, and Reconstruction: The Ethos of Military Occupation in Civil War America,” Journal of the 
Civil War Era 4 (2014): 559-589; Ricardo A. Herrera, For Liberty and the Republic: The American Citizen as 
Soldier, 1775-1861 (New York and London: New York University Press, 2015). 
11 Michael E. Woods points to the importance of states’ rights in prewar northern resistance to southern proslavery 
aggression in “‘Tell Us Something about State Rights’: Northern Republicans, States’ Rights, and the Coming of the 
Civil War,” Journal of the Civil War Era 7 (2017): 242-268. 
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Soldiers were “devoted state loyalists even as they formed and fought in the largest national 
army of the century,” Phillip Shaw Paludan noted.12 That national army was composed largely of 
regiments formed by individual states, and these regiments were made up of companies often 
recruited in individual towns and villages. As I will argue, traditions of localism and states’ 
rights hampered the Union war effort while also providing vital support. New York, with its 
diverse population, varied regions, and strong agrarian, industrial, and transportation economies, 
reflected the northern states as a whole and provides fertile ground for examining northern 
mobilization. 
 New York’s role in the Civil War is also worthy of examination in its own right. As its 
nickname indicates, for most of the nineteenth century and long into the twentieth New York 
enjoyed an imperial reputation as the wealthiest and most populous of the United States. During 
the Civil War, New York drew on these assets to provide more troops, money, arms, and other 
resources to the Union cause than any other state. Federal officials from President Lincoln down 
sought guidance from New York’s leaders and people in mobilization. New Yorkers’ impressive 
display of patriotism and martial fervor at the war’s outbreak inspired all Union loyalists; later, 
the success of the federal draft in 1863 depended on how it proceeded in New York City. The 
Draft Riots of that year starkly illustrated the depth and bitterness of political, social, and ethnic 
divisions in that huge, diverse city, divisions that caused nationwide concern throughout the war. 
After Horatio Seymour—an outspoken critic of Lincoln’s administration—had become governor 
earlier in 1863, Lincoln reached out to him. The president noted that having the cooperation of 
the Union’s “greatest state” was essential to the national war effort, and Lincoln hoped the two 
                                                 
12 Paludan, “A People’s Contest,” 19. 
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men could avoid “difference of purpose.”13 Lincoln’s careful handling of Seymour and his 
Democratic constituents in New York was something like his relationship with the Border States. 
Lincoln believed “to lose Kentucky is nearly the same as to lose the whole game.”14 Unlike the 
Border States, there was no chance of New York seceding from the Union (much less joining the 
Confederacy) despite the conservative antiwar faction among its populace. But Lincoln knew the 
Union would have faced extreme difficulties in waging war without the political, popular, and 
materiel support most New Yorkers provided. 
 Recruitment of troops in the democratic, decentralized, yet nationalistic United States 
determined the course of the war to a degree most historians have not appreciated. In an 
influential 1989 article, Maris A. Vinovskis issued a wake-up call to social historians to examine 
how the Civil War transformed American life.15 In examining recruitment, scholars tend to 
concentrate on the federal draft that debuted in 1863, since this marked a turning point of 
centralized power in wartime and proved a lightning rod for Lincoln’s domestic enemies. Federal 
conscription, however, was one component of an overall effort to retain public support for 
volunteering. Historian Russell L. Johnson points out that scholarly “focus on conscription … 
oversimplifies the complicated process of manpower mobilization for the Union Army.”16 As I 
will show, government at all levels relied on community groups to meet their manpower needs, 
and this was a major aspect of the cruciality of states and localities during the war. Northerners 
connected recruitment at home with the battlefield, recognizing that progress in campaigning 
                                                 
13 Lincoln to Seymour, March 23, 1863, in Lincoln, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, ed. Roy P. Basler 
(New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1953-1955), 6: 145-146. 
14 Quoted in William C. Harris, Lincoln and the Border States: Preserving the Union (Lawrence: University Press of 
Kansas, 2011), 101. 
15 Maris A. Vinovskis, “Have Social Historians Lost the Civil War? Some Preliminary Demographic Speculations,” 
Journal of American History 76 (1989): 34-58. 
16 Russell L. Johnson, “‘Volunteer While You May: Manpower Mobilization in Dubuque, Iowa,” in Union Soldiers 
and the Northern Home Front: Wartime Experiences, Postwar Adjustments, ed. Paul A. Cimbala and Randall M. 
Miller (New York: Fordham University Press, 2002), 32. 
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depended on progress in troop raising. Greater federal oversight as the war ground on did not 
improve efficiency in mobilization, or at least recruitment, and states and smaller communities 
continued to guide efforts right up to the end in the spring of 1865.  
Issues of class and ethnicity, meanwhile, factored greatly in the work of mobilization. 
Questions of whether recruitment and the draft made it “a rich man’s war and a poor man’s 
fight”—a cliché that summarized class controversies in military service and continues to inform 
scholarship—and what form African Americans’ participation and their rewards should take, 
decisively influenced the northern war effort and postwar America. The evolution of the North’s 
war from a struggle to save the Union to one focusing on both the Union and emancipation was 
seen in, and partly guided by, mobilization. Many blacks and their white allies believed 
enlistment and service to the Union cemented black claims to civil rights. Rochester abolitionist 
and recruiter Frederick Douglass may have said it best: “Once let the black man get upon his 
person the brass letters U.S., let him get an eagle on his button, and a musket on his shoulder, 
and bullets in his pocket, and there is no power on the earth or under the earth that can deny that 
he has earned the right to citizenship.”17 But black service and citizenship faced bitter opposition 
from millions of conservative whites in New York and elsewhere. While a host of scholars have 
documented the North’s transition from a limited war for the Union into a “second American 
revolution,” the words and deeds of the Empire State’s white citizens reveal that preserving the 
republic remained their dominant war aim. In their eyes, African American emancipation and 
recruitment were mainly attractive as war-winning measures rather than moral imperatives.18 
                                                 
17 Frederick Douglass, “Speech of Mr. Frederick Douglass,” in Addresses of the Hon. W. D. Kelley, Miss Anna E. 
Dickinson, and Mr. Frederick Douglass, at a Mass Meeting, Held at National Hall, Philadelphia, July 6, 1863, for 
the Promotion of Colored Enlistments (Philadelphia: n. p., 1863). 
18 For the neo-abolitionist school emphasizing black freedom as a northern wartime principle, see for instance 
Kenneth M. Stampp, And the War Came: The North and the Secession Crisis (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State 
University Press, 1950); James M. McPherson, The Struggle for Equality: Abolitionists and the Negro in the Civil 
War and Reconstruction (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964); McPherson, Abraham Lincoln and the 
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The conflict saw Americans of all backgrounds make choices about whether and how to 
engage in the struggle; recruitment, with its appeals to both patriotic duty and self-interest, 
reflected this. Families and individuals constantly addressed the question of whether they owed 
service to the Union, while villages, towns, and cities faced the task of contributing sufficient 
men to preserve local honor and meet quotas. Together, these dilemmas brought the war home to 
northerners. The struggle to provide manpower and avoid draft-related turmoil became a cause 
rivaling the Union and emancipation in its importance to communities across the United States. 
“The greatest concern [of the entire war] was caused by the draft,” a German immigrant in New 
York City reflected at its end.19 Furthermore, policy failures in mobilization seriously hampered 
the war effort. Years afterward, no less an authority than General William T. Sherman identified 
recruitment and promotion practices as the worst mistakes the Union made during the war.20 
These facts underscore the vitality of recruitment in the North’s war, its outcome, and impact on 
citizens. While the Union Army and Navy fought a war to the south, northern citizens waged a 
conflict to secure sufficient manpower while preserving their autonomy. This dissertation 
examines that domestic conflict in New York.  
Historiography 
My research draws on, and reckons with, much scholarship on northern mobilization 
during the war. While relatively few historians have tackled Civil War recruitment directly, 
                                                 
Second American Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Chandra Manning, What This Cruel War 
Was Over: Soldiers, Slavery, and the Civil War (New York: Random House, 2007). My findings fall closer to those 
of Gary W. Gallagher in The Union War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2011). On the importance of 
the Union to northerners, see also Earl J. Hess, Liberty, Virtue, and Progress: Northerners and Their War for the 
Union (New York: New York University Press, 1988). 
19 Karl Wesslau to “Dear parents,” June 13, 1865, in Walter D. Kamphoefner and Wolfgang Johannes Helbich, eds., 
Germans in the Civil War: The Letters They Wrote Home, transl. Susan Carter Vogel (Chapel Hill: University of 
North Carolina Press, 2006), 71. 




together they present a large body of work touching on the roles of individuals and communities, 
their motivations, government growth, conscription, social change, and other topics relating to 
mobilization. The handful of works dealing with nationwide recruitment concentrate on the draft; 
supplementing these are many more military, state, community, and social histories 
incorporating manpower mobilization and its effects. If any general impressions can be taken 
from such disparate works, they might include the fact that scholarship on the entire war or the 
Union side of it tend to portray a federal government struggling to regulate state efforts, a 
process said to be well underway by the war’s end and necessary to Union success.  
A range of works have debated the extent of federal authority before the Civil War, or 
what Richard Franklin Bensel calls “the self-effacing antebellum state,” and how Washington 
came to exert centralized control by the late nineteenth century.21 Bensel actually dates the origin 
of robust central power to the immediate prewar era, arguing that the Republican Party swept the 
1860 elections by pledging to strengthen the national government into an entity capable of 
defeating southern secessionism. It is certainly clear that secession was facilitated by the 
impotence of the national government.22 But Brian Balogh and William J. Novak, among others, 
have argued that Washington exerted more power than traditionally believed, thanks in part (and 
perhaps paradoxically) to reliance on local groups. The “General Government,” Balogh argues, 
asserted power on the periphery of the national scene through patronage, foreign affairs, and the 
Postal Service. Furthermore, by supporting capitalism and laissez-faire (the same governing 
philosophy seen at the state level in New York), federal authorities “laid the legal groundwork 
                                                 
21 Howard G. Brown describes an earlier model for centralization in wartime in War, Revolution, and the 
Bureaucratic State (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995). On federal growth in the post-Civil War United States, see 
Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-
1920 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 
22 Richard Franklin Bensel, Yankee Leviathan: The Origins of Central State Authority in America, 1859-1877 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 17 (quote), 68-69, 85. 
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for a world inhabited by groups and associations … a world in which individuals increasingly 
exercised their political and economic preferences through groups.”23 These groups undertook 
much of the work in mobilization when the Civil War began. In four classic volumes on The War 
for the Union, Allan Nevins described the process by which northerners transformed their 
unsuccessful “improvised war” of 1861 into the triumphant “organized war” of 1865.24 One area 
in which national power undoubtedly gained sway was supply contracting. As Mark R. Wilson 
shows in The Business of Civil War, state governments tried to assert control over military 
contracting and purchasing, but the Department of War assumed much authority over the course 
of the conflict.25 Historians like Fred A. Shannon, Herman Hattaway, Archer Jones, and James 
M. McPherson have argued that predominantly decentralized government—adherence to states’ 
rights—weakened the Union’s war effort.26 These scholars believe the Confederacy, with its 
earlier, more draconian conscription and long service terms for soldiers, among other policies, 
enjoyed an advantage in mobilization that partially compensated for its inferior resources. 
“These methods,” Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones assert, “made the Confederate war effort 
better mobilized and more effectually directed than that of the Union where civil and states-
rights traditions more constantly impeded dedication to the Union.” Hattaway and Jones follow 
Fred A. Shannon in decrying the supposed poor job of the individual northern states in 
recruitment.27  
                                                 
23 Balogh, A Government Out of Sight, 11-13, 15 (quote); William J. Novak, “The Myth of the ‘Weak’ American 
State,” Journal of American History 113 (2008): 752-772. 
24 Allan Nevins, The War for the Union, 4 vols. (New York: Scribner, 1959-1971). 
25 Mark R. Wilson, The Business of Civil War: Military Mobilization and the State, 1861-1865 (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 2006). 
26 Fred A. Shannon, The Organization and Administration of the Union Army, 1861-1865, 2 vols. (Cleveland: Arthur 
H. Clark, 1928); Shannon, “States Rights and the Union Army,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review 12 (1925): 51-
71; Herman Hattaway and Archer Jones, How the North Won: A Military History of the Civil War (Urbana: 
University of Illinois Press, 1983); James M. McPherson, Ordeal by Fire: The Civil War and Reconstruction, 4th ed. 
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 2010), 204. 
27 Hattaway and Jones, How the North Won, 273, 699-700 (quote), 721. 
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Some studies have cited the Enrollment Act of 1863—the basis for federal conscription—
as a major departure in American mobilization that ceded power from states and localities to 
national authorities.28 The federal draft is often seen as a particularly obvious example of how 
the Civil War brought about such centralization. Scholarship on northern mobilization under the 
Enrollment Act has centered on whether it worked, whether it made Union efforts “a rich man’s 
war and a poor man’s fight,” and the degree to which it represented a shift to federal over state 
power. Historians of the draft writing since the Centennial years have generally agreed that 
despite its grotesque inefficiencies and opportunities for corruption, the draft succeeded by 
raising a decisive force of over one million troops, almost entirely volunteers.29 While some have 
cast the draft controversy as a states’ rights issue, Rachel Shelden used New York politics as a 
case study to demonstrate that conscription in 1863 was not a straightforward story of federal 
authority taking control over war making from the states and thus paving the way toward the 
modern, centralized nation. Rather, the Enrollment Act grew out of “vertical political 
relationships” between members of the national, state, and local governments. Lincoln’s 
administration assumed greater war powers, most notably national conscription, thanks in large 
part to a long campaign by influential figures at the state level and lower who believed that 
                                                 
28 See for instance Alan R. Millett, Peter Maslowski, and William B. Feis, For the Common Defense: A Military 
History of the United States from 1607 to 2012, 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press, 2012), 187. 
29 For studies of the federal draft making these arguments, see Murdock, Patriotism Limited; Murdock, One Million 
Men; Hattaway and Jones, How the North Won; Geary, We Need Men; McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom; Russell 
F. Weigley, A Great Civil War: A Military and Political History, 1861-1865 (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2000); Edward K. Spann, Gotham at War: New York City, 1860-1865 (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 
2002); Tyler Anbinder, “Which Poor Man’s Fight? Immigrants and the Federal Conscription of 1863,” Civil War 
History 52 (2006): 344-372. Weigley, however, has a less favorable view of some of the Enrollment Act’s 
provisions than some of these other writers. “In 1863,” he asserts, “substitution and commutation were not only 
invidious; they made no military sense whatever.” Weigley, A Great Civil War: A Military and Political History, 
1861-1865. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), 235. 
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victory depended on raising large armies. These men leveraged Washington officials into 
enacting a draft law.30  
This dissertation demonstrates that federal regulation was often intended to preserve state 
and local roles in mobilization, while greater central oversight did not improve efforts as the war 
went on. Meanwhile, individual choices and community endeavors guided recruitment 
throughout the conflict, for better and for worse. My scholarship draws on and supplements an 
important work of cultural history by J. Matthew Gallman, a leading authority on the northern 
home front. In Defining Duty in the Civil War, he describes how “the Union depended on the 
same sort of market forces that had driven growth and expansion in the antebellum years. 
Military and economic policies depended on northern citizens weighing options and making 
choices.”31 Federal and state authorities initially had no will or means to call out every available 
man. Furthermore, the United States, unlike the Confederacy, was not at great risk of attack, and 
opposition to the war was considerable. For all these reasons, mobilization had to be a matter of 
individual and communal choice until the war’s second summer (with the passing of the Militia 
Act) and remained so to a large degree until the end. The Enrollment Act, among other federal 
initiatives, placed much of the responsibility of troop-raising in state and community hands and 
retained the voluntary principle to a large degree. 
Individuals, of course, based their choices on self-interest. In Democracy in America, 
Alexis de Tocqueville described a uniquely American concept of self-interest. According to 
Tocqueville, self-interest was an eminently pragmatic virtue. By working for their own good, 
citizens improved society while undergoing a minimal amount of personal inconvenience. 
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Americans, he explained, “obligingly demonstrate how enlightened love of themselves regularly 
leads them to help one another out and makes them ready and willing to sacrifice a portion of 
their time and wealth for the good of the state.” Americans prided themselves on their ability to 
intertwine patriotism with self-interest. Tocqueville asserted that citizens of all classes 
subscribed to this unique virtue and had made it universal: “It lies at the root of all action. It 
crops up in everything Americans say.”32 Choice and self-interest figured greatly in Civil War 
mobilization. The tradition of compulsory militia service had faded away by 1861 (one reason 
why its projected reappearance in the Militia Act of the next year made that law momentous), 
and Americans were free to decide whether and how to serve. Militia tours of duty were short 
and volunteer terms based on a set length of time (usually varying from nine months to three 
years) rather than the war’s duration. New York soldiers staged numerous mutinies in the first 
half of the war when federal officials reneged on what the men saw as their contracted terms of 
service. Volunteers could choose their regiment and branch of the military, and so could draftees 
from 1864 on.  
These decisions held great importance, and many men chose to remain civilians if their 
preferred rank or branch of service was unavailable. Few historians have appreciated how much 
care most enlistees placed in choosing their units. As Russell L. Johnson argues, potential 
recruits conceptually divided the branches of the service into different jobs to be weighed against 
each other, in addition to the better-known motivation to join a company with one’s relatives and 
friends.33 In 1863, recruiters across New York began an impromptu media campaign promising 
potential soldiers safe and comfortable duty in specific branches and regiments—promises that 
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led to turmoil when they crumbled in the face of military necessity. My research also reveals that 
soldiers overwhelmingly supported mass mobilization, calling for a more comprehensive draft 
and for northern men to join them at the front. But many of these same soldiers urged their 
friends and relatives to reject such calls and remain civilians. In February 1865, a Rochester 
newspaper printed a letter from George Breck, an artillery officer who had seen much combat. 
“Come, good, loyal friends of Rochester,” Breck exhorted his readers, “come, fill up the ranks, 
step to the music of the Union, and don’t delay for the draft …” One week later, however, Breck 
wrote his wife after learning a loved one might be drafted, vowing to purchase a substitute for 
him or resign and reenlist as a substitute himself, adding “I am in earnest. Frank shan’t come to 
the war if I can help it.”34  
New York’s small African American communities likewise grounded their wartime 
experiences in personal choice and reciprocity. Many expressed no interest in fighting a war to 
restore a Union that sanctioned slavery and otherwise denied them civil rights. When black 
regiments were finally authorized in the northern states, recruitment went poorly in New York 
until federal officers and well-connected civilian associations injected more system into it. James 
Kettner has shown that the American model of citizenship, which was still developing in the 
mid-nineteenth century, grew out of beliefs that the “tie between the individual and community 
was contractual and volitional, not natural and perpetual.”35 Americans, especially in the 
democratic, free-market North, pridefully guarded their right to choose how they would 
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participate in society and expected fair treatment from government and society in exchange for 
participating. Public responses to mobilization reflected this American concept of citizenship. 
Fred A. Shannon pointed to community attempts to avoid the draft as bringing a 
“mercenary factor” into the army’s organization from 1863 on.36 There is much evidence 
supporting Shannon’s contention, which was widely held by Americans who lived through the 
Civil War. They often assumed that sharp distinctions existed in motivation and reliability 
between men who enlisted in the war’s first two years and those who signed on in 1863 and 
afterward, and historians have commonly reinforced these distinctions. The men of 1861 and 
1862 were mainly guided by patriotism and a spirit of adventure, the story goes, while those who 
came after the advent of national conscription were often little better than cowardly mercenaries. 
It is commonly believed that from first to last, the conflict rested on the shoulders of early-war 
volunteers rather than the motley masses of later conscripts and volunteers attracted by high 
bounties.37  
These stereotypes are grounded in some truth but obscure the complications of 
recruitment and motivation, which usually intertwined patriotism with a range of prosaic 
motives. The story of military recruitment in the Civil War is one of patriotism and financial 
security intertwined. This is seen most vividly in the great importance of aid funds for soldiers’ 
families. Historians most often concentrate on bounties, commutation, and bonds in discussing 
the monetary aspects of mobilization, but family aid was an early and just as crucial component 
                                                 
36 Fred A. Shannon, “The Mercenary Factor in the Creation of the Union Army,” Mississippi Valley Historical 
Review 12 (1926): 523-549; Shannon, The Organization and Administration of the Union Army, 1861-1865; 
Shannon, “States Rights and the Union Army.” 
37 See for instance James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1988), 606; McPherson, For Cause and Comrades: Why Men Fought in the Civil War (New York and 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 8-9, 101-102. Eugene C. Murdock claims that with the advent of the 
Enrollment Act in 1863, the “‘love of country’ boys of 1861-62 had now given way to those who had to be bribed 
with bounties before they would enlist,” men he designates as “‘love of money’” volunteers …” Murdock, 
Patriotism Limited, 16. 
17 
 
in attracting men to the colors.38 “Young men, without families, hardy, vigorous, and brave, … 
who can go without disregarding obligations hardly less sacred than those due to their country,” 
should volunteer first, opined an editor in Herkimer, New York, two days after Lincoln’s first 
troop call, but in fact many of those composing the first waves of enlistees were family men.39 
Voluntary aid societies and limited government welfare (mainly for public education) were 
defining institutions for New Yorkers in the era, and from the earliest days of mobilization they 
recognized that assurance of support for soldiers’ families would be vital for raising a large 
volunteer army. Family relief was a major concern that grew to encompass countless small and 
large agencies and, as some historians argue, contributed to the growth of federal welfare 
policy.40 Richard F. Miller argues that state and local aid societies have received short shrift in 
historiography compared to the national organizations that historians often cite to support the 
centralization thesis.41 Despite popular and scholarly belief, Union recruitment from the war’s 
beginning was colored by financial reward, however meagre, and it was linked to the national 
cause.  
There is no denying, however, that recruitment did involve a “mercenary factor” that 
became pronounced from 1863 on. Three books by Eugene C. Murdock concentrated on the 
details of that evolution (or devolution) in manpower procurement and what it looked like on the 
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ground. Examining recruitment and the operations of the Provost Marshal General’s Bureau in 
Ohio, New York, and the entire Union, Murdock chronicled the policies and lurid violations that 
had inspired the notion of “a rich man’s war and a poor man’s fight,” such as draft commutation, 
substitution, and growing enlistment bounties. He concluded, however, that it was not 
exclusively a “poor man’s fight;” paying commutation to avoid the draft, for instance, was 
available to all classes.42 James W. Geary agreed with Murdock and disputed other scholars, 
such as W. P. Rorabaugh, who believed recruitment and the draft primarily brought in the social 
and economically disadvantaged. But Geary injects complications by showing that the draft was 
an important element in “determining the type of recruit who entered the Union army after the 
midpoint of the war.” More older and higher-status men enlisted in late 1864 after commutation 
was repealed and in areas where substitutes were not readily available.43  
Other authors have tackled the weighty topic of class in mobilization. James M. 
McPherson’s data led him to conclude that Civil War armies were not disproportionately 
working-class but generally reflected the social makeup of their societies.44 Yet McPherson hits 
on a matter of great concern for wartime New Yorkers when he observes, “The half-billion 
dollars paid in bounties by the North represented something of a transfer of wealth from rich to 
poor.”45 Enlistment bounties were a powerful weapon in the battle for recruits, and communities 
from the war’s second year on competed with one another to offer the highest local bounties and 
thereby meet their quotas with volunteers. Russell L. Johnson’s community study of wartime 
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Dubuque, Iowa, reveals: “The recruiting system in Dubuque passed through a series of phases—
voluntarism, coercion, controlled market, and free market. In each phase, local war supporters 
placed emphasis on pushing working and poor people into the army.”46 While I have not found 
such distinct phases in my own research into New York, the situation there for most of the war 
fit into Johnson’s second observation. The fervent patriotism of citizens in nearly every city and 
town at the war’s outbreak led them to call for an all-out commitment to save the Union. As 
early as the fall of 1861, recruiters shifted to targeting manual laborers and the unemployed. New 
York civilians largely accepted this and called on monied people to contribute to the cause 
through funds while those less well-off shouldered muskets. Soldiers, on the other hand, wanted 
everyone (except their own family and friends) to join them in the ranks and expressed anger at 
times when only social misfits and the poor seemed to be doing so. The summer and fall of 1862 
saw renewed appeals for volunteers across the socioeconomic strata, but thereafter the focus 
shifted back to the working classes and poor. Class analysis of New York servicemen is beyond 
the scope of this dissertation. Whether accurate or not, however, the impression was widespread, 
especially by 1864, that recruits largely came from the poorer segments of the northern 
population. The shocking, widespread corruption of civilian recruiting agents and collusion from 
officers and civilians at all levels of authority brought countless unfit men and boys into the 
Union ranks; filling quotas and gaining enlistment credits overtook larger war aims in the minds 
of too many northerners. I argue that the continuation and exacerbation of this fraud belonged to 
the overall trend among New Yorkers to keep mobilization a matter of choice: rather than 
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enforce a comprehensive draft, they looked to unscrupulous officers and middle-men and opened 
the ranks to virtually anyone willing to serve.  
Here my work partially belongs to a “dark” or “antiwar turn” in Civil War studies.47 
“Sacrifice Is Out. Selfishness Is In,” as Stephen Berry has characterized this trend, which is part 
of a larger “new revisionism” and inspired by the post-9/11 atmosphere of incessant war and 
partisanship. Berry observes that many scholars are dropping time-honored interpretations of the 
Civil War in favor of “a war with fewer heroes and victims, more opportunists, unintended 
consequences, and mixed motives.”48 The new revisionists seek to overturn older, celebratory 
interpretations of the war by emphasizing selfishness among its actors and the vast suffering the 
war caused.49 There is much of merit in the new revisionism, but their discounting of ideology is 
not entirely borne out in the people I researched for this project. New Yorkers certainly viewed 
the war and mobilization as matters of choice and self-interest, but this attitude was inextricably 
bound up in devotion to American democracy and the Union. It is also worth remembering that 
many of them were only marginally affected by the war’s transformations and devastation. 
Loyalty to their communities vied with patriotism in the minds of northern citizens. 
Geary differed with Shannon and Murdock, who viewed local pride as a potent entity for 
communities during the entire war, in arguing that local pride and disgrace associated with 
drafting faded away “once quotas were assigned on a district [instead of community] basis with 
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the Enrollment Act” of March 1863.50 J. Matthew Gallman, viewing conscription through the 
lens of popular culture, has complicated this notion. Gallman identifies a “paradox” of self-
interest and community spirit. From 1863 on, northerners interpreted their responsibilities in the 
war effort as no longer involving an individual obligation, but in finding someone to serve—not 
necessarily themselves or family members—thereby helping their communities avoid a shameful 
draft.51 Widespread mockery of draft evaders in late 1862, Gallman argues, indicates that 
northerners thought “the man who cooperated with the enrolling officers and waited patiently to 
see if his name had been called was a truly patriotic citizen.” This attitude—which foreshadowed 
principles behind the adoption of Selective Service in 1917—changed with the advent of the 
Enrollment Act and more overt resistance, at which point criticism from draft supporters became 
more bitter. But Union loyalists remained committed to personal choice. “The specter of 
conscription did not eliminate that free choice,” Gallman writes of prevalent attitudes in 1863, “it 
simply shifted the ground on which the good citizen must reconsider decisions.”52 New Yorkers’ 
policies, rhetoric, and actions indicate that community pride remained crucial throughout the 
war. Governor Edwin D. Morgan established a policy of recruitment by senatorial districts in the 
summer of 1862, and populations and recruiting committees in each district worked energetically 
to raise the “senatorial district regiments” assigned them. Furthermore, New Yorkers expressed 
concern for community honor until the end of the war and beyond to the postwar era of memorial 
statues and local war histories. Local pride led citizens to celebrate when they met their quotas 
and express mortification when they did not, but also to expect justice when they thought state 
and national authorities demanded too much of their communities. 
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Community and social histories document an array of efforts among individuals and 
groups on the northern home front to hold onto autonomy as the Union asked them for more and 
more commitment. In his work on the growth of Springfield, Massachusetts, Michael H. Frisch 
asserts: “The complex business of meeting the quotas was the war’s most direct manifestation, 
reaching deeply into almost every aspect of community life.”53 It is, in fact, possible to see the 
whole history of Civil War mobilization as a series of concentric struggles for authority between 
levels of government, communities, and individuals, all of them involved in the war to varying 
extent but having different and evolving interests along with their common interest in winning 
the war. Important works on the Union governors by William B. Hesseltine and Stephen D. 
Engle, a handful of state histories published in recent years, and the voluminous correspondence 
between state and federal officials in the War Department’s published records have all helped me 
come to grips with the vital but often thorny relationships between governors and Lincoln’s 
administration and between state governments and their citizens.54 In his massive Gathering to 
Save a Nation, Engle exhaustively tracks the interactions of Lincoln’s government with the 
governors to show that leaders on both sides of these exchanges recognized and supported states’ 
extensive authority in prosecuting the Union’s war. He chronicles governors’ activities in 
commanding their state militias and working with Lincoln to answer troop calls on their states. In 
a twist to long-established wisdom, Engle argues for an expansion of both federal and state 
power during the war and believes governors’ work on behalf of the Union helped spur a new 
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nationalism.55 My research into the papers of New York’s three wartime governors—Edwin D. 
Morgan, Horatio Seymour, and Reuben E. Fenton—as well as their correspondence in the 
Official Records supports the notion that governors retained considerable influence throughout 
the war. While New York State’s war years have not received extensive recent study, I have 
benefited from older works belonging to the sphere of traditional political history, along with 
dissertations and several studies of nineteenth-century community growth, in fleshing out how 
New Yorkers experienced the conflict.56 
Among the array of community histories appearing in the 1960’s through 1980’s, 
Frisch’s work was rare in giving full attention to the impact of the Civil War. In recent decades, 
however, a host of community studies have expanded our knowledge of how ordinary people 
experienced the war. Phillip Shaw Paludan led the way with “A People’s Contest.” This 
groundbreaking work examines northern society, underscoring the importance of self-
government and communities to mid-nineteenth-century northerners, and portrays the war as a 
force for major social change. A great many regional and community histories have appeared 
since the release of Paludan’s book. Dominated initially by work on cities, the field has widened 
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since to include the types of smaller towns and villages in which most mid-nineteenth-century 
Americans lived.57 As it had for decades beforehand, the city at the mouth of the Hudson exerted 
great influence in the war. New York City contributed massive resources of men, money, and 
materiel to the Union, drew endless attention from the authorities, and almost functioned as its 
own state. Several historians have enhanced our understanding of how Gotham’s diverse 
neighborhoods answered and resisted the challenges of mobilization.58 But J. Matthew Gallman 
makes a convincing case in his studies of the northern home front and wartime Philadelphia that 
the Civil War did not bring about drastic change.59 My dissertation mainly supports Gallman’s 
conclusion—many New Yorkers, forgoing enlistment or other sacrifice, did not see their lives 
transformed by the great conflict in any meaningful way—but reiterates the cruciality of 
communities large and small to the process of raising troops.  
As I will demonstrate, it was the voluntary associations that residents formed within their 
communities that really deserve the lion’s share of credit for providing men and meeting quotas. 
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Communities and voluntary associations are key to understanding the North’s slow, chaotic, and 
decentralized learning curve in mobilizing for the largest war Americans had ever seen. The 
antebellum reform spirit combined with localism and weak government infrastructure to cause a 
proliferation of community-based committees and other volunteer groups for firefighting, poor 
relief, temperance, and virtually every other need except the mails. As one historian explains: 
“When the need arose to accomplish some project of general importance in the nineteenth 
century, Americans most likely formed an association” instead of turning to government.60 
(Although political clubs were one of the most common forms of association.) Tocqueville 
identified such groups as the source and sustaining power of American democracy.61 Some 
scholars have long interpreted voluntary associations as a rejection of government and unbound 
by nationwide organization. Others, however, argue that associations “grew parallel to the 
institutions of national republican government” in the mid-to-late nineteenth century and “were 
not just scattered local creations, but were linked into well-institutionalized national networks. 
…” Increased governmental reach as a result of the Civil War was a major impetus for this 
trend.62  
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The burden of procuring manpower and other resources fell largely on state and local 
governments, who in turn relied on community leaders to organize their neighbors for the cause. 
Most community associations were just as committed to local needs as they were to the Union; 
often these loyalties combined in the minds of members as they strove to answer the call, but 
associations could prioritize their community over the nation as well. President Lincoln’s 
characterization of the Union war effort early on as “essentially a people’s contest” was perhaps 
more perceptive than he knew, summarizing the way northerners waged the war as well as their 
goal of saving democracy.63 To a large extent, it was war by committee.  
Here as in other aspects of nineteenth-century public life, New Yorkers led the way, and 
their experiences demonstrated how reliance on voluntarism both hampered and saved the Union 
cause. Northern mobilization saw a combination and clash of government, community, and 
individual interests, many of which had formed before the war began. Associational culture 
shaped mobilization from the war’s beginning to its end. On April 16, 1861, the day after 
Lincoln called on Americans for seventy-five thousand militia to put down the rebellion, 
Manhattan attorney George T. Strong gathered with several acquaintances at the New York 
Club. “Our talk was of war,” he noted, and Strong added his name to a subscription fund for 
equipping a militia regiment and a roster for a “projected Rifle Corps.” Strong and his circle did 
what came naturally to them: knowing that government and military forces were inadequate in 
the crisis, they stepped in to volunteer their money and services.64 Three and a half years later 
and roughly four hundred miles to the west, the provost marshal district comprising Erie County 
was threatened with a draft. The Sixty-Fifth New York National Guard—a German-American 
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militia regiment based in Buffalo—volunteered for one year’s federal service, completing the 
county’s quota and saving its residents from a hated draft. The federalized Sixty-Fifth was 
almost immediately dispatched to Virginia and went into its first battle within weeks of 
mustering into service, many of its men loading their muskets for the first time as they advanced 
toward the enemy.65 The services that voluntary associations like the New York Club and 
National Guard regiments provided often were amateurish and fell short of needs, but they filled 
gaps that government could not, and New Yorkers and their fellow northerners experienced the 
war to a large degree through these groups and the communities they helped form. 
Voluntary associations drew much of their membership from middle and upper-class 
women. The scholarship on northern women in the war years is large and vibrant, but only 
recently has the directly consequential role they played in recruitment been explored in any 
depth. Historians agree that the importance of widespread ideological support in the Union and 
Confederacy made the Civil War a milestone for American women, who claimed new spaces as 
a result, but what was the nature of that milestone and those spaces? Americans of the 1860s 
placed great reliance on the need for home and family to nurture good citizens, which enlarged 
the influence of women as wives, mothers, and guardians of morality.66 Females also exerted an 
impact they had gained with the market revolution, enjoying greater say as breadwinners with 
the growth of dairy farming, for instance.67 Historians estimate that ten thousand women’s aid 
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organizations assisted the Union cause during the war as they filled essential posts outside the 
home.68  
Yet Judith Giesberg’s research on female reformers and on working-class women in 
wartime Massachusetts and Pennsylvania indicates that the war was primarily a localized affair 
for northern females. Many women were caught up in the patriotic fervor of 1861 as much as 
men, and many more felt the effects of large-scale mobilization, sometimes including suffering 
and displacement when husbands and sons went to war.69 They were critical components of the 
war effort despite most of them not engaging in the public spheres of activism and politics. From 
their kitchens, fields, and desks, women kept their homes and farms running and produced 
writings that alternated enthusiastic support for the Union cause with strong criticism when the 
war appeared to demand too much of their families.70 Giesberg and Nina Silber show that 
northern women were increasingly valued for their commitment to the “expanding nation-state,” 
but that those who actively supported the war effort realized “that the war, and their government, 
demanded their allegiance more than it encouraged their critical interaction.”71 Working-class 
women’s opposition to the draft from 1862 on laid them open to criticism from the larger society 
and unfavorable comparisons with the supposedly more devoted women of the Confederacy.72 
Despite the multitude of roles they assumed, female reform work was not drastically changed by 
the war—in part thanks to men’s unwillingness to cede authority—and women did not win 
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greater freedoms beyond what Silber calls their “new civic identity.”73 However, the experiences 
of New Yorkers indicate that female influence in mobilization was largely welcomed, 
widespread, and not the preserve of middle-class literati. From the first days of recruitment, 
women frequently led the way in gathering family relief funds for recruits. To an unknown 
extent, women also shamed their male relatives and acquaintances into enlisting or pressured 
them to stay at home. 
The Civil War wrought great disruption to New York State—even though many New 
Yorkers avoided or minimized their involvement. Over four hundred thousand men were 
credited to the state on Union muster rolls, communities drove their citizens into debt to finance 
enlistment bounties and commutation, and the economy dipped, then surged thanks to war-
related turmoil. These changes did not last, however, and neither did most of the sites and 
memories of New York’s mobilization. “The persistent, irreversible disappearance of New 
York’s scarce but meaningful Civil War sites,” Harold Holzer reflected in 2002, “has made it 
easier for twenty-first century Americans to all but ignore the state that raised so many of the 
soldiers, and provided so much of the wealth to sustain them.”74 New York’s role in the great 
conflict deserves to be remembered. In particular, recruitment in the state is a story of a localized 
but patriotic people determined to preserve their autonomy even as they responded to a national 
crisis and government called on their aid. It is a story worth resurrecting for what it can tell us 
about the Americans who experienced the nation’s deadliest conflict. 
Chapters 
Chapter One introduces the reader to New Yorkers in early 1861 and the divisions 
marking their society. The Empire State was a place of large population, great diversity, and 
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economic wealth. All citizens had become connected through the market economy, widespread 
literacy, and common concern over sectional tensions between North and South. New York was 
in flux, however, as these developments inspired extensive dislocation and class conflict. Young 
families and unattached men moved away. Marginalized laborers and small farmers pushed back 
against capitalist exploitation. Ethnic groups increasingly insulated themselves from one another. 
Republicans, Democrats, and abolitionists argued over whether the Southern “Slave Power” 
posed a threat to northern free labor and, if so, how to meet it. In a world of decentralized 
authority, citizens revered their state and nation but most often looked to voluntary associations, 
community leaders, and local politics in addressing their needs. At the same time, however, New 
Yorkers stood transfixed by worsening tensions between the slave and free states. Governor 
Edwin D. Morgan, a Republican Party leader, voiced a majority opinion among the state’s 
residents when, in the Secession Winter of 1860-1861, he urged Washington officials to seek 
peace with the breakaway southern states while still preparing to uphold United States law. 
Chapter Two describes the frenzied martial atmosphere when mobilization began after 
the Confederate attack on Fort Sumter and lays out the process of volunteering. Tensions quickly 
developed between Lincoln’s administration and that of Morgan over authority and 
responsibility in calling out New York’s militia and volunteers. Morgan was constantly 
frustrated by what he viewed as interference and incompetence when Lincoln and the War 
Department bypassed the state to appoint commanders for New York troops. Both nation and 
state, however, depended on the huge outpouring of popular and associational support for 
mobilization. The governor and his military staff were alternately sustained and stymied by the 
committee-forming and associational impulses that resulted, most prominently, in New York 
City’s Union Defense Committee. While such bodies diluted authority, they also filled gaps in 
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recruitment and other necessities of mobilization. Given the weakness of established federal and 
state military forces and the formidability of the Confederacy, many New Yorkers argued the 
North could only triumph quickly by raising large forces. The volunteer impulse ruled the hour 
and possibly kept the Union cause alive in those anxious early-war days. 
Chapter Three recounts myriad conflicts between the Union’s new soldiers and their 
military and civilian leaders. New York volunteers, as good republicans, entered service upon 
certain conditions and expected authorities to meet their obligations. When Washington or 
Albany failed to follow through by not supplying the soldiers properly or holding them to longer 
enlistments, volunteering slowed and troops protested. The war’s first full year also witnessed 
controversies and tensions over which groups would be allowed to serve in this new people’s 
army. Women and girls had expected roles to perform in mobilization and recruitment: they 
inspired their male relatives and friends to volunteer and often led fundraising efforts for soldier 
and family relief societies. But females had autonomy as well and sometimes discouraged 
service. The very visible outpouring of enthusiasm at the war’s beginning obscured the fact that 
New Yorkers were guided by self-interest as well as patriotism and reserved the right to choose 
their level of involvement in the war. Morgan’s energetic dedication to answering the country’s 
call while safeguarding the rights of his state continued after the disaster at Bull Run. The 
governor worked with Lincoln’s administration to introduce greater efficiency in recruitment and 
logistics, only to be met with a new crisis in mid-1862. 
 In Chapter Four, we see New Yorkers respond to major battlefield setbacks with a new 
surge of volunteering and demands for greater efficiency in mobilization. Lincoln’s 
administration called for enormous reinforcements, prompting Morgan to reorganize his state’s 
recruiting by offering an enlistment bounty and placing responsibilities in the hands of senatorial 
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district committees. In July and August, communities around New York came together at rallies 
and in committees to redouble popular support for the Union cause and meet the need for troops, 
an impulse captured in the popular poem and song “Three Hundred Thousand More.” Officials 
and recruiters emphasized filling up regiments in the field rather than organizing new ones; this 
policy achieved only modest success thanks to the decentralized nature of recruitment, and 
attrition continued to exact a heavy toll on the army. Civilians and soldiers alike believed large 
reinforcements would allow the Union to finally win the war, and the summer and fall of 1862 
saw rising recruitment fraud and competition between officers and communities. A growing 
chorus of northerners urged opening enlistment to African Americans and granting them 
freedom, but these proposals received bitter opposition from conservative Democrats. As 
casualties mounted and a draft appeared on the horizon, Irish-Americans increasingly rejected 
calls to enlist and become cannon fodder. Tensions like these and an improving economy 
ultimately caused New York to fall short of its volunteer quotas that year despite all the efforts at 
injecting more organization and popular enthusiasm into the war effort. 
 The paradox of conscription and acceptance of limited mobilization marked New York’s 
recruitment by 1863, as recounted in Chapter Five. The large recruiting drive in the fall and fall 
of 1862 had been inspired in part by the Militia Act passed that August, which opened the door 
to limited conscription. New York adopted an enrollment plan for military-age men based on 
War Department guidelines. Enrollment spawned widespread anxiety and complications about 
discrepancies in data and who was exempt under state and federal law. By the late fall, however, 
volunteering had gathered steam (thanks in part to fears of a draft), and Albany officials were 
able to postpone the state draft until after the new year. Discontent over battlefield failures and 
Lincoln’s policies of conscription, curbing dissent, and emancipating southern slaves had broken 
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the spirit of cooperation between administration supporters and opponents and caused 
resounding Democratic victories in the November elections. Horatio Seymour assumed the 
governorship of New York in January 1863 determined to raise enough volunteers to avoid a 
hated draft. The year saw state and federal officials offer larger bounties and a range of other 
enticements to secure enlistments and reenlistments. At the same time, the Provost Marshal 
General’s Bureau undertook a new national enrollment mandated by the Enrollment Act. This 
legislation authorized the first federal draft in United States history but provided many 
mechanisms for decentralized control and encouraging volunteering; Americans remained 
wedded to localism and individual choice in mobilization. Feverish efforts to meet state and local 
quotas with volunteers inspired reckless enlistment fraud that swept in the unfit and men enlisted 
under false pretences. But the draft came that summer anyway, and the New York City Draft 
Riots in July sent a chill through the North. Communities intensified their efforts to secure 
volunteers and avoid having to draft their citizens. Thus, the Enrollment Act worked much as it 
was intended to. Federal conscription and northerners’ responses demonstrated widespread 
support for maintaining a voluntary war effort. 
 Chapter Six tells stories of desperation, corruption, and hope in the final eighteen months 
of the war. Determined to avoid mass coercion in the war effort, New Yorkers accepted a variety 
of legal and illegal methods for meeting manpower quotas without drafting. The War 
Department and state officials encouraged veterans to reenlist, while black and white civilian 
association finally sidestepped Seymour’s opposition to recruitment of black troops in New 
York. The enlistment and outstanding service of black New Yorkers inspired war supporters and 
helped fill quotas, but unequal treatment in the Union Army undermined further African 
American recruitment. Eighteen sixty-four dealt more setbacks to idealism as brokers and 
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unscrupulous recruiting officers perpetrated fraud on a wide scale, bringing countless unfit and 
unreliable men and boys into the ranks. Emphasis on meeting numbers over quality or 
preparation of recruits brought thousands of reinforcements into the ranks in time for the spring 
1864 campaigns. Relentless fighting from May onward highlighted these serious defects in 
northern mobilization and prompted a new call for troops in July. Communities and committees 
either indebted themselves to raise unprecedented bounties or tried to get their quotas reduced 
with credits from previous enlistments. These efforts paid off as the state exceeded its quota. 
Even as the war turned firmly in the North’s favor in late 1864 and early 1865, New Yorkers 
reacted with apathy and angst as federal authorities hit them with yet more troop quotas. 
Concerns over mobilization persisted right up to the date when the War Department halted 
















“INTERESTS THE MOST VARIED AND HOPES THE MOST EXALTED”:  
NEW YORKERS ON THE EVE OF THE CIVIL WAR 
 
Wednesday, January 2, 1861, was the second day of the Eighty-Fourth New York State 
Legislature. The 160 members of the Senate and Assembly met in their respective chambers in 
Albany’s Capitol building at 11 A.M. Both houses took care of preliminary business before 
settling in for a lengthy and important ritual: the reading of the governor’s annual message to the 
Legislature.1 Governor Edwin D. Morgan’s private secretary, Lockwood L. Doty, delivered 
copies to both houses, where the address was then read aloud by the clerks, James Terwilliger in 
the Senate and Hanson A. Risley in the Assembly.2 Annual messages reviewed state and national 
affairs, explained a governor’s policies, and recommended specific actions on the part of the 
Legislature. But the annual message to be delivered this day was especially important, for 
everyone knew 1861 would be a year of high drama. 
Morgan began his long, eloquent, and wide-ranging address with a nod to current events. 
“You have met under circumstances of more than usual interest,” he told his audience.3 Two 
months earlier, the most intense political campaign in living memory had resulted in Morgan’s 
reelection and given the presidency to another, more controversial Republican. The election of 
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Abraham Lincoln had prompted several southern states to call secession conventions, and on 
December 20, South Carolina seceded from the Union. Other Deep South states were sure to 
follow. Disunion gave New York’s political leaders ample cause for alarm. Not only did 
secession threaten to destroy the republic they loved; it also damaged their state’s economy. New 
York City relied heavily on its cotton trade with the South, and the sectional crisis had caused 
economic panic in the nation’s largest city—a wave of business failures and layoffs that was 
spreading to other cities.4Already, in the first months of a struggle that would last more than four 
years, patriotic and practical concerns melded in the minds of New Yorkers. As merchant-
turned-governor Morgan reminded the legislators: “[Y]ou represent the sovereignty of the State 
of New York, the noblest, the grandest commonwealth that ever had existence; an empire of 
nearly four millions of people, imperial in all its proportions, with interests the most varied and 
hopes the most exalted.”5  
 The governor had good reason to extol his state. New York was the wealthiest and most 
populous of the United States and had been for several decades. In fact, the wealth and population 
of the Empire State made it both outstanding and typical among American states and especially 
crucial in national events.6 New York in early 1861 was the Union writ small: a province of 
mounting economic and social diversity whose residents did indeed have varied interests and 
exalted hopes.   
“Let us each recollect that the people are the source of all political power, that their will is 
the simple and safe rule of our conduct,” Morgan noted early in his address.7 The most important 
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aspect of any era in history is the humanity involved, and this would hold true in the coming Civil 
War, when procuring sufficient manpower would loom as the single greatest wartime issue for 
New Yorkers. The 1860 census counted over 3,800,000 people in New York, nearly a million more 
than lived in the next most populous state, Pennsylvania. New York boasted the nation’s largest 
city, of course, but also its third largest, Brooklyn (then a separate city); New York City and 
Brooklyn combined surpassed one million people. Also stunning was the rate of the state’s 
population growth: eleven fold since 1790 and a double increase since 1830, a greater growth rate 
than seen by the nation as a whole.8 In the five years ending in 1860, the number of New Yorkers 
had grown by over four hundred thousand.9 Settlements large and small felt the population boom; 
what had been the little town of Buffalo in 1810 was America’s tenth largest city fifty years later.10 
The population of the “Queen City of the Lakes” had almost doubled in the last decade alone, 
while Brooklyn’s expansion was even greater, and a host of lesser cities swelled seemingly 
overnight.11  
Then as now, New York was famed as a gateway for immigrants and a place of great 
diversity. State authorities had actively encouraged immigration since 1847; within thirteen years, 
over three-quarters of European arrivals to America were entering through the receiving station at 
New York City’s Castle Garden. After a two-year slump following the financial panic of 1857, 
immigration had rebounded tremendously.12 “During the year 1860,” Morgan informed the 
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legislators, “the emigrants arriving at the port of New York numbered one hundred and four 
thousand three hundred, being an increase of more than twenty per cent. over the preceding two 
years.”13 One out of every four New Yorkers—over nine hundred thousand in total—had been 
born abroad.14 Irish and Germans made up the bulk of migrants and, by 1861, dominated whole 
neighborhoods and trades. Twenty-six percent of New York City residents were Irish-born, as 
were twenty-two percent of Brooklynites and nearly forty percent of Albany’s population.15 Irish 
tended to remain in cities and perform unskilled manual labor, while the more diverse Germans 
and British went everywhere and took up farming or skilled work.16 The canals and railways that 
had jumpstarted the market economy were largely the work of Irish-American laborers, and 
Irishwomen filled the ranks of domestic servants from New York City to Buffalo.17 German-
Americans had established an exclusive, close-knit neighborhood called Kleindeutschland on 
Manhattan’s Lower East Side, where they specialized in tailoring and shop keeping. As one 
historian notes: “Only Vienna and Berlin had larger German populations than New York City,” 
and the city’s Germans outnumbered the total populations of all but three U. S. cities.18 Far to the 
north, migrants crossed the state’s long, largely unregulated Canadian border with ease. By 1861, 
thousands of German and French Canadians had settled in New York’s northern counties.19 
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Despite hostility from the native-born, immigrants factored mightily in New York’s economic and 
democratic growth, and communities would come to rely on their bodies for the war effort. 
Migration from Europe was also the single greatest contributor in population expansion. Many of 
Governor Morgan’s listeners would have agreed with his assumption that the large, rapidly 
growing population of the Empire State confirmed its glory and success. 
 Those seeking further confirmation might have turned to the four pillars of New York’s 
impressive economy: agriculture, shipping, manufacturing, and finance. Thanks to the changes 
wrought by the market and transportation revolutions over the preceding forty years, in 1861 the 
state was an empire of wealth as well as population. Agriculture was the brightest jewel in New 
York’s crown. Farmers and farm laborers together made up the largest share of the state work 
force, and farms employed even more people at harvest time.20 These workers had an extraordinary 
output in a long list of categories. New York ranked first among the states in improved acres and 
in the cash value of its farms, farming implements, and machinery. Among its non-human 
residents, the state was first in milch cows and swine, second in sheep, third in horses and oxen, 
and first in value of livestock and animals slaughtered. New York produced more oats and potatoes 
than any other state and was second in rye and wool, seventh in wheat, and even eleventh in 
tobacco—not a crop usually associated with this northern state. New York led in the cash values 
of its produce, butter, cheese, hay, grass seed, hops, flax, maple sugar, beeswax, and honey, and 
enjoyed a high ranking in the value of nearly every other agricultural product. New York farms 
churned out almost twenty-seven percent of America’s barley, twenty-nine percent of its 
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buckwheat, forty-six percent of its cheese, forty percent of its flax, twenty-eight percent of its 
maple sugar, and most of its hops.21 Such output is even more impressive considering that the 
number of farmers in the state was declining.22  
New York led not only in production but in shipping and what was termed “scientific 
farming”—agricultural research and development. For decades, politicians and major landholders 
had encouraged (and often forced) innovations that brought all corners of the state into the market 
economy.23 By 1861, numerous canals and railroads connected Upstate farmers and their distant 
competitors with the huge, hungry populations of the cities.24 In West Albany (about four miles 
from the Capitol), the seven hundred cattle cars of Congressman Erastus Corning’s New York 
Central Railroad brought endless herds to the NYCRR’s livestock pens, where they were 
slaughtered and packaged for local sale or fed before being reloaded onto cars for Boston.25 At 
Buffalo Harbor—the largest grain port in the world—tourists gazed in admiration as steam-
powered grain elevators loaded bushels of wheat onto boats for the 363-mile trip up the Erie 
Canal.26 Meanwhile, traditional, family-operated subsistence farms were being overtaken by 
market-oriented operations using hired labor to produce saleable commodities.27 New York 
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publishers led in the production of agricultural books and journals (as they did in all forms of 
printing), and the state government sponsored agricultural societies, fairs, and trials for new 
machinery such as mechanical reapers and mowers.28 The spirit of innovation affected humbler 
technologies as well. Over the course of their own lifetimes, older country people had seen plows 
transform from crude wooden instruments into cast-iron models that doubled productivity.29  
New York farmers’ leadership in the market economy boosted their profits and reputations. 
From 1850 to 1860, the cash value of the average farm in the state had risen to $4,180, a gain of 
more than $900.30 Prices of manufactured goods failed to increase much over this period, but prices 
of agricultural products exploded.31 Several regions set standards in product quality; Orange 
County butter and Herkimer County cheese, for example, were widely considered the best in the 
nation.32 Farm ownership conferred status in rural communities and New York farmers took great 
pride in their vital occupation.33 Others also acknowledged its importance. “We are poor or rich as 
our agricultural productions are meagre or bountiful,” Governor Morgan told the legislators. “This 
pursuit, engaging nearly or quite one-half of the population of the State, sets in motion the wheels 
of internal commerce and crowns with plenty and happiness, the homes of our people.”34 For 
historians, the magnitude of New York farming in the 1860s complicates the common but 
simplistic image of the Civil War as a fight between an industrial North and an agrarian South.35 
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Morgan—no rookie in matters of commerce—was right to link New York’s agriculture to 
its other industries. The urban population boom and the integrated economy ensured that the urban 
and rural populations were each the largest consumer of the other’s products: city dwellers lived 
on food from Upstate farms while rural families spent their growing wealth on city-made tools and 
luxuries.36 Meanwhile, as in farming, so it was in industry: the northeastern states led the nation 
and the Empire State led everyone. The value of the nation’s yearly manufacturing product hovered 
near $2 billion, making America the world’s second industrial power after Britain.37 Almost three-
quarters of this output were concentrated in the Northeast, and in 1860 New York industry alone 
had generated over $378 million, nearly twice the amount from all the southern states combined. 
New York outclassed all other states in the number of its manufacturing establishments (22,363) 
and manufacturing workers (230,112), while the value of capital invested in the state’s industry 
(almost $173 million) trailed only that of Pennsylvania.38  
As discussed below, more and more rural New Yorkers were pulling up stakes, moving 
west or to the booming towns along transportation routes, leading to declining numbers of farmers 
and artisans and a growth in non-agricultural and wage workers. These tendencies boosted urban 
industry.39 Thanks to a trend toward specialization and subcontracting, New York did not lead in 
as many manufactured commodities as it did in agricultural ones, but many industries had seen 
striking growth since 1850. Consider printing, a quintessential New York industry and one that 
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would prove crucial in wartime mobilization. The state accounted for forty percent of the value of 
the book, job, and newspaper trades in the United States, and New York print revenue in 1860—
more than $12 million—was greater than that of the entire nation ten years before and a doubling 
of the state’s own print revenue. The printing houses in New York City’s Fourth Ward alone made 
nearly one-tenth of the print income in the United States.40 Newspapers were major shapers of 
public knowledge and opinion.41 In 1860, New York printers had churned out 542 newspapers, 
magazines, and journals, and their total annual circulation was 321 million, an increase from 428 
and 115 million, respectively, in 1850—a telling signal of the intertwined growth of literacy and 
capital during the decade.42 In the year ending June 1, 1860, 28,600,000 copies rolled off the 
presses of Horace Greeley’s New York Daily Tribune.43 James Gordon Bennett’s New York 
Herald had the largest daily circulation of any newspaper in the world to date, and its April 14, 
1861, edition reporting the surrender of Fort Sumter would set a global record for copies sold.44 
Gains also occurred in the fields of agricultural implements, cotton goods, coopering, 
papermaking, meat packing, sugar refining, metal work, and retail, and anything connected with 
the alcohol and tobacco trades flourished.45 
New York City was the economic heart of the nation. A constant stream of raw materials 
entered the city to supply an outward flow of manufactured products worth roughly $159 million 
annually.46 Like its namesake state, the city exhibited to an outstanding degree trends affecting the 
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entire United States. Just twenty percent of the American population was urban, compared to 
thirty-nine percent in New York State, but both figures had grown with each census.47 New York 
City’s commercial development advanced up the island of Manhattan and had nearly reached 42nd 
Street by January 1861. Eleven percent of Gotham’s population, some 90,000 people, made their 
living in manufacturing.48 Mechanization was in its infancy. In 1861, the most industrialized city 
in America was powered mostly by human bodies. The Novelty Iron Works was the city’s largest 
manufactory; 950 workers toiled at its five-acre facility on the East River. But firms employing 
hundreds of people were rare, and the average shop size in the city was twenty-one workers.49 Far 
more common than state-of-the-art steam-powered factories were the homes and small workshops 
where whole families of immigrants squinted in the dim light, sewing ready-made clothing by 
hand. (The garment industry employed more people than any other sector.)50 Even metalworking 
firms tended to employ ten workers or fewer, and the tradesmen who smelted, assembled, and 
repaired their products relied on skill and brawn more often than machinery. Manufacturing in 
Albany and Buffalo also witnessed this preference for bodies over mechanization.51  
What made New York City a capitalist center was not its manufacturing—which had 
declined in several trades during the 1850s—but the activities of New York Port, the shipping and 
financial sectors, and the city-based businessmen who controlled production and freight across a 
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region extending upstate and into New Jersey.52 This is demonstrated by New York State’s cotton 
goods trade, headquartered in the city. In the ten years before 1860, the number of cotton mills and 
warehouses in the state, the capital invested in them, and their workforce all diminished while the 
costs of raw materials and labor rose. Yet the industry was not withering but thriving: Over the 
same period, the value of the state’s cotton goods increased by twenty percent.53 Small wonder 
that the threatened secession of several cotton-growing states (which were also markets for 
northern finished cotton goods) in late 1860 sent New York into a financial panic. The cotton 
goods trade exemplified the benefits and dangers of the maturing, integrated market economy.54 
Urbanization, industrialization, and integration wrought their changes in the state’s great 
hinterland as well. Thanks largely to the economic effects of the Delaware and Hudson Canal, the 
population of historic Kingston (New York’s first state capital) grew over 275 percent from 1840 
to 1860. By the later date, nearly half of the village’s male residents over age fifteen performed 
semiskilled or unskilled wage labor instead of farm work.55 The consequences of change were 
considerable. As one historian notes, “Manmade schedules rather than the sun’s natural periodicity 
took over the rhythm of daily lives.”56 Instead of painstakingly crafting cloth, shoes, and other 
items at home, people in Kingston and elsewhere in the Hudson Valley used their new disposable 
income to purchase cheap, ready-made products shipped from New York City. Cash transactions 
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were replacing the age-old tradition of bartering, and farmers now commonly thought in terms of 
distant markets.57 Trends in the valley were replicated on larger scale some 250 miles to the west 
in Rochester. As cheap grain brought in from the west overtook the local wheat market, Rochester 
had transitioned from the “Flour City” into the “Flower City”—a gardening and vining center 
where plants from around the country were grown, sold, or made into wine. (Of course, this 
integration was cold comfort to suffering wheat farmers.)58 As in New York City, smaller cities 
enjoyed diverse economies. Albany, with a population of 62,000, was a major center for printing, 
lumber, stoves, agricultural implements, railroad servicing, slaughtering, and meat packing.59 Yet 
at the same time, business methods like consolidation led to some smaller cities and towns being 
dominated by one or two industries, such as Cohoes and its cotton mills or nearby Troy and its 
iron foundries—the latter being largely controlled by the resourceful president of the NYCRR, 
Erastus Corning.60 In the first two years of the war, Troy’s iron molders would enlist in large 
numbers, affecting a range of communities: their city, neighborhoods, industry, and local union.61 
 “Our present Banking Capital is larger than ever before,” Governor Morgan reported in his 
Annual Message, alluding to the fourth major element in New York’s economic boom.62 The 
1850s had been revolutionary for finance as New York politicians and businessmen established 
the capitalist system that would later flower in the Gilded Age. Following the lead of other state 
governments, New York’s 1846 constitution had enshrined a trend toward restricting the 
Legislature’s power to regulate finance, trade, and industry, thus legalizing laissez-faire and 
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permitting business to incorporate, speculate, and exploit mostly at will.63 Over the next decade, 
railroad construction and incorporation—with all of their possibilities for speculation—gave New 
York the most advanced money markets of any state.64 Corning and Morgan were two of several 
powerful New Yorkers helming the railroad surge and other lucrative ventures.65 New York City 
was the nation’s financial capital, with Wall Street seeing dramatic growth in banking, investing, 
contracting, insurance, and consequent fraud at all levels of power.66 One aspect of the money-
market boom—a proliferation of insurance firms—was exemplified in 1860, when the leading 
residents of the city’s German-American enclave joined with merchants in forming a nationwide 
insurance company for German immigrants.67 A small but diverse group of financiers enjoyed 
considerable influence in the city. Notable among them were German-born banker August 
Belmont and his faction, who bankrolled the local Democratic establishment and expressed great 
optimism about American progress through capital.68 In January 1861, the Belmont circle and 
other business elites—derided in the Republican-leaning Tribune as “dry goods southerners”—
were marshaling their considerable power in the Democracy in hopes of achieving compromise 
with the South and saving their cotton interests.69 Yet soon Belmont and his peers would unite 
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with Republicans in efforts to meet the city’s wartime manpower goals, drawing on their well-
honed skills in community leadership and fundraising.  
For leading New Yorkers, the market and transportation revolutions had produced a perfect 
storm of prosperity. Within months, as the war that mercantilists dreaded would become a reality, 
New York’s population, agriculture, industry, finance, and transportation networks would all prove 
vital, and the state was destined to contribute more men, money, and materiel to the Union cause 
than any other. 
Population and wealth were not the only qualities of New York that inspired native pride. 
Decades of national economic growth had been matched by democratic reforms in which the 
Empire State blazed trails for the republic. The 1821 state constitution extended suffrage to most 
adult white males, ushering in an era of pervasive interest and participation in politics.70 With 
suffrage now based on residency and participation in one’s community rather than property 
ownership, voting and party loyalty linked to patriotism and civic duty, and campaigns offering 
entertainment for the masses, New York’s voter turnout for presidential elections reached ninety 
percent by the late antebellum years, while an 1856 estimate put the number of political clubs in 
the state at forty thousand.71 In the spring of 1861, party politics would channel into mobilization 
through the efforts of politicos and factions such as New York City’s Tammany and Mozart Halls.  
The extension of the franchise drew partly from an older reform culture based in central 
and western New York—the famous Burned-Over District—during the Second Great Awakening. 
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A long list of leaders in revivalism, utopianism, feminism, education reform, and abolition either 
lived in or hailed from the region, and some of them, including Gerrit Smith and Frederick 
Douglass, would take leading roles in wartime mobilization.72 African Americans in Western New 
York, overwhelmingly concentrated in Buffalo, relied on Baptist and African Methodist Episcopal 
churches to meet their religious and social needs, and these churches also hosted movements for 
black voting rights and other reforms.73 Advances in education had the widest influence on New 
Yorkers of any reform movement. “Our Educational System is justly the pride of the 
commonwealth,” Morgan proclaimed in his Annual Message. “Granting to all a thorough course 
of common school education, New York fully recognizes the duty of the State to educate her 
children.”74 The necessity of literacy for life success had been a well-established principle for 
years, and even children of poor farm workers commonly attended state-funded public schools 
during the winter. Schooling was more extensive for middle-class youths.75 By 1861, the fruits of 
education reform were seen in a falling illiteracy rate, the proliferation of libraries and lyceums 
(New York had sixty percent of the school libraries in the United States), and the huge 
consumption of books and periodicals.76 Not even civil war would halt the spread of learning; in 
                                                 
72 For Upstate reform efforts, see Judith Wellman, Grassroots Reform in the Burned-over District of Upstate New 
York: Religion, Abolitionism, and Democracy (New York: Garland Publishing, 2000). Two classics on the Burned-
Over District are Whitney R. Cross, The Burned-Over District: The Social and Intellectual History of Enthusiastic 
Religion in Western New York, 1800–1850 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1950), and Paul E. Johnson, A 
Shopkeeper's Millennium: Society and Revivals in Rochester, New York, 1815-1837 (New York: Hill and Wang, 
1978). 
73 See Ena L. Farley, “Afro-American Presence in the History of Western New York,” Afro-Americans in New York 
Life and History 14 (1990): 27-89. 
74 Morgan, “Annual Message, January 2,” 273. 
75 Joseph F. Kett, The Pursuit of Knowledge under Difficulties: From Self-Improvement to Adult Education in 
America, 1750-1990 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994), 38-39; Lee Soltow and Edward Stevens, The Rise 
of Literacy and the Common School in the United States: A Socioeconomic Analysis to 1870 (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1981), 191; Jacqueline S. Reinier, From Virtue to Character: American Childhood, 1775-1850 (New 
York: Twayne Publishers, 1996), 136-137, 142; Nancy Beadie, “Academy Students in the Mid-Nineteenth Century: 
Social Geography, Demography, and the Culture of Academy Attendance,” History of Education Quarterly 41 
(2001), 252-256, 262. 
76 Lawrence A. Cremin, American Education: The National Experience, 1783-1876 (New York: Harper and Row, 
1980), 490-491; 1860 Census, 503; Gunn, “Antebellum Society and Politics (1825-1860),” 361. 
50 
 
September 1864, for instance, the village of Adams would celebrate the opening of the Hungerford 
Collegiate Institute, one of numerous academies founded to educate rural youth.77 As with market 
developments, widespread literacy and political participation tightened links between farm and 
townhouse and between New Yorkers and their fellow Americans. Despite New Yorkers’ 
tendencies toward localism, the late antebellum years were also a time of growing interest in 
national issues.78  
 Yet all was not prosperous in the Empire State. By 1861, statistics demonstrating 
population growth and modernization also represented major dislocation and class conflict across 
New York.79 Northerners had long championed their free-labor system as superior to southern 
slave society, but market improvements frequently seemed to benefit the middle and upper classes 
while leaving poorer folk out in the cold.80 Canals and railroads had slashed shipping costs to the 
point that businessmen, western farmers, and Canadians reaped profits at the expense of countless 
rural New Yorkers. The prairies of the western states produced more and cheaper products than 
did the smaller, rockier plots of the Northeast, and New York tycoons took advantage. The cattle 
riding east on Corning’s NYCRR were mainly western, not New York raised, and so were the 
endless bundles of wheat shipped out of Buffalo.81 The railroad boom of the 1850s had caused 
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economic stagnation for settlements such as Rochester that relied on canal traffic; meanwhile, 
railroad magnates wrested control of lines from communities and charged higher rates for in-state 
shipping than for out-of-state imports. Many farmers and communities benefited little from 
railroad development and resented it.82 Market fluctuation and exploitation disrupted the lives of 
rural people. While land ownership remained common in the rural North and class distinctions less 
rigid than elsewhere, small holders and tenants remained vulnerable to the whims of powerful 
landholders. In a system reminiscent of feudalism, landlords such as the Wadsworths in the 
Genesee Valley alternated between ignoring tenant needs in favor of speculation and forcing 
“improvements”—hops cultivation, for instance—that eroded small farmers’ independence.83 The 
market economy had also spawned despised “middle-men” who exploited farmers, buying up their 
goods and selling them at inflated prices.84 (In their unpopularity, lack of scruples, and apparent 
necessity, middle men presaged the bounty and substitute brokers who would emerge during the 
manpower crisis.) Mounting debt, land prices, and unemployment added to this state of flux. 
Economic changes had made the traditional family-owned farm, passed down through generations, 
an increasingly unobtainable ideal.85 
Economic dislocation and class tensions were even worse in the cities.86 In the turbulent 
1850s, industrialization, decentralization of authority, the growth of popular politics, and 
increasing diversity had replaced old social and economic ties with competing factions of 
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merchants, industrialists, artisans, and wage workers.87 Class divisions hardened with the 
maturation of the market economy. State legislators and elites had abdicated much of their 
traditional responsibility for social welfare, passing it off to reform groups and party bosses.88 
Wealthy elites divided into rival industrialists and merchants, while both groups opposed worker 
activism, viewing it as an attack on their authority by the “dangerous classes.”89 New York City’s 
high property costs led many industrialists to move their operations elsewhere; those who stayed 
either subcontracted or deliberately undermined their workers, minimizing their tasks to prevent 
development of skills and wage increases.90 These were, in fact, statewide trends. Skilled workers 
everywhere considered themselves an endangered species as their numbers and status eroded.91 
Once proud members of the middle class, these artisans found themselves and their families 
trapped in “physical isolation and the drudgery of unending toil.”92 In Cohoes, weaving was the 
only surviving skilled or semiskilled trade, and the ubiquitous cotton mills now were staffed by 
Irishwomen earning less than a living wage.93 In New York City’s Kleindeutschland, 
consolidations, sweatshops, and sewing machines were forcing German-born women out of 
tailoring and leaving them with little recourse except laundering or prostitution.94  
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Working-class New Yorkers commonly lived hard, precarious, and insular lives, which 
exacerbated class and ethnic strife. Skilled tradesmen, mostly native-born, and semiskilled workers 
and common laborers, who tended to be immigrants, stood on opposite sides of a widening social 
gulf, as did industrialists and merchants, middle-class and working-class people, and capitalists 
and workers.95 People increasingly lived in social and ethnic enclaves.96 The wealthy speculated 
in business ventures and lived ostentatiously, while many of their workers faced long hours for 
inadequate wages—at least in the seasons when work was available—and skyrocketing food and 
housing prices.97 The obvious recourse for workers in many cases was organization and agitation. 
Exemplifying the emerging hostility between labor and the allies of capital, strikes by Rochester 
canal diggers in the 1850s had been put down by militia.98 Immigrants and blacks endured vicious 
hostility from native whites, while Irish and German communities regarded each other with 
contempt.99 In some rural areas, traditional antipathy between Dutch “Yorkers” and New England 
“Yankees” persisted, while political partisanship everywhere was bitter and pervasive.100 Although 
divisiveness built and strengthened communities of like-minded peoples, it also would have 
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implications for the war effort. As Iver Bernstein shows in his study of the 1863 Draft Riots, it is 
impossible to understand wartime controversies over military obligation without reference to 
prewar social and political tensions.101  
Discontent found expression in two developments: emigration and activism. Revealingly, 
New York’s population boom did not reach all corners of the state. In the five years ending in 
1855, one-third of the state’s counties (nearly all of them in the northern and western regions) had 
fallen in population. The loss rate slowed over the next five years, but more than one in six counties 
still showed a decrease in 1860.102 Governor Morgan acknowledged in his 1861 Annual Message 
that “it appears the increase of population in this State is confined principally to our commercial 
centers …”103 But many New Yorkers living in cities and villages alike felt little encouragement 
to remain and raise large families. They frequently attempted to salvage their prospects by limiting 
family size and moving. The shrinking birthrate was a nationwide trend in the mid-nineteenth 
century but especially pronounced in the rural Northeast.104 Wherever they lived, economic change 
left many merchants and farmers unable to provide their sons with property, forcing youths to seek 
opportunities elsewhere.105  
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By 1861, young adults and whole families were voting with their feet at a rate alarming to 
those who remained. Not every village adapted to change as did Kingston. A Jefferson County 
writer would later warn that the “population of many farming towns decreases with every decade, 
and not a few once prosperous and flourishing villages have thus gone into decline and decay” as 
residents, particularly young farmers, fled for brighter prospects in cities or out west.106 Cities also 
hemorrhaged residents. Urban flight was not exclusively a working-class phenomenon; Rochester 
lost a substantial portion of its businessmen to points west, depriving the city of badly needed 
investment capital.107 The 1860 census revealed that almost one quarter of Americans born in New 
York lived outside the state, while one quarter of those living in New York were foreign-born. 
Transplanted New Yorkers were especially prevalent on the cheaper land of the Old Northwest; 
thirty-six percent of Michigan’s heads of household, for instance, were New York natives, as 
would be eleven percent of Iowa’s wartime volunteers.108 Despite effusions of state pride by 
Morgan and others, observers noted a general rootlessness and lack of birthplace ties among New 
Yorkers.109 Turnover in population through immigration and emigration also reinforced the sense 
among the state’s residents that society was in a state of flux. During the war years, emigration 
and a resulting rise in the value of labor would cause difficulties in meeting manpower quotas, 
leading some New Yorkers to decry a supposed want of community spirit and patriotism. 
Emigration was not the only strategy for those displaced by modernity. Many farm families 
embraced commercial agriculture, switching to dairying and other ventures that allowed females 
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to contribute as breadwinners.110 (Of course, movement in search of economic opportunity was 
another instance of market participation.)111 Other rural New Yorkers fought rampant capitalism 
through politics and more drastic measures. In the mid-1850s they had swung their support to the 
new Republican Party and its message of agrarianism and free labor.112 In areas where the 
notorious leasehold system was most prevalent—particularly Delaware and Albany counties—
working-class people waged “anti-rent wars,” abandoning or buying their tenancies, taking 
political action against unfair leasing, and attacking landlord property. Despite crackdowns and 
evictions, by 1861 the Anti-Renters had largely broken the landlords’ power. Historian Reeve 
Huston calls the Anti-Rent Wars “one of the most powerful social movements of the antebellum 
era and the largest and most sustained farmers’ movement in American history before the 
1870s.”113 This localized struggle over what Anti-Renters deemed “voluntary slavery” was to 
continue concurrently with the Union’s larger war for freedom, finally ending in May 1865.114 
The cities of the Empire State were locus points for the constant battles between Americans 
over the proper role of government. In January 1861, local and state governments—including the 
legislators whom Morgan addressed in his Annual Message—still had greater impact on people’s 
lives than did officials in Washington. This was especially true in New York, where counties added 
                                                 
110 Summerhill, Harvest of Dissent, 101; Craig, To Sow One Acre More, 79. See also Sally Ann McMurray, 
Transforming Rural Life: Dairying Families and Agricultural Change, 1820-1885 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1995). 
111 Parkerson makes this point in The Agricultural Transition in New York State, 3. 
112 Summerhill, Harvest of Dissent, 145; Dean, An Agrarian Republic, 2-3, 12, 14, 40. See also Hendrik Booraem V, 
The Formation of the Republican Party in New York: Politics and Conscience in the Antebellum North (New York: 
New York University Press, 1983). 
113 See Huston, Land and Freedom (quote on p. 5); Charles W. McCurdy, The Anti-Rent Era in New York Law and 
Politics, 1839-1865 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001). 
114 McCurdy, The Anti-Rent Era in New York Law and Politics, 316 (quote), 329. McCurdy notes that some New 




another layer to local administration.115 Federal and state could offer some support, as in 1858 
when Buffalo’s mayor beseeched Washington and Albany for money to employ the needy on 
public works. For the most part, however, elites formed voluntary associations to fill the void in 
poor relief, firefighting, militia duty, political action, and other community needs.116 The state 
legislature facilitated this movement by passing many acts sanctioning such organizations and 
handing off responsibilities to local officials. At the same time, a push for greater state oversight 
saw the development of agencies such as the Insurance Department and the Commissioners of 
Immigration.117 After Fort Sumter fell, these contradictory trends would reap confusion and 
conflict on the home front, impeding the war effort.118  
It is well known that the struggle and eventual victory of the Civil War tied the United 
States closer together. Scholars frequently point out that Americans referred to their country in the 
plural (“the United States are”) before the war and in the singular (“the United States is”) 
afterward, a claim borne out in the twenty-first century through digital analysis of period 
publications.119 But in January 1861 and throughout the sectional crisis, that remained in the future. 
Economic and social developments had expanded northerners’ worldview and prompted 
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nationalism, but they remained bound by older traditions of localism even as they struggled to save 
their nation and form of government.120  
Localism and a related culture of voluntary groups provided mid-nineteenth-century New 
Yorkers with many of the answers to social, political, and economic needs. The most important 
voluntary associations in terms of their impact on the war effort were political, ethnic, and 
working-class in nature and often intertwined. The market revolution had witnessed the growth of 
a distinct working-class identity, particularly in the cities, prompting mass labor and political 
activism. Millions of New Yorkers joined labor unions and political factions, especially after the 
turning point of the 1857 financial panic.121 The brutal depression that followed saw distressed 
laborers in New York City calling on local government, not social elites, for “work or bread.” The 
new species of professional politicians, or “bosses”—most famously Fernando Wood and William 
M. Tweed—took advantage. They painted themselves as friends of the working man and turned 
Tammany into a Democratic political machine, one drawing on working-class and immigrant 
support to help their party dominate city affairs.122 After being voted down in his bid to become 
Tammany’s leader in 1858, Wood formed a rival Democratic faction, Mozart Hall. Drawing now 
mostly on support from Democratic Germans rather than Irish, Wood was reelected mayor the next 
year.123 Towns and cities across New York were patchwork quilts of ethnic and social 
neighborhoods controlled by party bosses dispensing patronage in exchange for votes. Immigrants 
formed vital voting factions in both major parties. While Irishmen everywhere remained a 
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Democratic bloc, the more diverse Germans split in allegiance, though German-American Turner 
societies provided crucial support to the Republicans in 1860.124 When war erupted in the spring 
of 1861, Tammany and Mozart would each organize volunteer regiments for the cause, and several 
local politicos would work their connections to gain high rank in the Union Army. Indeed, popular 
politics would provide a model for wartime mobilization. Parties relied on local leaders, 
committees, and political clubs for fundraising and marshaling voters. These groups campaigned 
with pageantry, staging mass rallies and paramilitary parades.125  
As with other types of public associations—especially volunteer fire and militia 
companies—political mobilization bore a disturbingly masculine, foreign, and working-class 
stamp in the eyes of native-born middle and upper-class New Yorkers, who increasingly 
championed the virtuous refinement provided by home and family life.126 But the value of 
voluntary associations could not be denied in an era of small government and fierce competition 
for resources. Americans in 1861 lived in a world of churches, clubs, lyceums, aid societies, 
fraternal orders, labor unions, fire and militia companies, chambers of commerce, and boards of 
trade, all of which banded like-minded individuals into communities.127 Elites took on many 
prominent roles in this volunteering culture. Some, notably August Belmont and his friends in 
New York City, were political leaders who attended party meetings and funded campaigns while 
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leaving the hard work of politics to bosses.128 Others, particularly industrialists, adopted the old 
mantle of paternalism and organized reform societies such as the Association for Improving the 
Condition of the Poor—led by the president and major stockholder of New York City’s Novelty 
Iron Works—and the Buffalo Association for the Relief of the Poor. Such groups were not purely 
altruistic but sought to mold working-class people into copies of their social betters. Elite women 
were elemental in reform groups, just as they would be in wartime aid societies.129 Through 
chambers of commerce and boards of trade, merchants established business standards, policed 
their class, and provided mutual aid and sociability.130 In July 1862, the Buffalo Board of Trade 
would “adopt” the 100th New York Regiment and help recruit its decimated ranks.131  
 As controversies over slavery expanded in the prewar years, New Yorkers and their 
communities played influential roles. Like much of the North, New York was home to two 
simultaneous, not necessarily opposing trends: antislavery and white supremacism. All its slaves 
had been freed decades earlier, but the Empire State in 1861 was hardly a haven of equality. New 
York’s white majority kept racial oppression alive in law and custom, although the severity of 
discrimination varied across regions. Anti-black feeling burned hottest in the rural southeast—
where many Dutch “Yorkers” had held onto their slaves for as long as possible—and New York 
City, the scene of intense labor competition and a cotton trade dependent on southern slavery.132 
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By early 1861, blacks in the metropolis experienced an alarming increase in antagonism from their 
white neighbors. The previous decade had brought on endangerment resulting from the Fugitive 
Slave Act, growing hostility from the Irish and other Democrats, and merchants doubling down on 
their commitment to slavery. Illegal slave-trading vessels even reappeared in New York Harbor.133 
Perhaps one-quarter of the city’s black population left as a result, but discrimination was the rule 
throughout the state and beyond.134 The situation that Frederick Douglass—the most prominent 
black American of his time—had described in 1848 was largely unchanged thirteen years later: 
“Slaves to individuals at the South, we are little better than slaves to community at the North.”135 
 Hope bloomed for blacks and the foes of slavery in Upstate New York. A diverse black 
and white coalition of reformers, politicians, clergymen, and editors fought the hated Fugitive 
Slave Act, or “Bloodhound Bill,” by thwarting slave catchers and helping runaways settle or flee 
farther north.136 These efforts grew in scale as the region became a Republican bastion in the mid-
to-late 1850s and Senator William H. Seward of Auburn emerged as the party’s leading 
abolitionist. Gerrit Smith, the “Sage of Peterboro,” was a leader in the Underground Railroad and 
attempted to settle African Americans on land he owned.137 From Auburn, Harriet Tubman carried 
out stunning fugitive rescue missions, as did the black Reverend J. W. Loguen of Syracuse, who 
conducted as many as 1,500 runaways through the Underground Railroad. Syracuse, indeed, 
“became known as the most openly abolitionist city in the nation” and the center of what historian 
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Milton C. Sernett calls North Star Country.138 Farther upstate, abolitionist zealot John Brown 
assisted a small black colony called Timbuctoo and partly planned the Harpers Ferry raid at his 
farm in North Elba.139 Yet Brown’s abortive slave uprising in October 1859 heightened many New 
Yorkers’ scorn for abolitionists despite their antislavery feelings, as it did that of whites elsewhere 
in the country.140 A few weeks after Governor Morgan addressed the legislators in January 1861, 
rioters in Syracuse would break up a meeting of the American Anti-Slavery Society.141 And no 
matter their opinions on slavery, most white New Yorkers remained firmly opposed to racial 
equality. In 1860, under pressure from Douglass and other black activists, Republicans in the state 
legislature called for repeal of the $250 property qualification that kept most New York blacks 
from voting. But Democrats exploited the white electorate’s racism, and the measure suffered a 
heavy defeat at the polls that November even as Republican candidates swept the election.142 In 
Morgan’s Annual Message, he echoed his party and millions of his fellow northern whites. The 
governor condemned attempts by slavery’s supporters “to extend the institution into the national 
domain, with a view, as we have seen, to increase the number of the slaveholding States.” 
According to Morgan, however, blame for sectional agitation lay equally with abolitionists, “a few 
inconsiderate persons of Northern States [who] have made either actual or seeming aggressions 
upon the rights of the people of the slaveholding States.” He also argued for repeal of northern 
states’ personal liberty laws, which had raised southern ire by undercutting the Fugitive Slave 
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Act.143 Despite their antislavery principles and concerns over the malign influence of a southern 
“Slave Power,” it would take the revolutionary changes of the war years for Morgan and most 
other Republicans to embrace abolition. 
 Yet the progression of Morgan’s party over the previous seven years and its victories in 
November 1860 indicated how deeply antislavery ran among northerners, particularly reformers 
and farmers, and their determination to halt slavery’s encroachment on free labor.144 The governor 
asserted that “existing national difficulties, are not the results of any new and unexpected causes, 
but are the slow growth of a generation.”145 In the late Fifties, New York Republicans had viewed 
with alarm federal enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act and challenges to the state’s personal 
liberty law, seeing this as evidence of the “slave power conspiracy” in the highest reaches of the 
national government.146 Seward’s landmark speech at Rochester in 1858, in which he called the 
North and South two opposing societies heading toward an “irrepressible conflict,” and Republican 
rhetoric about the supremacy of northern free labor encouraged northerners to believe their society 
was superior to that of the South and that coexistence could not last forever. Republicans drew 
much of their strength from young voters, who had never known a time without sectional 
discord.147 Some abolitionists, including Douglass, welcomed the prospect of civil war as an event 
that would hasten emancipation.148 
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 The election of 1860 was the opening act in the great drama of the Civil War era, and here, 
as in so many aspects of the period, New Yorkers played pivotal and quintessential roles. 
Democrats and Republicans nationwide knew the contest would hinge on the Empire State’s thirty-
five electoral votes, and operatives from New York were influential at the nominating conventions 
for both major parties.149 Hard social and economic disparities, the importance of parties in 
citizens’ lives, and the high stakes involved that year made the campaign in New York a markedly 
divided contest between upstate Republicans and downstate Democrats.150 The Republicans, 
however, enjoyed support from influential reformers in New York City, including Horace Greeley 
and members of the Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor, in addition to their voter 
strongholds of northern and western New York.151 While Democrats could count on the loyalty of 
metropolitan workers and merchants sympathetic to the South and fearful of war, they were 
hampered by national and state divisions and the unpopularity of the Albany Regency, a 
longstanding Democratic faction centered in the capitol.152 Nationally, both sides recognized the 
importance of this election and mobilized huge numbers of supporters for one of the most intense 
and memorable campaigns in American history. It was, in fact, a foreshadowing of wartime 
mobilization. Paramilitary political clubs “mustered” around New York and beyond, thrilling 
onlookers and enlisting voters with their torchlight parades and pledges to protect favored 
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candidates.153 On the night of October 5, Manhattan lawyer George T. Strong viewed a “brilliant 
and successful” procession of Republican Wide Awakes along Broadway that took two hours to 
pass him. Eighteen nights later came the turn of Democratic marchers. Strong called their turnout 
“more numerous than any political demonstration I have ever witnessed,” an endless pageant of 
“lanterns, Roman candles, red shirts, and … band after band” that continued past midnight.154 
Candidates and party operatives gave an estimated ten thousand speeches in the state over the 
course of the campaign. Democrats pumped more money into the contest and southerners 
threatened to secede should Lincoln win, but Republicans benefited from greater enthusiasm and 
better campaigning than their rivals—thanks in part to their national chairman and prominent Wide 
Awake, Governor Morgan.155 When polls opened on November 6, about ninety-one percent of 
New York’s eligible voters cast ballots. Morgan was reelected by a wide margin and Lincoln 
carried the state and the presidency.156 The party of Lincoln and Morgan also swept the state 
assembly: when the Eighty-Fourth Session began on January 1, ninety-three Republicans faced 
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thirty-five Democratic assemblymen (in addition to twenty-three Republican and nine Democratic 
senators elected in 1859). Morgan must have drawn hope from the new lineup in Albany, but soon 
opposition from Republican radicals would hinder his policies.157 
 Despite the governor’s belief that sectional animosity was “the slow growth of a 
generation” rather than the result of recent events, the crisis heated up after Lincoln’s election as 
so-called “fire-eaters” in several southern states organized secession conventions. Weeks before 
the election, the threat of secession had caused a stock-market dip and an economic panic in cotton-
reliant New York City, and this recession deepened and spread from November on. Hundreds of 
businesses failed and thousands of workers lost their jobs. Anxious citizens constantly asked one 
another: “Do you think the South will secede?”158 Yet most New Yorkers and their fellow 
northerners—unlike Gotham’s merchant elites—refused to panic however much they deplored the 
prospect of disunion. Fire-eaters were bluffing, they believed, and at any rate preserving the Union 
by force was out of the question. Moderates like Lincoln, Seward, and Morgan dominated the 
Republican Party, and Greeley, one of the most influential Republicans in New York, argued 
strongly against coercion on November 9. “If the Cotton States become satisfied they can do better 
out of the Union than in it,” he declared in the Tribune, “we insist on letting them go in peace. … 
We hope never to live in a republic whereof one section is pinned to the residue by bayonets.”159 
A growing number of northerners argued for concessions to the South, particularly repeal of 
personal liberty laws.160  
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 Widespread northern support for coercion would only come in the wake of the attack on 
Fort Sumter in April, but the seeds of civil war were planted when hesitancy and despair changed 
to outrage in the Secession Winter of 1860-1861. An alarming rush of events further impressed 
New Yorkers with the seriousness of the crisis. In late November, Republican editor Thurlow 
Weed of Albany suggested (with Seward’s encouragement) a compromise that would have 
required the new Republican administration in Washington to drop opposition to slavery in the 
territories. Support for compromise was high and growing—especially in New York City—but for 
most Republicans, Weed’s proposal betrayed what they stood for and indicated the dangers of 
concession.161 Disunion became a fact on December 20 as South Carolina formally seceded. This 
action along with the impending secession of other states put federal installations throughout the 
South in peril. From U. S. Army headquarters in New York City, General-in-Chief Winfield Scott 
spoke in favor of holding and reinforcing forts along the southern coast, and Major Robert 
Anderson, commanding Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor, echoed this determination. The resolve 
of these officers despite conciliation by widely despised President James Buchanan and other 
Washington officials made them heroes in many northerners’ eyes.162 Simultaneously, popular 
outrage followed a report that Secretary of War John B. Floyd had ordered the sale and transport 
of huge stocks of arms held in northern arsenals, including Watervliet Arsenal north of Albany, to 
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a firm in Savannah, Georgia.163 Just days before the New Year, rumors of impending southern 
attacks on Washington and Fort Sumter prompted militancy throughout the North. Scott and 
President-Elect Lincoln received numerous proposals of armed support from would-be warriors.164 
On December 28, three wealthy New Yorkers addressed confidential letters to Scott through 
General Charles W. Sandford of the state militia. They proposed to charter a steamer in New York 
Harbor and fill it with supplies and volunteers, “[t]he funds to be raised by private subscription.” 
This expedition would reinforce Major Anderson in Charleston. “Such a course taken by a few 
hundred brave men,” James A. Hamilton wrote, “would rescue the garrison and save the fort; this 
having been done without the participation of the government could not be considered by S. 
Carolina as an act offensive to her, which would invite much less justify an assault.”165 Aside from 
their hopes of avoiding provocation, the offer by Hamilton and his colleagues was a nascent 
glimmering of the northern war effort and the natural outgrowth of associational culture: 
voluntarism on a local level, through leadership and fundraising on the part of social elites, 
designed to meet national needs beyond the power of federal authorities. Scott declined the 
proposal despite his concern for the Charleston garrison.166 
 As January ushered in the uncertain year of 1861, New Yorkers ranging from William H. 
Seward to James Gordon Bennett of the Herald called for mustering state militias to protect the 
national capitol while simultaneously working for compromise with the South.167 Morgan—a rich, 
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conservative New York City merchant who sought peace, but also a leading Republican—
embodied the dilemmas faced by his state in the sectional crisis. “Let Governor Morgan, in his 
Annual Message to our Legislature,” the Herald suggested, “put in a strong recommendation for 
the call of a State Convention to open negotiations with Virginia for the Union …” Prominent 
Republicans, on the other hand, urged Morgan to take a stand against compromise in the address.168 
In the end, the governor’s Annual Message on January 2 saw him take a middle path. “The people 
of the State of New York, in my judgement, are not prepared” to accept southern secession, 
Morgan told the legislators, and he predicted “they will give the Federal authorities, in the adoption 
of all wise, just and necessary measures for the enforcement of the laws, their earnest, faithful, and 
constant support.” But what constituted “wise, just and necessary measures?” The governor 
assured the legislators—and the hundreds of thousands who would read his words in newspapers—
that “the people of this law-abiding State” would never participate in any aggression against 
slaveholding states, and he advised the Legislature to make a similar promise to protect southern 
rights. Morgan concluded his long address by calling for New York to work with other states to 
ensure that “the Constitution shall be honored, and the Union of the States shall be preserved.”169  
 New Yorkers were divided over the best strategy for keeping the peace and ending the 
crisis: should they try to mollify the South, as Democrats believed, or take a hard line against 
secession and prepare for possible war, the plan supported by most Republicans? Or did the 
solution lay in a combination of appeasement and military readiness? Few among the public or 
their representatives argued for holding restive states in by force.170 “Pacification in sentiment and 
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preparation in act, were the order of the period,” an official later noted of the Republican-
dominated state government.171  Morgan had argued for this approach in his Annual Message, and 
it received further support from other quarters. Vermont Governor Erastus Fairbanks wrote to 
Morgan urging “unity of action” between their states’ legislatures, including bolstering state 
militias and repealing personal liberty laws in order to conciliate the South.172 Morgan, through 
his adjutant general, had already offered the U.S. Government replacement troops for the forts in 
New York during the secession crisis, an overture that the army’s adjutant general rejected on 
January 8 because the “emergency has happily passed.”173 
Such was hardly the case. Events in Charleston Harbor soon raised the stakes. General 
Scott, determined to hold federal installations in the South, had ordered supplies and 
reinforcements sent to Fort Sumter. The ostensibly secret outfitting of this expedition in New York 
Harbor momentarily rallied both the public and the stock market.174 On January 9, South Carolina 
forces fired upon the supply ship Star of the West as it approached Fort Sumter. Reaction in the 
North was swift and resolute. In Albany, Assembly Speaker DeWitt C. Littlejohn opened the 
January 11 session by noting that South Carolinians had “virtually declared war,” and that given 
this and the ongoing secession of southern states, New York should offer the president “whatever 
aid in men and money he may require to enable him to enforce the laws and uphold the authority 
of the Federal Government. …”175 The Assembly and Senate both passed Littlejohn’s resolutions 
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by an overwhelming margin and Morgan forwarded them to President Buchanan.176 Prominent 
and ordinary New Yorkers largely echoed their leaders’ well-publicized stand. The commander of 
the First Division of the state militia offered regiments for New York Harbor and Washington; 
meanwhile, the Albany legislators’ resolutions inspired a wave of similar pronouncements by state 
and local bodies across the North.177 In early February, the New York Senate passed a $500,000 
funding bill for the militia with the support of Governor Morgan and eager young Adjutant General 
J. Meredith Read, and the two men planned arms purchases; these were the first of many overtures 
over the next four years meant to generate funds for the state’s hugely expensive war effort.178 On 
February 11, Secretary of State nominee Seward—who would closely follow military affairs in his 
home state during the war—told the governor that five thousand to ten thousand men should be 
readied in secret to reinforce Washington at short notice.179 “Hoping for peace, but ready for war,” 
as a Weedsport militiaman described himself, New Yorkers awaited an imminent struggle for the 
Union.180  
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They had longer to wait, however. Thanks to leading Democrats and Republicans alike, 
compromise won out over mobilization. From January through April, sympathy for southerners—
or at least fear of provoking them—prompted Democrats from Buchanan down to refuse calls for 
military preparation and boost compromise efforts.181 A pro-compromise convention in Albany 
included prominent Democrats Daniel E. Sickles, Michael Corcoran, and William D. Kennedy, all 
three destined to lead New York troops in battle. In Buffalo, a compromise petition gained the 
signatures of ex-president Millard Fillmore and some three thousand others.182 Men more 
supportive of readiness, including Seward and Scott, also rejected military offers as premature and 
worked to maintain peace.183 The New York Senate’s militia appropriation bill failed to pass in 
the Assembly after Democrats decried it as a dangerous provocation.184 New York City, 
meanwhile, remained a fiercely Democratic bastion. Though Mayor Fernando Wood’s notorious 
secession plan gained no traction, most city residents blamed the crisis on Republicans and 
bemoaned the possibility of war. Southern secessionists drew strength from manifestations of 
support like that of Tammany and Mozart Halls, both of which issued calls to let them go in 
peace.185 Winter wore on, slave states continued to secede, and northern leaders did little to stop 
them. The popular belligerence inspired by the Star of the West incident ebbed.186 Albany editor 
Thurlow Weed, who had sparked Republican outrage with a compromise proposal in November, 
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then beat the drum against secessionists in January, returned to advocating peaceful settlement in 
March.187 In Manhattan, a disgusted George T. Strong believed northern passivity stemmed from 
localism. The United States was not a nation, he wrote, but only “an aggregate of communities, 
ready to fall apart at the first serious shock and without a centre of vigorous national life to keep 
us together.”188 But Thurlow Weed’s change of mood by late winter was common among 
Republicans in New York and beyond. His outlook, and theirs, would undergo yet another 
transformation in April.189 That many of the elites and associations rejecting coercion in early 1861 
were destined to lead the mobilization effort testifies to its voluntary nature, the weakness of 
federal power, and the revolution in sentiment that would come with heightened tensions and war’s 
outbreak. To a large degree, the same leaders and communities that Strong dismissed in March 
would shoulder the burden of saving the Union. 
Back on January 2, when legislators heard the governor’s words, all of this lay in the future. 
After the clerks in the Senate and Assembly finished their laborious task of reading the Annual 
Message, both houses resolved to take further consideration of the governor’s advice on national 
matters at a later time.190 But affairs in the Senate took an unexpected turn thanks to resolutions 
from a seemingly unlikely quarter. Francis B. Spinola, a Democrat representing New York City’s 
Third District, reminded his fellow senators that one state was currently committing treason and 
that it was the duty of every state and citizen to make sacrifices for the preservation of the Union. 
Spinola next offered resolutions that the governor be “directed, in the name of the people of the 
State of New York, to tender to the president of the United States, the services of the militia of the 
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State, to be used in such manner and at such times as the President may deem best to preserve the 
union and to enforce the Constitution and laws of the Country.” Furthermore, the Senate’s 
committee on military affairs should make a report on the condition of these forces and, if needed, 
“report a bill to raise ten millions of dollars to properly arm the State.”191 Spinola, a tireless 
legislator who had risen from the jeweler’s trade to a career in politics, was going against his party 
leadership and most of his constituents in advocating increased military readiness. But senators in 
both parties (including Spinola) were unprepared for immediate action. They voted unanimously 
to refer the resolutions to a committee of five rather than consider them in session that day, and 
then moved on to other business.192 Military preparedness would have to await another day, and 
Spinola would play a prominent and notorious part. 
 In the final paragraph of his Annual Message, Governor Morgan had urged his fellow New 
Yorkers to show leadership in the crisis tearing the Union apart. “Every State can do something, 
and ought to do all that it can to avert the threatened danger,” he noted. “Let New York set the 
example in this respect.”193 Morgan called specifically on the state’s congressmen in Washington 
to lead the way in finding a peaceful and legal solution to the national emergency. His words, 
however, symbolized the leading and archetypal roles that the Empire State and its citizens had 
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“THE ENTHUSIASTIC UPRISING OF THE PEOPLE IN OUR CAUSE, IS OUR GREAT 
RELIANCE”: THE RUSH TO ARMS IN 1861 
 
Throughout their acquaintance, the relationship of Edwin D. Morgan and Abraham 
Lincoln was one of alliance and mutual respect. In May of 1861, however, Morgan expressed 
deep frustration with Lincoln and his administration over their lack of appreciation for state 
sovereignty. A semi-official body in New York City, the Union Defense Committee, had 
bypassed Morgan’s authority and obtained Lincoln’s acceptance of fourteen three-year regiments 
that the committee had raised in New York. Lincoln had heard of Morgan’s opposition to these 
regiments, which were not authorized by New York State law, whereupon the president told a 
UDC member to “cut the knots” and bring on the troops.1 This was just one of several instances 
in which Lincoln or Secretary of War Simon Cameron accepted offers of troops without 
consulting governors of the states involved; sometimes they overrode governors’ opposition to 
certain regiments, so anxious were they to secure forces to protect the capital and defeat the 
rebellion. After Morgan complained to Lincoln, the president wrote to him explaining that he had 
not intended to undermine the governor’s authority, but that support from ordinary New Yorkers 
and other loyal Americans was crucial in this mobilization. “The enthusiastic uprising of the 
people in our cause, is our great reliance,” Lincoln wrote, “and we can not [sic] safely give it any 
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check, even though it overflows, and runs in channels not laid down in any chart.”2 Members of 
the committee echoed this argument.3 Morgan pragmatically accepted the president’s decision 
but continued to resent what he saw as the UDC’s interference.4  
The issue of the fourteen regiments indicated the decentralized nature of mobilization, 
especially early on, and the degree to which troop-raising and related war issues saw struggles 
for authority between levels of government, associations, and individuals. When war broke out in 
April, New Yorkers and other northerners reacted with awesome patriotic furor. Partisanship 
subsided as governments, communities, and citizens mobilized to save the Union. Early on, 
northern war making was guided by national and state policy but relied on northern communities 
for implementation, and here lay both its strength and weakness. Patriotism and volunteer culture 
overcame the North’s unpreparedness to an impressive degree and helped the Union survive the 
first, fearful months of war. 
The match that ignited popular war spirit was lit before the fall of Fort Sumter. Lincoln’s 
newly installed administration occupied the difficult position of holding Forts Sumter and 
Pickens in the face of Confederate demands that the government abandon them. In early April, 
rising tensions over the forts sparked fear and frustration in New York and across the Union. 
Committees and individuals besieged Lincoln, Morgan, and other officials with letters, 
resolutions, petitions, and editorials, most of them insisting on firmness and preparation in the 
face of southern aggression.5 As historian Russell A. McClintock notes, the formation and 
behavior of these impromptu bodies indicated the public’s increasing willingness to call for 
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action when it found government lacking in the crisis.6 Tentative mobilization got underway in 
New York. The federal government increased its orders with the Troy and Watervliet arsenals 
and stepped up regular army recruiting in New York City. Relief expeditions for Pickens and 
Sumter fitted out in New York Harbor and militiamen around the state met for drill.7 Once again, 
war looked certain. The militia appropriation bill reappeared in the Assembly after Pennsylvania 
adopted a nearly identical measure, though a version of the New York bill would not become law 
until after Fort Sumter fell.8 The reigning sentiment was not enthusiasm, however, but fear. “The 
panic here is raging horribly,” Morgan’s cousin wrote him from New York City after urging that 
the state arm for war, adding that he feared “Washington will soon be invaded, and you may yet 
have to protect the city of New York.” Weed’s Albany Evening Journal supported the Fort 
Sumter relief mission but dreaded imminent news of hostilities. A Brooklyn Democratic sheet 
went further, predicting “ruin” and “military despotism” and deploring the arms bill.9 Influential 
Democratic voices around the state continued to blame the nation’s woes on Republicans and 
abolitionists.10 Divisions in New York were deep, bitter, and persistent.  
Then came the Confederate assault on Fort Sumter, which incited patriotic displays and 
calls to arms unprecedented in American history. In the rush of events, governments, 
communities, groups, and individuals acted almost simultaneously, if not always concertedly. 
News of the bombardment reached New York City and Brooklyn on the night of April 12, and 
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the extraordinary excitement there was replicated across the state and beyond. The metropolis 
whose residents had backed the South seemed to make a sudden, 180-degree turn: New Yorkers 
from Mayor Wood down voiced outrage at the southern attack and support for Lincoln’s 
administration and the Union.11 “The first gun has nearly united the North, and the government 
will be sustained,” a Brooklyn newspaper noted with relief. Ironically, the diverse, polarized 
citizens of New York State seemed to agree on one thing: the endangered Union must now be 
preserved.12 
Fort Sumter fell on April 13, and Morgan met with his staff in Albany early the next 
morning. Anticipating calls for troops from the Lincoln administration—calls that were sure to 
draw heavily on New York—Morgan, as commander-in-chief of the state militia, determined to 
enroll thirty thousand men. Then, at a meeting of executive and legislative leaders that afternoon, 
Morgan and others present did something natural to their worldview and which would be 
replicated countless times during the war: they formed a committee. A group made up of two or 
three executive officials, a Democratic senator, and a Republican assemblyman was enjoined to 
prepare a militia bill for presentation in the Legislature the next day.13 The resulting document 
stipulated that the state enroll up to thirty thousand men for two years’ service and appropriate $3 
million for expenses. The troops were to be specially raised militia drawn from outside of the 
organized state forces and must be turned over to the president of the United States upon his 
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request to the governor. They would be subject to federal regulations, but once back in state 
control could only be discharged in the county where they were organized.14 Thus did the April 
14 bill recognize the sovereignty of the federal, state, and local governments in the national 
emergency. The proposal also indicated that Morgan’s government understood the gravity of the 
situation. Lincoln’s first manpower call must be answered with the state’s organized regiments, 
the so-called “uniformed militia” capable of responding quickly but constrained by ninety-day 
federal term limits. Should the war last longer than three months, more troops would be needed 
and for a longer period. The April 14 bill was a wise measure, written by men who were not the 
overconfident politicians of Civil War lore.15 
This bill, the first official act of mobilization by the most influential state in the Union, 
set a pattern of conflict and confusion that would mark New York’s war effort and that of the 
nation. Legislative debates over the bill on April 15 indicated that some in the State Capitol 
believed mobilization was too much responsibility for Morgan alone.16 The final version of the 
act, taking effect April 16, created a seven-member group to share joint authority in carrying it 
out. This body would consist of the governor, lieutenant governor, secretary of state, comptroller, 
attorney general, state engineer, and state treasurer.17 Morgan and Adjutant General Read were 
outraged: committees with limited power were necessary, but the Military Board, as it came to 
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be known, represented red tape and dilution of central authority at a time when quick, decisive 
leadership was needed.18 Necessary as they were in an era of small government, committees by 
their nature sometimes hindered the war effort. The Military Board, indeed, soon became a 
byword for inefficiency, with Seward calling it symptomatic of every state’s difficulties in 
mobilization.19 Thankfully for Morgan and Read—and possibly for the Union cause—the 
Board’s power was largely limited to the troops raised under the April 16 law.20 That act also 
courted controversy by the number of troops it authorized and their term of service. Thirty 
thousand was a much higher figure than the War Department requested of New York, but some 
influential New Yorkers asserted that still more men were needed.21 What was more, the two 
years stipulation was relatively prescient—being far longer than the term Lincoln designated—
but would soon lead to mass confusion and dismay over which volunteers were enrolled for three 
months and which for two years. 
The federal call telegraphed to Morgan and the other governors late on April 14 (and 
publicized the next morning) was an altogether different animal than the New York act. That 
Lincoln’s administration needed troops from the loyal states was painfully clear. Federal 
authorities had done little to prepare for war. The regular United States forces were tiny, 
scattered, and depleted even before war began by resignations of southern officers and a large-
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scale surrender in Texas. The Treasury was inefficient and practically broke. Confederates, 
meanwhile, had gotten a head start on mobilization, with thousands already enrolled for their 
defense.22 This was the context in which Lincoln called for troops and the War Department made 
requisitions on each loyal state. Lincoln’s April 15 proclamation drew directly from the language 
of the 1795 Calling Forth Act, the legal basis for a presidential call-up of state militias to quell 
rebellions. Noting that “combinations too powerful to be suppressed” through normal legal 
channels had caused several states to revolt, Lincoln called for seventy-five thousand state militia 
and asked loyal citizens to support this campaign for the Union. Additionally, he summoned 
Congress to meet on July 4 to address the situation.23 Secretary of War Simon Cameron’s follow-
up letter to Union governors requested a quota of infantry or riflemen from each state (based on 
its population in the latest census) and listed states’ rendezvous points. In a nod to law and 
tradition, the troops would be commanded by state-appointed generals and their service limited 
to three months. New York, as the most populous state, had the largest quota: seventeen 
regiments and 13,280 men. Albany, Elmira, and New York City were the selected rendezvous.24 
Though technically a demand by federal authorities upon the states and characterized as such by 
Morgan and others in passing, the circumstances and procedure of this and subsequent federal 
calls indicated the voluntary nature of the mobilization.25 Lincoln’s administration made clear its 
reliance on the states. As head of a board tasked with deciding army organization in May, 
Treasury Secretary Salmon P. Chase’s concern for state loyalties inspired him to recommend 
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three-year enlistments instead of the standard federal five-year term, to authorize governors to 
appoint officers in their state regiments, and to reject an officer’s suggestion that volunteer 
regiments be made part of the regular army.26 States would retain much responsibility for 
forming and officering regiments throughout the war. 
Fully aware of the general government’s impotency in the crisis, New Yorkers quickly 
answered the state and federal manpower calls. On April 15, Morgan asked the Legislature to 
immediately authorize him “larger discretionary power than is now possessed” to raise, equip, 
and finance a volunteer force, an early indication of his concern over the red tape already causing 
rifts in Albany.27 Intensely excited legislators met in the crowded Capitol to decide on the bill for 
thirty thousand troops and $3 million. It passed by overwhelming margins in both houses. 
Recruiting offices opened in Albany that evening and a procession of militiamen marched to the 
Executive Chamber to personally offer their services to Morgan, their passage hailed by cheers 
from observers.28 State authorities also set about meeting the federal requisition for militia. On 
April 18, Morgan formally acknowledged Lincoln’s call and reported it already underway in 
New York.29 These were among the first of countless scenes over the next three months 
indicating an extraordinary degree of commitment to the Union cause by New Yorkers of all 
classes. New York was not the first state to offer troops to the general government, nor were 
New Yorkers first to leave for the front.30 Yet citizens of the Empire State took pride in offering 
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large, additional forces and in meeting with bilateral support “the nation’s call with that 
promptness which comports with her past history, and with her present position in the sisterhood 
of States,” as Morgan noted.31 State pride would loom large over the next four years.  
An observer could be forgiven, however, for concluding that little in the history or culture 
of the state and nation predicted a large, bipartisan military response. Frequent allusions to their 
patriot forbears obscured the fact that New Yorkers and their fellow Americans had long felt 
ambivalent toward military service. As Marcus Cunliffe notes, American military practices 
involved a peculiar combination of devotion and neglect stemming from professional, anti-
professional, and “antimilitarist” cultures.32 Conceptions of the military in 1861 were rooted in a 
centuries-old reliance on short-term militiamen and volunteers and a small, neglected body of 
regulars. Several historians have explained how these customs developed in the colonies. In the 
seventeenth century, New Yorkers and other colonists used an Elizabethan model of town-based, 
compulsory, short-term militias officered by civic leaders.33 By late in the century, colonial 
governments no longer relied on militiamen for anything but brief emergencies, preferring to 
handle major campaigns with specially recruited volunteers called provincials, raised through 
manpower quotas that colonial governments placed on communities. It was largely provincials—
recruited from the itinerant poor and other powerless classes—who fought the “French and 
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Indian Wars” alongside British regulars.34 Inspired by republican and Whig doctrine, which 
championed the value of a citizen-soldiery and abhorred standing armies, Americans relied on 
their traditional mobilization practices in the Revolution. They revered the militia ideal and 
enforced service for brief terms, but legislators had allowed most militias to atrophy into police 
bodies and social clubs, and men who could afford exemptions or substitutes frequently left 
militia duty to their poorer neighbors.35 In scenes that would be replicated on a larger scale 
eighty-six years later, Americans of all backgrounds rushed to arms in 1775, but soon the 
weakness of militias and plummeting support for the war led the Continental Congress to place 
greater reliance on a regular force, the Continental Army, recruited mainly from the same classes 
that filled regular and provincial ranks. George Washington, recognizing the need to appeal to 
Americans’ self-interest, pushed for pay and bounties as recruitment tools targeting the poor.36 
The pressures of war also revealed to many the need for military professionalism.37 Yet the war 
did not end fears of federal and military threats to republicanism; legislation at the state and 
national levels kept state assemblies largely in control of defense during the war and afterward, 
while the Continental Army (which had mostly consisted of state regiments) was disbanded in 
1783.38  
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The new republic faced a variety of threats and few honed weapons with which to meet 
them. Thus, the nine decades from the Treaty of Paris to the fall of Fort Sumter were punctuated 
by debates between proponents of federal versus state control of military readiness—and crises 
that foregrounded the issue time and again. Congress reinforced states’ sovereignty in 
mobilization with the Uniform Militia Act of 1792. This notoriously toothless law was a 
monument to republicanism: it established compulsory militia service for citizens in national 
emergencies, but limited such service to three months in any year, left the responsibility for 
maintaining forces to the states, and gave them little incentive to do so.39 States passed 
legislation conforming to the act; together, these federal and state laws allowed for customs that 
would shape the course of the Civil War, including exemption from duty and substitution. Yet 
one thing these enactments could not do was ensure a cohesive, dependable federal force in 
wartime.40 Despite immediate and obvious weaknesses in American military policy, a revised 
1795 national law known as the Calling Forth Act ceded even more control to the states. The 
1792 and 1795 acts—reverence for states’ rights and the citizen-soldier ideal enshrined in law—
would guide United States mobilization until their replacement by a new militia act over a 
century later.41  
Despite reform proposals, growing specialization in military science, and the cultivation 
of a professional ethos in the tiny U. S. Army and Navy, citizens and soldiers alike remained 
bound to republicanism.42 Americans consequently repeated the errors of the Revolutionary War 
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in all their major nineteenth-century conflicts. Prejudice against military professionals and 
deficiencies in the federal enlistment system prompted reliance on short-term volunteers and 
militiamen.43 Following a centuries-old tradition, Americans commonly despised the regular 
army as a mercenary gang of immigrants, criminals, and other misfits.44 During the War of 1812, 
the government’s attempt to recruit a substantial regular force at rendezvous around the country 
fell far short of goals until the introduction of one-year enlistments and large bounties; in a 
blunder that would be repeated fifty years later, bounties were paid upon enlistment, inspiring 
widespread desertions.45 Inept regular-army recruiting policies continued postwar. The General 
Recruiting Service, established in 1823 for the peacetime force, proved itself unable to handle 
increased numbers during the Mexican War, and even in times of peace recruiters might resort to 
misleading promises.46 Manpower issues were not helped by the regulars’ class problem; in 
1860, an officer noted that enlistment of poor, immoral immigrants discouraged “enterprizing 
[sic] American youth” from serving, and concluded that the “prevailing sentiment seems to be 
with officers and citizens, that there is something essentially degrading in enlisting into the 
army.”47 Amidst the martial fervor of the spring of 1861, potential enlistees in New York City—
a major recruiting point for the U. S. Army—favored volunteer over regular regiments because 
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there was “more honor attached to a volunteer.”48 In the antebellum era, critics of military 
professionalism also condemned West Point and the United States Navy as expensive and 
undemocratic institutions, although both survived thanks to other influential voices.49 
The Navy enjoyed a reputation for skill and dedication throughout the antebellum years, 
although it too labored under manning difficulties. The mariner’s life was an infamously hard 
one, especially under the yoke of military discipline. Reforms introduced in 1839 cut down on 
notorious enlistment practices such as “crimping” (impressment) and theft of bounties. At naval 
recruiting rendezvous—the largest of which were in New York City—the practice became to 
send new sailors aboard receiving ships immediately, before crimps could seize their money.50 
The Navy attempted to ease its manpower problem by enlisting young boys, locals at overseas 
stations, and—despite government reluctance—free blacks in limited numbers.51 Yet only with 
the introduction of increased wages and reenlistment bounties in the mid-1850’s did the 
enlistment rate significantly improve. At war’s outbreak in 1861, the Navy’s culture of 
professionalism helped it absorb thousands of raw recruits more successfully than the regular 
army.52 
When Americans thought about military affairs during the early national and antebellum 
eras, it was usually not in terms of the U. S. Army or Navy but local militias, the anti-
professional element in the country’s military culture. As late as the 1790’s, the standing militia 
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with its training days and political influences “touched the lives of more individuals than any 
other function of government save taxpaying,” according to one historian.53 With the new 
century, however, came a decline in universal service. The War of 1812 saw federal and state 
authorities bungle their employment of militias, which in any case were often composed of 
undisciplined, unenthusiastic amateurs.54 The notorious behavior of New York militiamen at the 
Battle of Queenston Heights—in which they refused to cross into Canada to aid hard-pressed 
comrades—reinforced widespread beliefs that standing militias had outlived their usefulness.55 
After 1815, a number of developments sounded the death knell for the institution. Resentment 
from working-class men obliged to serve, declining interest in military matters, a peace 
movement, and mockery of politicking Sunday soldiers in the burlesque of the day (these aspects 
forming the “anti-militarist” part of Cunliffe’s trio) caused state after state to amend its onerous 
service laws.56 In 1846, New York officials replaced compulsory duty with a commutation fee, 
or “militia fine,” for those unwilling to serve, with the proceeds meant to fund the state’s 
volunteer regiments. Yet even this small fee brought protest from those who considered it an 
unequal burden on the poor, and New Yorkers found it easy to avoid paying.57 Enrollment for the 
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militia, whether resulting in training duty or fee payment, was highly unpopular for citizens and 
officials alike.58  
The explosion of voluntary associations in the early to mid-nineteenth century also 
weakened the standing militia’s appeal as they provided New Yorkers with varied opportunities 
for civic engagement.59 One especially colorful form of volunteering involved the service of 
uniformed militia regiments. By the late 1850’s, many volunteer units had emerged out of the 
wreckage of the standing militia, their membership consisting of men who enjoyed uniforms, 
drill, and patriotic displays.60 This movement, centered in New York City and Boston and once 
the preserve of social elites, now involved members of every class and ethnicity, who joined 
companies with their peers.61 New York City Irishmen formed the Ninth Regiment as an “army 
of liberation” for their homeland, while the officers of the Washington Riflemen disseminated 
orders in their native German.62 Anti-immigrant nativists organized at least one New York City 
regiment, the Seventy-First “American Guard,” and Know-Nothings were also prominent among 
Buffalo volunteers.63 Young Saratoga County native Elmer E. Ellsworth formed a drill team in 
Chicago modeled after French Algerian troops called zouaves. When Ellsworth's Zouave Cadets 
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toured New York in 1860, their flashy uniforms and acrobatic maneuvers caused a sensation; by 
July, as the Military Gazette reported, zouave companies were “springing up all over the State” 
and beyond.64 The zouave craze inspired many with its potential for athleticism, comradery, and 
discipline, and Ellsworth’s New York zouaves would figure prominently in the war fever of 
1861.65  No volunteer corps, however, rivaled the New York Seventh in prestige. This New York 
City regiment boasted an exclusive, upper-class membership and had been the first American 
organization to call itself the “National Guards.”66 In the antebellum years, their closely 
regulated dress and behavior and prominence in riot duty earned the National Guards a superb 
reputation, and they, too, would be among the first responders at war’s outbreak.67 The War 
Department, recognizing the value of the volunteers, supplied the states with weapons to arm 
them; the rest of their outfit was usually financed by the men themselves.68 Stingy government 
support and lax militia laws prompted interested people to devote their own resources to 
volunteer organizations.69 The New York State Military Association, founded in 1853, 
encouraged readiness by awarding prizes to the best-drilled corps and publishing a military 
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science journal.70 Much like volunteer fire companies and other associations, the uniformed 
militia bound its members in like-minded communities and informed their social outlook and 
behavior. The volunteer movement crossed the Atlantic in the late 1850’s as Britons, inspired by 
American militiamen, formed their own corps.71  
State volunteers made their shambling entrance as a major wartime institution in 1846. In 
gathering forces for the Mexican War, the general government requested regiments from the 
states to avoid the expense of recruiting more regulars.72 New York was to supply seven 
regiments, and recruiting began with a war meeting in New York City that May.73 Recruitment 
for this war added little luster to the Empire State.  Officers for the regiments—largely 
Democratic political appointees—relied on party bosses to fill their ranks from Gotham’s 
desperate poor (though upstate volunteers also supplied some companies).74 The result was 
corruption on an alarming scale as recruiters broke laws, made vague promises, enlisted unfit 
men, and coerced many into serving in the two regiments eventually formed. Staffs at volunteer 
depots, set up by the War Department to secure replacements, employed similar methods with 
increasing severity as the war went on.75 The effects of state control and prioritizing politics and 
troop-raising over military efficiency were evident in Mexico. Undisciplined New Yorkers and 
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other state troops sometimes fought bravely but indulged in scandalous behavior that caused 
headaches for the high command.76 Unfortunately for the Union, too few Americans remembered 
the corruption of the Mexican War when mobilizing for a vaster conflict thirteen years later. The 
War of 1812 and the Mexican War revealed that harmful mobilization practices and conflicts of 
authority between the federal government and the states, born in the eighteenth century, were 
alive and well. Yet localism prompted many Americans to draw inaccurate lessons from their 
wars with Britain and Mexico: glossing over fiascos caused by bad policy, poor leadership, and 
unreliable state troops, they viewed these short-term volunteers as the heroes of both conflicts 
and downplayed the need for real military readiness.77  
Other simplistic notions persisted as well. For a century after the Civil War, historians 
carried the same assumption as many Americans before and during the conflict, that a “cavalier” 
or “militant” South enjoyed a distinct advantage over the North thanks to southerners’ greater 
expertise in warlike activities.78 But the condition of prewar New York and Massachusetts 
volunteers partially supports counterarguments made by scholars since the 1960’s.79 On the eve 
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of the Civil War, New York’s uniformed state militia was the largest in the nation—larger even 
than the U. S. Army—and rivaled only by that of the Bay State in proficiency. The past year had 
seen expansion as volunteers responded to darkening war clouds by forming new companies.80 
Militia commanders, eager to serve the state and Union, pushed for greater preparation and 
offered their forces to meet any needs of Morgan and Lincoln’s governments.81 But these calls 
were largely unheeded. State Senator Francis B. Spinola’s proposal on January 2, 1861, that New 
York appropriate ten million dollars to arm the militia and offer it to the general government 
exemplified common sentiment regarding military readiness—and so did the Senate’s unanimous 
vote to put the proposal off for another day. For every voice praising the militia and calling for 
readiness, there were several voices scoffing at their need. In 1860, the Military Gazette had 
declared that the state militia was in “its darkest hour” due to declining legislative support and 
funding. That December, the state adjutant general noted that “whatever of assistance has been 
derived from the State, has been wrung from it like agony, and when yielded, it has come almost 
with derision.” Considering “the present questionable status of the Union,” he added, “parsimony 
like this appears to have been singularly mal-opportune.” Modern weaponry was lacking and 
many militiamen failed to appear for training.82 New Yorkers often dismissed military service as 
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a needless expense, a patronage plum for corrupt politicians, and an overall joke—an attitude 
that in some cases would survive into the post-Fort Sumter mobilization.83 Glittering volunteer 
corps belied the fact that most people were not interested in military matters and that state and 
nation were manifestly unprepared for war.84 (That New York’s uniformed militia was 
considered one of the best state forces in the nation is instructive in this regard.) These attitudes 
foreshadowed how New Yorkers would feel during the conflict—in most cases, they held great 
interest in events and supported the war, but saw mobilization as a voluntary process, one in 
which they would only participate on their terms.  
Lincoln and his fellow loyal citizens hoped to restore the Union quickly despite their 
unpreparedness. The president’s April 15 proclamation established Union war aims: to retake 
government property in the South, crush the illegal, immoral rebellion, and restore federal law. 
In refusing to recognize the Confederacy and calling on Americans to defeat this corrupt 
insurrection, as Russell A. McClintock explains, Lincoln meant to “tap into the sense of outrage 
that he hoped would well up throughout the loyal states following the attack on Fort Sumter.”85 
Widespread, enthusiastic public support was critical to a successful war effort and might hasten 
victory. Indeed, many scholars and popular writers have interpreted behavior by Americans north 
and south at war’s beginning as evidence of a foolish assumption that their side would win 
quickly, and probably in a single battle.86 Northerners certainly displayed naiveté early on as 
they struggled to handle this war of unprecedented size. For instance, citizens who offered 
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cavalry forces were initially turned away by federal and state officials, who considered horsemen 
a needless expense and only saw the error of this assumption months later.87 Furthermore, the 
language and actions of authorities indicated desire for haste. United States officers stood by 
ready to muster in volunteers at Albany and other rendezvous within days of Lincoln’s 
proclamation, and Cameron repeatedly thanked Morgan for his “alacrity and promptness” in 
meeting calls for troops.88 
Some historians have pointed out, however, that despite Union officials’ hopes, they 
knew better than to count on a quick or easy victory.89 Lincoln waited only for confirmation that 
loyal Americans would support mobilization, then expanded upon his April 15 call.90 On April 
19, the president proclaimed a naval blockade of the rebellious states; one week later, he 
approved an expansion of the regular army and navy and opted to allow most of the seventy-five 
thousand militia to enroll for three years’ service.91 Lincoln authorized a modified version of 
these proposals on May 3 when he called for forty-two thousand infantry and cavalry volunteers 
enlisted for three years (now in addition to the three-month militia) along with increases to 
federal forces. Soon Cameron’s department enlarged the size of regiments to over one thousand 
men and asked governors to muster all volunteers still at home for three years rather than three 
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months.92 (After Fort Sumter, Cameron and another cabinet member had proposed a call-up of 
five hundred thousand men, which Lincoln rejected in favor of Seward’s less radical suggestion 
of seventy-five thousand.)93 General Scott advised Morgan to place the majority of the two-
years’ men in training camps in order to use the time wisely, since “most of these regiments are 
not likely to take the field much before frost,” and Morgan predicted that artillery would soon be 
needed in addition to infantry.94 All of these actions indicated that officials planned for a 
potentially long conflict. In the fraught atmosphere of the spring of 1861, Lincoln, Cameron, and 
Morgan had to work within the system available to them while devising creative improvements 
for tomorrow. By calling for ninety-day state militiamen, the Lincoln administration indicated no 
assurance that victory would be quick and easy, but rather recognition that mobilization was 
ultimately voluntary. Cameron’s April 15 requisition was not an overconfident or even a 
confident document but a desperate one. Northerners did indeed respond to Fort Sumter with the 
outraged patriotism Lincoln desired, but his and others’ fears that the war would not be ended 
quickly also proved sadly correct. Fortunately for the Union, the governor of the wealthiest and 
most populous state was an energetic war supporter.  
Yet relations between state and federal officials led New Yorkers to wonder if 
bureaucratic inefficiency would leave their ardor wasted. Cameron quickly showed himself to be 
an incompetent War Department chief.95 After discouraging dealings with Cameron, New York’s 
governor privately remarked that the “Govt at Washington seems less warlike than here or in any 
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part of the North,” a frustration others shared.96 Disputes with national officials over state 
sovereignty marked New York’s war effort throughout 1861 and beyond, but especially in the 
three months after Fort Sumter fell. Morgan’s stoic dedication and administrative skill were 
constantly tested by power struggles between him, Washington, the Military Board, and the 
private associations and individuals that took on much of the job of raising and equipping troops 
in the absence of suitable government infrastructure. These tensions caused maddening delays at 
a time when most people sought haste.97  
Decades-old questions of state versus federal authority in troop-raising—along with 
bureaucratic inexperience and ineptitude—prompted uncertainty over whether certain New York 
regiments were state militia or volunteers, which quota they should count toward, and whether 
they should be mustered in for three months, two years, or three years. More than once, Morgan 
explained to Cameron that the militia called out under Lincoln’s April 15 call “are not 
considered in the thirty thousand[,] they being minute men sent forward on the spur of the 
occasion, to be replaced as soon as the volunteers could be raised,” as he noted in one message.98 
Morgan had obtained special permission from Cameron to have his thirty thousand volunteers 
federally mustered for two years (as promulgated in New York’s April 16 act) after arguing that 
changing plans would be disastrous, but the question surfaced repeatedly and soon caused 
dissatisfaction among the soldiers.99 Compounding the confusion were fourteen regiments of 
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three-years’ men raised by the Union Defense Committee, which were finally added to the 
state’s quota in May after a byzantine, three-way dispute between Morgan, the Lincoln 
Administration, and the committee.100 At this early stage of the war, Lincoln’s government was 
almost entirely reliant on state troop-raising efforts; in their zeal and confusion, however, the 
president and secretary of war granted authorizations to raise units to groups and private 
individuals, an imposition that led to the appointment of novice political officers and which 
Morgan and his fellow governors decried.101 One of the worst outcomes of this disregard for 
state sovereignty involved one Frederick George D’Utassy, a Hungarian who claimed military 
expertise, accepted more than sixty thousand dollars in private and association funds to raise a 
regiment called the “Garibaldi Guard” or “First Foreign Rifles,” and eventually was imprisoned 
for massive fraud against the government.102 Daniel E. Sickles, an infamous Tammany politico 
who had gone over Morgan’s head for permission to form a brigade, then caused additional 
trouble by filling it with men from other states, exhorted the governor to accept his unauthorized 
command so that it could leave for the front: 
It is too bad to send away two thousand good and brave men for a mere question 
of Bureau Etiquette. Can you imagine that [Confederate President] Jef. Davis or 
Governor Letcher [of Virginia] would hesitate in such a moment? Please take ‘the 
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responsibility’—we need this in our Governor. The city of New York will furnish 
all our uniforms, Equipment and Arms if need be … only give us the word—only 
say—and your allowance is sufficient—that we are accepted in the service of the 
State.103 
Sickles and his Excelsior Brigade soon received orders for Virginia.104 The larger issue was 
momentarily resolved by September, when Lincoln referred the author of an outlandish troop-
raising plan to the governors, who “say they cannot and will not continue the effort with this 
individual competition constantly thwarting them.”105 On September 16, the Adjutant General’s 
Office finally placed recruiters in the loyal states, acting on War Department authority, under the 
control of their governors.106 
In an era of small government and considerable state pride, Morgan personally took on 
more responsibility in the Union war effort than Sickles appreciated. The Treasury Department 
appointed Morgan an agent to handle government funds for transporting troops and supplies, and 
Cameron accepted his advice on mobilization.107 Raising enough troops was the paramount war 
concern for Morgan, followed closely by the desperate need for sufficient arms and equipment 
and improving defenses in New York Harbor and along the Canadian border. Thanks to his ally 
and fellow New Yorker Secretary Seward, Morgan managed to get all regiments raised in the 
state counted toward its quota despite other cabinet members’ fears that it would cause jealousy 
                                                 
103 Sickles to Morgan, n.d. (summer or fall 1861), reel 30, ibid (quote); Sickles to “My Dear Seymour,” July 2, 
Letters from Sickles, box 1, folder 12, Daniel Edgar Sickles Papers, New York Public Library; Joseph Hopkins 
Twitchell to father, May 15, in Joseph Hopkins Twitchell, The Civil War Letters of Joseph Hopkins Twitchell: A 
Chaplain’s Story, ed. Peter Messent and Steve Courtney (Athens and London: University of Georgia Press, 2006), 
25-26. 
104 Frederick Phisterer, New York in the War of the Rebellion, 1861-1865, 3rd ed. (Albany: J.B. Lyon Co., 1912), 1: 
725-726. 
105 Lincoln to Joshua Harrison, September 16, reel 31, EDM Papers, NYSL. 
106 OR, ser. 3, vol. 1, 518. 
107 Salmon P. Chase to Morgan, April 30, and Cameron to Morgan, April 26, April 29, box 3, EDM Papers, NYSL. 
100 
 
in other states.108 New York affairs did influence mobilization in other states: The governor of 
Ohio, for instance, cited New York’s extra troops in petitioning Cameron to accept forty 
additional companies of Ohio men.109 One of the best-known sovereignty battles involved 
Morgan’s insistence that his state have authority to appoint generals for its troops, a common 
plea among governors. In an argument echoed by other New Yorkers, Morgan told Cameron that 
this was only just given the Empire State’s contributions, but Cameron replied that suspending 
the president’s exclusive privilege of appointing generals for one state would mean having to 
suspend it for all.110 Citing federal incompetence, New Yorkers indignantly pressed Morgan for 
greater state control of troop-raising throughout the first year of the war.111 Given other factors 
inhibiting mobilization in New York, especially lack of funds, equipment, and experienced 
officers to run federally authorized rendezvous, it was no contradiction that they also urged the 
War Department to muster New York regiments into federal service as soon as possible in order 
to lessen burdens upon the state.112 
Americans of the era and historians since recognized that “marshalling the resources 
necessary [for mobilization] required an extraordinary coordination between the federal 
government and the states,” especially between Lincoln and the governors, as Stephen D. Engle 
asserts.113 New York’s government received early and fierce criticism from opponents and allies 
alike for delays that were not always the fault of Albany officials. Émigré and activist Carl 
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Schurz, after convincing Lincoln to appoint him the commander of a German-American New 
York brigade, claimed that “something must be done to overcome the red-tape in this state, 
which rests like an incubus on our whole military business.”114 Several historians have similarly 
given Morgan and his fellow governors low marks in mobilization, noting the poor job of their 
states in recruiting and their jealous guarding of states’ rights, which put the Union at a 
disadvantage in the first half of the war.115 Morgan’s one biographer, James A. Rawley, better 
appreciates how Morgan bent his considerable energy and talents toward a daunting task, using 
them in attempting to overcome red tape and his own lack of military expertise.116 In this 
Morgan was aided by a military staff that included several skilled men—such as young lawyer 
George Bliss, Jr., and future president Chester A. Arthur, both of whom worked tirelessly and 
efficiently despite their lack of experience—as well as a few duds who mostly owed their 
positions to political connections. Adjutant General Read, formerly a leading Wide Awake, was 
keen but unsuited to his crucial position and soon replaced by the more capable Thomas 
Hillhouse.117 In recognition of Morgan’s services, the War Department appointed him a major 
general in late 1861. The state judge-advocate-general urged Morgan to appoint only New 
Yorkers to his general staff, for such men knew the ins and outs of the New York volunteer 
system better than did U. S. officers.118 
 Lincoln had hoped to rely on popular enthusiasm in calling for troops, but the public 
reaction to Fort Sumter and troop calls struck observers as unprecedented and even unbelievable 
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in its intensity.119 The telegraph and daily papers sped the news across New York and the nation, 
and loyal citizens were immediately consumed by a martial furor that had been building since 
April 12 and was unsurpassed by anything seen in America before or since.120 Echoing Lincoln’s 
language to Morgan, a New York official later described the actions of Yates County residents as 
“literally an uprising of the people,” a description that fit behavior across New York and the 
North.121 Despite their localism and deep social and political divisions, New Yorkers were united 
in wanting to preserve what they saw as the best government in the world, and they demanded 
that Washington be protected and the Union restored. As the New York Evening Post explained, 
both the authorities and the people had duties to perform: 
To-day the nation looks to the government to put down treason for ever. It will 
not grudge the men or the money which are needed. We have enjoyed for eighty 
years the blessings of liberty and constitutional government. It is a small sacrifice 
we are now to lay upon the altar. … Let but the government prove itself equal to 
the great occasion, and the people will not fail it.122 
Other influential voices also alluded to every citizen’s “duty” to demonstrate patriotic support 
and fight if needed.123 Confederates had revealed their dangerous aggression by firing first, and 
even Democrats bitterly opposed to Lincoln’s administration and any plans to invade the South 
called for saving the national capital from rebel attack.124  
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Whatever their motives, most New Yorkers met war’s outbreak with even more fervent 
dedication than they did political campaigns. A wave of “Union” or “war meetings” in the 
coming weeks demonstrated the commitment of communities across the state and all classes of 
people, who understood that action must be wedded to rhetoric.125 On the morning of April 15—
even before people knew precisely what would be expected of them—Buffalo newspapers 
carried notices for a meeting to be held for creating “a force of minute men, who will hold 
themselves in readiness to proceed to serve in defence of the State or National Government 
forthwith.” The turnout for the gathering was so large it grew nearly unmanageable, but many 
volunteers were secured.126 Two days later, journeymen printers in Brooklyn held a meeting, 
adopting resolutions that deplored war’s effects on business but “affirmed their devotion to the 
Government and their readiness to fight in its defense.” The printers organized themselves into a 
company and pledged their services “wherever and whenever required.”127 A Union meeting in 
Ithaca was typical of such public gatherings. Responding to a printed notice and, undoubtedly, 
word of mouth, a large crowd filled the town hall on the evening of April 24. After a rendition of 
“Yankee Doodle” by Whitlock’s Brass Band, the appointed chairman, Judge H. S. Walbridge, 
got the meeting underway. A militia colonel then gave a speech on “the necessity of sustaining 
and supporting the Government; that no other course, except to retain the National Capitol and 
guard public property, was left, and urged upon all the patriotic position of upholding the Stars 
and Stripes.” The colonel followed his speech by moving that a committee of five be formed to 
draw up resolutions. Chairman Walbridge appointed the committee members, who retired to 
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deliberate. After the crowd listened to another patriotic address, the committee returned with 
resolutions calling for all citizens to support the government in the war and rejecting Confederate 
actions as traitorous and illegal. Those assembled adopted the resolutions without dissent and 
then called for several more speakers, who proposed subscriptions to meet volunteers’ travel 
expenses and provide support for their families. This was met with a resolution that the village 
trustees be asked to appropriate up to $2,000 for family relief. The meeting finally adjourned 
after “six cheers for our flag and our country.”128 Many meetings followed this basic pattern, 
often with the addition of enlistments of local men into the militia or volunteers. Hundreds of 
such public gatherings across the state and nation established the primary roles of communities 
in mobilization: leadership by local elites, expressions of patriotic support, and raising of troops 
and funds for their families.  
The uniformed state forces, meanwhile, answered Lincoln’s April 15 militia call. On 
April 17, Albany authorities detailed New York City’s First Division—the best-prepared men in 
the state—for immediate service, and the Seventh Regiment received orders to leave first.129 
Even the elite Seventh suffered from equipment shortages, however—shortages that were partly 
filled thanks to prosperous patriots, including showman P. T. Barnum, who subscribed thousands 
of dollars for the regiment.130 Manhattanites cheered on April 19 as they watched the National 
Guards depart for the endangered national capital, with new recruits in civilian clothing 
marching alongside guardsmen in their famous gray uniforms.131 By May, eleven militia 
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regiments in total would leave the state for three months’ service, while four others would 
volunteer for three years, exceeding the state’s militia quota by several hundred.132 Even before 
the state militia marched off for Washington, New Yorkers had thrown themselves into raising 
the two-year, thirty-thousand-strong volunteer force authorized under the April 16 law. 
Newspapers reported an avalanche of exciting developments: Morgan received some fifty offers 
of volunteers per day, Ellsworth was recruiting a force of zouaves from New York City firemen 
amid a host of other new regiments, and three companies had already filled in Albany. By April 
23, the state had 114 companies enrolled.133  
The contrast between prewar and early wartime feeling was especially striking in New 
York City. Mayor Fernando Wood, Archbishop John Hughes, and others who had very recently 
sided with the South now used their positions to proclaim support for the Union cause.134 George 
T. Strong was relieved, proud, and awestruck by the “national movement here in New York and 
through all the Free States,” which he found “magnificent.”  The metropolis so recently home to 
widespread southern sympathies now saw Union-loving mobs intimidate offices of the Herald 
and other Democratic newspapers into displaying the Stars and Stripes. Indeed, the American 
flag took on new importance and ubiquity, appearing on buildings and lampposts everywhere.135 
“Recruiting, enrolling, organizing and drilling seem indeed the order of the day,” with 
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volunteering “almost universal,” the Herald observed.136 The public’s volunteer spirit seemed 
only to grow as days passed; in New York City, the first of the state’s new volunteer regiments 
filled its 780-man complement by noon on April 19. Other city regiments, many of them 
recruiting in separate wards and bearing colorful names like the National Minute Men and the 
Scott Life Guard, were not far behind.137 Residents of Gotham provided perhaps the most 
stunning display of patriotism in American history on April 20. Five days before, a committee of 
top merchants and other city leaders had begun planning a public Union meeting, and the 
Chamber of Commerce then mailed notices to various city elites informing them of their 
selection as vice-presidents for the meeting, taking pains to include prominent Democrats.138 The 
resulting rally in Manhattan’s Union Square was a magnificent spectacle. Twenty speakers 
harangued an enthusiastic crowd of at least one hundred thousand, who were also gratified by the 
presence of Fort Sumter’s returned defenders and their battered garrison flag. Leading New 
Yorkers at the meeting founded the Union Defense Committee, charged with securing money for 
the war effort.139 Like countless smaller meetings before and after, the Union Square rally—
possibly the largest public gathering seen in the Western Hemisphere up to that time—
demonstrated how the nation’s war effort from its beginning relied on the more-or-less voluntary 
leadership of community elites and the popular support of the masses. 
Several historians such as James M. McPherson and David J. Eicher share an assumption 
that Americans in the war’s first few months arrogantly expected a quick and easy triumph over 
their enemies, only adopting more realistic views after the shocking events of the Battle of Bull 
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Run.140 But evidence indicates that New Yorkers, at least, anticipated a costly struggle. “The last 
fond hope of a peaceful adjustment seems blighted,” a St. Lawrence County editor noted on 
April 19, “and civil war, with all its horrors, rises dark and foreboding before us.” A colleague in 
Clinton County blamed the war on southerners and Republicans alike and predicted it soon 
would “desolate many a fair portion of our glorious Union.” Bennett’s Herald interpreted public 
concern with events as an “intelligent appreciation of the misfortunes that are impending over us. 
The history of the world does not record any event so pregnant with calamity to the whole 
human race as the inauguration of civil war in this once happy and prosperous country.” 
Influential Democrats such as these had pushed for compromise and continued to anticipate 
disastrous consequences of war even as they mostly agreed on the necessity of mobilization.141 
Democrats and Republicans alike evinced a healthy respect for their southern foes, whom they 
believed were gifted soldiers and currently raising a strong force that threatened the national 
capital.142  
What, then, explains the intense popular enthusiasm that greeted calls for troops? Some 
northerners rejected gloom and welcomed war as an economic boon, a chance for glory, or a 
purifying force that would end slavery or encourage public-spirited sacrifice.143 The stereotype 
of a naïve soldiery held true for some volunteers; as the New York Seventh steamed south to 
war, a  member noted that “a large number of the men, especially the younger ones, seem to look 
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upon the whole affair as a gigantic spree, and to form no true conception of the serious character 
of the undertaking.”144 Days earlier, however, a potential Seventh recruit had maintained: “I am 
not excited over this at all, but look at it seriously and as a matter of duty, for us all to help 
sustain the honor of our government when it is in danger.”145 Citizens often recognized that 
while it was the government’s responsibility to defeat the rebellion, victory would depend on a 
united effort by all loyal citizens. New Yorkers of both major parties expressed relief at the 
newfound unity of the North and commonly agreed that the Union could only be saved through a 
sustained, all-out war to crush secessionism for good. “The war must be pushed until the traitors 
are annihilated or lashed into allegiance,” Thurlow Weed’s Albany Evening Journal declared. “A 
million of freemen are ready to respond to the call of their country. Let those who have drawn 
the sword perish by the sword.”146 The New York Sunday Mercury—no friend to Lincoln’s 
administration—predicted that the North would wage this great conflict “with a vigor, an 
enthusiasm, and an intensity never equaled since the days of the Crusades,” and in July, New 
York City residents petitioned the president to punish southern “traitors” severely.147 The 
Democratic Brooklyn Daily Eagle, noting that passions were aroused on both sides and that the 
war would be bitter and costly, argued: 
The free states must send forth the flower of their population; must drain their 
pockets deep, and be prepared for an effort that will call for their whole strength 
and all their available resources. To enter upon the contest in any other spirit and 
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with limited forces would be to invite inglorious disaster. … There are stern times 
ahead.148 
Citizens who called for large-scale mobilization evoked, without necessarily knowing it, the 
famous Levée en Masse issued by the French government in 1793, a groundbreaking decree that 
established the principle of a nation’s power to compel all citizens to devote their energies to the 
war effort.149 Americans had rejected federal proposals for conscription since the nation’s 
founding, but the spring of 1861 saw calls for something approaching a levée en masse and total 
war.150 Influential citizens such as newspaper editors were calling on the government to assume 
large powers in the interests of victory, presaging a military draft and the great conflicts of the 
next century.  
They were in for a tough fight, New Yorkers realized, but many drew confidence from 
their larger population and resources compared to those of the Confederacy. If employed 
properly, these advantages could help secure a speedy victory with light casualties. With the 
Confederacy posing “such an enemy to the liberties of man,” a Watertown paper asserted, “there 
is no peace policy for freemen, but by deciding at once and forever our military superiority. The 
quicker and more decisively this is done, the sooner will peace be restored” with minimal loss of 
life.151 Officers of the elite Fifth New York Zouaves asked the Union Defense Committee to 
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supply them with the best rifle-muskets available. “It is important,” they explained, “that those 
who are first in the field and first in conflict should be well armed; for if they are so it may save 
millions of money and rivers of blood.”152  
Speed and overwhelming force were key. In contrast to later complaints of high quotas, 
many New Yorkers in the war’s early weeks—motivated by state pride and the exigencies of the 
hour—believed their state and nation were not martialing sufficient forces and called for larger 
appropriations of funds and troops.153 A blistering editorial in the normally pro-administration 
New York Times accused the president’s cabinet of a cowardice and insufficient vigor that 
threatened to kill the “ardor of youth” on which the Union cause relied. Morgan and his 
government received similar angry complaints from New Yorkers who were not accustomed to 
the Empire State taking a back seat to others in the Union and expected New York to have a 
leading role. (Such complaints showed little appreciation for the numerous legal and logistical 
stumbling-blocks hindering the war effort.)154 New Yorkers responded to Lincoln’s May 3 
authorization of an increase in forces and switch to three-year enlistments with excited 
approval.155 They also closely followed attitudes and war preparations in other states.156 A 
Syracuse resident expressed humiliation at the energetic efforts of Massachusetts in comparison 
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with New York and informed Morgan that many Syracusans believe their state was “ingloriously 
inactive in the present emergency of our country.”157 The Plattsburgh Republican, a Democratic 
paper, had responded to war preparations by declaring that “the enemies of compromise are the 
enemies of the Union.” By early May, however, the Republican acknowledged: “This section of 
the State is a great military hive, filled with vigorous, patriotic fighting men,” and deplored a 
“Disheartening Rumor” that the Military Board might get the state’s quota reduced back to 
seventeen thousand.158 Speed and acceptance of all offered troops would maintain the popular 
support that was so vital, war supporters believed, while hesitation over red tape would be fatal. 
“The enthusiasm here is rising every hour,” Thurlow Weed wrote Morgan from New York City 
on April 23. “It is fearfully high! Everything must be done to foster it. Accept, I pray you, all the 
troops you can from the city. A two-fold good is accomplished by it. A recoil would be 
destructive.”159  
To an extent these assumptions were accurate, as volunteers expressed discouragement at 
delays.160 But other New Yorkers counseled patience and exhorted loyal citizens to stay in the 
fight until victory was won. “Let us hope that it may be a brief war—measured by months and 
not by years,” a Long Island editor noted in a common sentiment, “but whether short or long, let 
treason and traitors be punished as they deserve.”161 In July, a Delaware County paper, citing 
New York’s dismal record in the War of 1812, speculated that if the current war proved a long 
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one the state would likely need to draft men to fill its quotas.162 New York officials would plan 
for a state draft the following year but never implement it, unlike several other states. The 
Union’s war, while revolutionary in many ways, never involved a levée en masse. 
Limits in mobilization stemmed from social as well as legal considerations. Despite their 
acute understanding of the need for steady reinforcement, white New Yorkers overwhelmingly 
opposed opening the ranks to African Americans. When the war began, New York’s white 
majority found rare common ground in judging the significance of slavery to events and the role 
that African Americans should play in the Union cause. While southerners had embarked on 
what the Tribune called a “Pro-Slavery Rebellion” (which many New Yorkers believed was also 
caused by meddlesome abolitionists), northerners should fight to put down that rebellion and not 
to free slaves. Several conservative papers attacked Greeley and the Tribune for promoting a war 
of abolition, and a Plattsburgh sheet noted increased appreciation for liberty among northerners 
but pointed out the lack of legal authority to interfere with slavery.163 A war to defeat the “Slave 
Power” need not require abolishing the asset that gave the rebels their power.164 Furthermore, 
and despite the well-known service of black New Yorkers in the Revolution, whites in 1861 
tended to oppose any black participation in this new conflict.165  
Members of that abused race had a different perspective on events. J. Matthew Gallman 
identifies a shared consciousness among northern blacks in wartime: the “conversation in the 
black community” about the war, he writes, “was consistently about collective obligations and 
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aspirations, whereas much of the popular prescription in white obligations concerned the 
personal decisions of individuals.”166 This is seen in black New Yorkers’ response to war’s 
outbreak and mobilization. From Frederick Douglass down, the state’s African Americans 
commonly opposed secession and often expressed willingness to enlist, but insisted they would 
fight only for emancipation, not a union of states that had long denied them human rights.167 In 
April 1861, the New York Anglo-African criticized whites for not making abolition a war aim 
and laid out blacks’ conditions should they be called to service: “To let the Government take care 
of itself, and give our labors for the slave, and the slave alone.”168 Frederick Douglass’ Monthly 
similarly called for abolition as a war measure and asserted that a Union victory would hinge on 
black freedom and service.169 More than once in the war’s first months, black men in New York 
City held patriotic meetings and marches that were violently broken up by whites—sometimes 
led by police—who declared in one incident that “niggers could not be allowed to carry that 
[American] flag.”170 Black efforts to raise companies farther upstate also met with defeat.171 The 
dominant white attitude toward black service was reinforced in July 1861 when the U. S. 
Congress resolved that the war was being waged for the Constitution and the Union, not 
emancipation.172 White northern opposition to black service remained the leading attitude until 
much later in the war, when the pressing need for manpower began to vie with racist 
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sensibilities.173 The Navy had long accepted free black recruits, if tepidly, and continued the 
policy when war began.174 Despite discouragement, blacks and their allies continued to offer 
their services to the government, and the insightful Anglo-African predicted that the illegal slave 
trade would soon end and northern blacks be enrolled in a fight for freedom.175  
 Confronted with the greatest threat to the nation since the Revolution and inadequate 
state and federal resources to meet it, New Yorkers fell back upon their various leaders and 
communities to channel popular zeal into action. Relying upon this enthusiasm and associational 
culture, elites in all fields and their institutions promoted military and monetary volunteering. 
Local pride played a key part as citizens connected the raising and support of forces with the 
honor of their counties, towns, and villages. Under the headline “COPENHAGEN AHEAD!” a 
newspaper of that Lewis County village reported that the local company would be “the first 
company from this county. The merchants and clerks in New York [City], formerly from this 
county, have offered a prize of $500 to the first company organized in this county.”176 Referring 
to troops recruited around Corning, a paper of that town called it “gratifying that the Regiment is 
made up of Companies raised in this vicinity. There will naturally be more regard for the sick 
and wounded, and the band of friendship already existing, must become stronger as common 
dangers and suffering tend to bring them closer fellowship.”177 The Fort Edward Ledger proudly 
reported: “Men and money in proportion to our population will be ready at the call of duty,” and 
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invoked the town’s rich Revolutionary War heritage.178 Such mobilization of community was 
localism at its finest. 
Within municipalities, associations took on much of the labor of raising troops through 
inspiration and financial support.179 New York City’s Chamber of Commerce responded to 
Lincoln’s first call by holding a meeting in which members immediately subscribed $21,000 in 
aid for volunteers and their families.180 The Albany Common Council pledged five thousand 
dollars for soldiers’ families, the first of six installments made in the first months of war. 
Businesses in the city promised to keep paying their employees who volunteered, and artists 
contributed works to the local volunteer fund, raising one thousand dollars for soldiers’ 
families.181 Banks in Ulster County contributed four thousand dollars to feed and equip the 
Twentieth Militia, known as the Ulster Guard, while the county bible society presented each 
departing militiaman with a copy of the New Testament. Prominent Kingston banker Henry H. 
Reynolds guided efforts by local women to supply members of the Twentieth with clothing 
during their service, and the men named their camp in his honor.182 Congressman Joseph W. 
Corning recruited volunteers from his law office in Palmyra, Wayne County; his fellow Palmyra 
residents raised over $3,300 for the war on April 24 alone. When local volunteers prepared to 
leave, a minister addressed them with the promise that “we who stay at home will remember you 
when you are away. We will remember your families, and assure you that they shall be cared 
for.” Three Wayne County doctors offered to treat volunteers’ families for free during their 
service; meanwhile, veterans of the War of 1812 and men exempt from militia duty organized 
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themselves into home guard companies.183 The events noted here were repeated throughout the 
state, for New Yorkers recognized the need for financial and other forms of support in 
mobilization and readily accepted its burdens. Early on, many believed that all should contribute 
to the cause, if not with their bodies then with their money or other assets—a tradition extending 
back to the revolutionary era.184 The local family support committee in Ithaca urged that more 
people contribute by pointing out that the fund was pro-rata: as more subscribed, less money 
would be taken from each, and taking the full amount pledged by the many contributors who had 
limited means would be a “heavy burden” to them.185 But the notion of universal duty to the 
cause was subject to modifications and exceptions that became increasingly obvious as northern 
unity fell apart. Financial contribution remained a viable and important method of supporting the 
Union among all classes, however.186 The trend of associational support for recruitment 
continued past 1861 around the country, as seen in the raising of the Pennsylvania Corn 
Exchange Regiment and the Chicago Board of Trade and Mercantile Batteries, along with the 
Buffalo Board of Trade’s support for the 100th New York Infantry, all of which began in the 
summer of 1862. 
 Established societies joined forces—and sometimes clashed—with newer ones. The 
organizers of Albany’s volunteer fund were hardly the only association specially formed for the 
war effort. In the frenetic atmosphere of the war’s first year, one group loomed as the most 
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consequential and controversial: the Union Defense Committee of the City of New York. 
Formed at the Union Square rally, officially named on April 23, and boasting a roster that 
included Mayor Wood and thirty-one other city elites, the committee contributed mightily to the 
Union cause even as it provoked the ire of Morgan and others for being presumptuous and 
inefficient.187 Initially presided over by politician and general John A. Dix, then ex-governor and 
senator Hamilton Fish, the UDC had an Executive Committee, eight sub-committees, and offices 
on Pine Street where members met daily. Members were entrusted with large responsibility and 
funds. In addition to money the committee received from the Chamber of Commerce and 
individual subscriptions, the Board of Councilmen authorized a one-million-dollar appropriation 
(which the city comptroller raised through Union Defence Fund Bonds) to the UDC for 
equipping troops, and the Board of Aldermen gave it half a million to support soldiers’ 
families.188 Executive Committee members identified their duties in language that summarized 
the mission of the entire UDC: “to accelerate and facilitate the organization of forces, the 
transportation of troops and provisions, and the cooperation of popular action in all loyal parts of 
the country.”189 The committee arranged for reduced shipping costs on the Hudson River 
Railroad, sent men to reopen and maintain the lines at Annapolis, and chartered vessels for 
transporting troops and supplies. It monitored private communications for espionage and worked 
with officials to control movement into Washington. Committee members followed affairs in the 
border states, sent arms to Union loyalists around the country, and gathered information on 
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numbers and conditions of troops raised throughout the Union for the War Department.190 The 
Ladies’ Association of the Union Defense Committee vowed to “prepare lint and Bandages for 
the wounded in the coming war.”191 The Committee for Aid to Regiments—a sub-committee of 
the UDC that included Mayor Wood and the president of the Board of Aldermen—supplied units 
with everything from flannel drawers, to mountain howitzers, to money for officers’ expenses.192 
In just an eighteen-day period in May, the UDC received nearly $177,000 in private 
subscriptions.193 With private aid for individual regiments pouring into the committee’s accounts 
and officers pressing for funds to raise and complete their commands, the organization spent 
large amounts on city forces. Recipients, however, included D’Utassy’s problematic Garibaldi 
Guard and the Mozart Regiment, a command ostensibly raised by Mozart Hall but which 
received over $87,000 from the UDC and had to be completed with six companies from other 
states.194 The UDC was far from perfect, but it filled crucial gaps in the war effort. “I want all the 
money I can get to put my men in condition to be of service to the Country,” ran a typical 
missive from a colonel to a UDC member. “The state is doing nothing.”195  
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Albany officials, of course, had a far different perspective. The zeal and heavy 
responsibilities of the UDC—which sometimes caused delays and wastage—led to numerous 
accusations of fecklessness.196 By the time another sub-committee of the UDC formed to meet 
with Lincoln on May 17 and address the fourteen regiments dispute, the committee had already 
expended nearly half of its one-million-dollar city appropriation (including $280,000 on troops 
forming in New York City), and the prospect of some of these funds going to waste provided 
impetus for overriding Morgan.197 This quarrel was by no means the extent of friction over 
authority between the state and the committee, despite committee members’ attempts to 
cooperate with officials and maintain the government’s term of service and inspection standards 
for the volunteers the UDC helped raise.198 Hamilton Fish protested to an angry Morgan that 
UDC members had not sought their “arduous” duties; the people had given them to Fish and his 
associates.199 By early June, state inspections were still revealing equipment shortages among 
troops being prepared under the committee’s wing, but relations between its members and the 
governor had eased. On June 21, the committee reported that the city’s one-million-dollar 
appropriation was almost all spent, and its work and influence subsequently dropped off until 
further moneys were received in the fall; after another dormant period, the committee briefly 
revived with a new troop-raising campaign in the summer of 1862.200 The efforts of the famous 
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UDC were replicated elsewhere on a smaller scale; Yates County, for example, had a Union 
Vigilance Committee, with sub-committees in each town, which had a ten-thousand-dollar 
fundraising goal and secured one company of volunteers by May 2.201 For all its controversy, the 
Union Defense Committee provided services—particularly in funding volunteers—without 
which the North would have been even harder pressed in 1861. Allegations of meddling were 
inevitable given the competition for resources and the working at cross purposes that occurred 
among the various government levels and groups involved in the war effort. The UDC laid the 
groundwork for committees later in the war, such as the Loyal Leagues, that also provided a 
moral and financial bulwark to the Union.  
 Such was the state and nation’s unpreparedness in 1861 that not only associations but 
individuals of all stripes exerted more influence than in any American war since the Revolution 
or afterward. Just as they did in poor relief and other areas neglected by legislation, political, 
military, religious, and economic leaders filled voids in recruitment and fundraising, with 
governmental encouragement but decidedly mixed results. Dan Sickles—who showed little 
regard for his governor or state regulations, yet formed a brigade that went on to fight gallantly 
in many battles—was an extreme example of a trend that caused innumerable headaches for 
officials but also vitally strengthened the northern war effort.  Recruitment by social elites 
occurred across the Union, but was especially prevalent in the New York metropolitan area, with 
its huge population and numerous classes and associations. This practice laid bare a major 
weakness in nineteenth-century volunteer recruitment: the task largely fell to prospective 
commanders of companies and regiments, whose positions depended on their ability to field the 
requisite number of troops, not command experience. At its best, the trend produced regiments 
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like the Anderson Zouaves (later titled the Sixty-Second New York Infantry), which exemplified 
the power of inspiring personalities in raising troops. Soon after the war began, Manhattan 
attorney John Lafayette Riker called a group of gentlemen to a meeting at the Metropolitan Hotel 
and proposed forming a zouave regiment to be named after the hero of Fort Sumter, Robert 
Anderson, should he give his permission. Obtaining the major’s approval, Riker formed a 
committee to raise funds, which subscribers should deliver to Major Anderson himself, the 
president of the Mechanics’ Bank, and other worthies.202 Riker also gained support from the 
Union Defense Committee and a local minister who asked his congregation to contribute, but 
much of the credit for his success belonged to the major’s wife, Eliza Bayard Anderson, who 
formed a committee of her own with two other ladies and petitioned Lincoln to ensure the 
regiment was recognized.203 Riker secured all of the considerable funds needed to raise and outfit 
his regiment through associations and private subscriptions, though the War Department 
reimbursed some costs. The 950 men of the Anderson Zouaves marched to war that August 
under Colonel Riker, who would fall in battle the next year.204 Calvin E. Pratt, Henry Ruggles, 
and William H. Brown had a harder experience in recruiting their regiment: with no aid 
forthcoming from the UDC, the three men spent thousands of their own dollars until they got the 
unit accepted by the state and themselves commissioned to lead it.205 A diverse array of 
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figures—some with military experience, but many without—tried their hand at forming 
organizations, with widely varying levels of success. Inspiring leadership was just as 
indispensable in mobilization as it was in associational and reform culture.  
Elmer Ellsworth recruited troops through his celebrity and became the Union’s first 
martyr. Having determined to form a regiment from New York City’s famously tough volunteer 
firemen, Ellsworth accomplished his goal in under two weeks.206 The popular Ellsworth and his 
backers performed this feat with the help of funds supplied by the Union Defense Committee, the 
state government, and a subscription of over $30,000. In a situation repeated with many 
regiments formed of working-class men, the public both admired and feared the rowdy Fire 
Zouaves, who fought with immigrants while quartered at Castle Garden. The regiment departed 
New York for Washington on April 29 in a grand parade that included civilians of the regimental 
funding committee marching in front. Ellsworth’s men thus became the first volunteer regiment 
to leave its home state for the war—before the Military Board in Albany could accept and 
number the organization or federal officers could muster the men into service.207 “The whole 
country are watching the Regiment of New York Firemen,” a newspaper noted, but the 
command’s subsequent service indicated the dangers of haste in dispatching men to war. Poorly 
disciplined and demoralized by Ellsworth’s death at the hands of a Virginia secessionist, the 
vaunted Fire Zouaves became intractable and were finally discharged a full year early in May 
1862.208  
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While his regiment ultimately failed, young Ellsworth contributed to the Union cause 
with the formation of another, more reliable organization. Soon after the lamented colonel’s 
death, Albany citizens formed the Ellsworth Association of the State of New York. This body set 
out to organize a three-year regiment composed of one man from each town and ward in the 
state, carefully selected and funded by his fellow residents. Recruits had to meet a long list of 
qualifications that included being unmarried, of good morals, at least five feet eight inches tall, 
not older than thirty, and able to contribute twenty dollars toward the project.209 Some towns 
took to the Ellsworth Association campaign with vigor, selecting representative volunteers and 
raising subscriptions to pay for their equipment and entrance fees. Other New Yorkers scoffed at 
the project, however, and the regiment was finally completed by abandoning the original plan 
and accepting companies recruited with the normal standards. Still, the Forty-Fourth New York 
Volunteer Infantry—known as the Ellsworth Avengers or People’s Ellsworth Regiment—went 
on to fight with renown on numerous battlefields.210 With countless northerners aiming to take a 
hand in the cause and government oversight often at a minimum, the experiences of the many 
regiments recruited by associations and individuals in 1861 ranged from inspiring to 
ridiculous.211 A federal inspector summarized the situation on May 27 after determining that one 
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eighth of the men in ten regiments being raised by the Union Defense Committee were 
physically unfit for service. Pointing to “much confusion and clashing caused by the adverse 
opinions and interests of those engaged in raising and equipping these regiments,” he suggested 
the War Department send an energetic, experienced, high-ranking officer, regular or volunteer, to 
sort it all out.212 But with too few such officers to go around and support from Democrats 
essential, the federal and state governments turned to Sickles, the Union Defense Committee, and 
other groups and individuals. The Union would have been in dire straits without their zealous but 
sometimes inefficient and self-serving leadership. 
 In the first fourteen weeks of the Civil War, New Yorkers accomplished something like a 
miracle. A society marked by bitter divisions over how to deal with the breakup of the Union and 
unprepared for war was partly revolutionized by the attack of Fort Sumter and subsequent 
mobilization. Led by a governor who strove to do more than his part and other leaders of various 
backgrounds, citizens of the Empire State gladly assumed considerable sacrifices to their 
families and coffers, contributing tens of thousands of soldiers, millions of dollars, and 
immeasurable inspiration to their fellow Americans. A rollicking song composed anonymously 
in these first days of war included the chorus: “’Tis my delight, to march and fight / Like a New 
York Volunteer,” with verses praising the heroism of New York City and Massachusetts 
regiments alike as all marched south to save the capital from “traitors.”213 Clearly, localism did 
not prohibit New Yorkers from embracing a cause much larger than themselves or their own 
villages or city wards. The initial period of the war revealed the power of mass enthusiasm to 
partially overcome lack of government infrastructure when channeled through the close-knit 
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“WE WERE FOR GOING TO THE WAR IN OUR OWN WAY”:  
NEW YORKERS BATTLE FOR THEIR RIGHTS 
 
On the sweltering afternoon of July 21, 1861, a Union army of militiamen and volunteers 
fled in demoralization from the battlefield of Bull Run. This major defeat fewer than thirty miles 
from the national capital sent shockwaves through the northern states. Lincoln had urged on his 
apprehensive army commander by noting that his troops and the rebels were “all green alike.”1 
Two days after the battle, a newspaper on Long Island printed reports of a great victory at Bull 
Run, then acknowledged defeat farther down in the same column.2 More prominent New 
Yorkers likewise admitted that Bull Run was a stunning blow but urged state and national 
leaders to call up greater forces and reverse the tide. The general government, indeed, promptly 
authorized enrollment of half a million volunteers.3 Authorities finally seemed willing to 
organize the huge national army that many war supporters viewed as key for victory. Yet the 
skilled and irascible Inspector General of New York, Marsena R. Patrick, asked Morgan to 
relieve him from having to handle the state’s new levy. The first months of mobilization after 
Fort Sumter had revealed New York’s military departments capable of “neither order, system, 
efficiency, economy nor comfort for the troops,” Patrick wrote, but instead “results at once 
expensive to the State, subversive to good order, and at variance with all military discipline.”4 
Greenness and obtuseness at the federal and state levels prompted many volunteers to demand 
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greater attention to their rights as citizens and soldiers. New Yorkers and other northern 
volunteers had chosen to participate in the war and continued to exercise autonomy over how 
their service would proceed, leading to clashes with military and government authorities in the 
chaotic first twelve months of the war. 
In the patriotic euphoria that followed Fort Sumter and the calls for troops, northerners 
took heart as Democrats and Republicans dropped their differences and united for the Union 
cause. But political enmities were quite resilient and immediately colored mobilization. Under 
state party chairman Dean Richmond, New York “War Democrats” supported the Union cause 
but in many cases remained steadfastly opposed to Republican principles. “There never was 
greater use for party than now,” Richmond’s Albany Atlas and Argus declared in response to 
calls for bipartisanship. “It is in moments of civil commotion like these, that the vigilance of 
party is needed to protect the liberties of the people.” Democrats were “the only party that can 
carry on a successful war, or command an honorable and enduring peace.”5 An assemblyman 
from Queens County voted in favor of the bill for thirty thousand troops but blamed the “vile 
doctrines” of Republicans for secession and war. Likewise, the powerful Tammany faction 
sponsored a regiment while also criticizing the Union Defense Committee for its bipartisanship, 
and Democrats consistently claimed that members of their party enlisted in greater numbers than 
Republicans did.6 A smaller group of Democrats refused to go along with mobilization, calling 
for compromise and questioning Lincoln’s authority to order state militias into other states. 
These seeds of opposition laid early in the war would grow into heavy and sustained criticism of 
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Republican policies, especially emancipation and conscription, under Horatio Seymour.7 
Republicans, for their part, were hardly immune to factionalism.8 A young lawyer and 
abolitionist explained that he had joined the Seventh Regiment partly out of party and class 
pride. “Shall the Democratic rag-tag and bob-tail go out to war and strike good blows for the 
right,” he asked, “while we Republicans sit safely at home[?] … [S]hall culture and education 
deafen us to the call of honor and patriotism?”9 Partisanship colored mobilization as it did many 
aspects of New Yorkers’ public lives. 
 Questions regarding which groups would serve shaped the course of mobilization in the 
war’s first year. Officials and recruiters were supposed to base their actions on federal and state 
laws. At the beginning of mobilization, the U. S. Army relied on regulations dating from 1857, 
during peacetime. State troops had their own regulations but came under United States orders 
when they mustered into federal service.10 In New York, the Military Board adopted federal 
regulations in cases where they did not conflict with state law.11 Until a new system took over in 
1863, field officers appointed by the Adjutant General supervised the army’s recruiting service 
from three headquarters, including Fort Columbus in New York Harbor.12 Many problems in 
mobilization stemmed from the longstanding custom of making officers responsible for 
recruiting their own units, especially in cases where state quotas and officers’ commissions 
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depended on securing sufficient numbers of men. This often led to fraudulent enlistments that 
little helped the war effort and even hampered it. 
On paper, army customs were exacting and conscientious. Recruiting parties were to 
consist of a junior officer, a non-commissioned officer, a drummer, and a fifer. Regulations 
specified that recruiters “will not allow any man to be deceived or inveigled into the service by 
false representations, but will in person explain the nature of the service, the length of the term, 
the pay, clothing, rations, and other allowances to which a soldier is entitled by law, to every 
man before he signs the enlistment.” Enlistment was open to “[a]ny free white male person 
above the age of eighteen and under thirty-five years, being at least five feet four and a half 
inches high, effective, able-bodied, sober, free from disease, of good character and habits, and 
with a competent knowledge of the English language,” though exceptions for height and age 
were made for minors joining as musicians. Those under the age of twenty-one needed written 
permission from a parent or guardian. Once a recruit fully understood what he was undertaking, 
he signed a declaration to enlist and took an oath of enlistment. Each man must be examined for 
his fitness by a specially appointed physician; if passed, he was mustered into federal service. 
Recruiting parties’ progress and expenses were to be carefully accounted for.13  
Two days after New York enacted its April 16, 1861, call for volunteers, the state 
adjutant general began issuing general orders for the force, with special attention paid to 
requiring that companies and regiments reach a minimum strength of thirty-two men before 
electing officers and seventy-seven men in order to be accepted, as well as parental permission 
for minors.14 In obedience to American tradition, enlisted men through at least the first half of 
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the war elected their lieutenants and captains, a custom that hardly encouraged discipline and 
alarmed professionally minded officers on both sides. Only governors, however, held the power 
to commission officers into their state regiments, which often made elections all but symbolic 
but did not ensure military efficiency.15 The Military Board voted on whether to accept offered 
companies, officially banded companies together in regiments—something regimental 
commanders had frequently already begun—and numbered regiments. Companies usually 
consisted of men from one locality, especially early in the war, and the Board took account of 
local pride by forming companies from the same county into regiments when possible; whole 
regiments were formed in the large cities of New York, Brooklyn, Albany, Buffalo, and 
Rochester. Once the adjutant general received a regiment’s report of mustering into state service 
and election of officers, the unit was accepted into the state service and could prepare for federal 
acceptance.16  
These regulations underwent modifications soon after mobilization began. The height 
standard was set at five feet three inches, for instance, and by June, officers sought to fill 
companies to a standard of one hundred men.17 The army published updated regulations in 
August and raised infantry regiment strength to one thousand, setting a need for regimental 
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recruiting parties that could return home and secure more men.18 In many cases, however, 
untutored or unscrupulous recruiters broke laws as they strove to fill their commands, ignoring 
age, height, health, and language restrictions. The wide dispersal of recruiting parties did little to 
ensure strict adherence to standards. Historians often assume that regiments were composed of 
neighbors, but this was more often the case at the company level, as most regiments were not 
formed of men from a single city or county.19 As we have seen, Sickles and other commanders 
courted trouble by pulling in recruits from other states, giving New York credit for other states’ 
soldiers. By late 1861, several new regiments, including the Calcium Light Sharpshooters and 
the Ira Harris Guard, had recruiters scattered across New York, and this became increasingly 
common as officers competed for a shrinking pool of prospective volunteers.20  
Old tensions regarding class and military service asserted themselves in 1861 and never 
disappeared during the war. Eyewitnesses in the war’s early months often praised volunteers as 
the best and brightest of northern society. “The volunteer forces at Elmira are composed of 
strong, hardy appearing men,” an officer wrote from that rendezvous in May. “In intelligence, 
size, health, energy, power of endurance, in everything which goes to make up the material of an 
army, they well represent the best fighting population of the States.”21 Nearly two years later, a 
member of an artillery battery formed under the auspices of the YMCA pointed to the diverse but 
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excellent composition of the Union forces as proof of their patriotic devotion.22 But others 
expressed alarm at the rough and physically unfit character of several regiments, particularly 
those formed in large cities.23 Onlookers were by turns inspired and appalled by the men forming 
Ellsworth’s Fire Zouaves, “Billy” Wilson’s similar zouave regiment, and Sickles’s Excelsior 
Brigade, all mainly recruited from the polyglot population of New York City.24 A prominent 
abolitionist claimed that Wilson recruited his ferocious-looking men based on their brawling 
ability and desire to be killed in battle. “It is my impression,” he added, “that no such band of 
fiends in mortal shape was ever sent out from any planet in our system.”25 New Yorkers urged 
that Ellsworth and Wilson’s rowdy men be moved out of the city for the safety of its residents.26 
New York’s first volunteer regiment, another Gotham organization, symbolized class and 
leadership issues in mobilization. In April 1861, the Times noted the “splendid appearance” and 
youth of the men in Colonel William H. Allen’s First, which included several veterans of the 
renowned Seventh among its officers. But an upper-class officer who later took command called 
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it a drunken mob of “580 of the hardest characters New York City could produce,” adding: “As 
the sapling is bent, the tree is inclined, and a Regiment commenced under such a man as is Allen, 
with such material as the first is made of can never be a good one.”27 The typical regiment 
probably resembled Buffalo’s Twenty-First, which a journalist described as a mixture of the 
“very best” men and “some of ruder and rougher character.”28  
Evidence suggests that by the fall of 1861, recruiters had settled on targeting the poor and 
working classes, men and boys who were often well-educated but lacked employment—a 
demographic especially large during the lean months between the harvest and spring planting.29 
In September, Morgan sought orders from the War Department to raise twenty-five thousand 
more troops, noting that with the navigation season almost over, boatmen would be out of work 
and unruly, making them prime candidates for the army.30 The Union Defense Committee 
forwarded to Morgan a lieutenant’s request “to pardon some 150 persons now confined in the 
Penitentiary for Assault and Battery” so they could be enlisted under his command.31 The mix of 
patriotic and prosaic impulses that brought in volunteers was aptly summarized on a recruiting 
poster printed in the village of Malone: it laid out army pay for one year (something hardly 
appealing to a prosperous civilian) and predicted the war would be over by the end of that period. 
“For such a noble Cause, and with such liberal pay,” the broadside added, “who can falter or 
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resist the temptation to serve so Glorious and Liberal a Government.”32 This strategy probably 
did not help combat traditional beliefs regarding class and service that persisted in 1861, as one 
middle-class Auburn volunteer found in September when his family called his enlistment a 
“preposterous idea” because “there were enough ruffians to go.”33 An army surgeon lent support 
to this old (and often true) stereotype when he noted that while numerous men volunteered out of 
patriotism, the ranks were also filled with those needing work thanks to the early-war economic 
slump, and others were attracted to the army’s reputation for “idleness or dishonesty;” he went 
on to attribute many of the North’s military disasters to its acceptance of officers from the latter 
class.34  
Many a colonel, determined to make his regiment the best in the service, insisted on 
standards of character, fitness, and military experience that exceeded army regulations.35 Yet 
even when officers strove to select men with great care, as in the case of Colonel Abram Duryée 
and his elite Fifth New York Zouaves—sometimes called the best volunteer regiment in the 
army—unsuitable recruits still slipped through.36 Lax medical inspections and disorder at recruit 
depots were part of the problem, despite state and federal attempts to enforce regulations.37 New 
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York’s highly capable Surgeon General, Samuel O. Vanderpoel, tried to maintain exacting 
examination and sanitary standards at the three state rendezvous points, but these soon expanded 
into twenty-three branch depots where oversight was sometimes minimal.38 (In any event, federal 
regulations issued in April suggested that entire companies could be medically examined in only 
half an hour.)39 The Elmira rendezvous initially enjoyed the best management thanks to strict 
orders on cleanliness, discipline, and barracks layout issued by its commandant, Robert B. Van 
Valkenburgh. This orderly management disappeared after his election to Congress.40 The 
members of the Second New York Infantry, formed in Troy, did not undergo a medical 
inspection until two months after enlistment, having already been mustered into service and 
fought their first battle. A medical board gave many of the men the option of leaving or staying; 
118 were discharged, though most reenlisted.41 This was an uncommon case, but not by much; 
by the summer of 1862, New York gained a dubious distinction among the northern states for lax 
examinations of recruits.42 
In addition to the physically unfit, underage boys found their way into uniform. The 
Army, Navy, and Marine Corps all had regulations allowing for the service of boys as young as 
eleven or twelve with guardians’ permission. This custom—a relic of earlier eras before the 
development of modern conceptions of childhood—disturbed some observers by the mid-
nineteenth century. The Army Adjutant General had identified underage recruitment as a 
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problem in 1860, and reforms were underway to end enlistment of minors.43 After mobilization 
began in the spring of 1861, the federal and New York State governments made conscientious 
efforts to forbid underage enlistment without parental or guardian authorization.44 Officials 
fought a losing battle, however, against the rage militaire engulfing American society, which 
swept people of all backgrounds into service with encouragement from their families and 
neighbors. Northerners thrilled to the story of twelve-year-old Brooklynite Clarence D. 
McKenzie, a drummer in the Thirteenth New York State Militia who became his city’s first war 
death and an early Union martyr.45 Within a year, the War Department (with Congressional 
sanction) dropped efforts to enforce a law mandating that minors enlisted without permission be 
discharged.46 This only exacerbated the problem another Brooklyn resident had noted in April 
1861, that “many of too tender years and feet have joined.”47 Thanks to irresponsible recruiters 
and examiners and the many thousands of eligible men unwilling to fill the ranks, enlistment of 
the unfit only increased as the war went on and became something of a national scandal.48 
Excluded from military service, women—white women at least—nevertheless held 
important duties from the beginning of mobilization. Northern women came together in their 
own and larger communities to fight for the Union in any way they could. The reform spirit 
inspired and shaped the actions of middle-class women in particular, who quickly carved out 
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spaces in the war effort. Elizabeth Blackwell brought together two thousand New York City 
women to found a medical organization, the Women’s Central Association of Relief, in April, 
1861, being followed soon afterward by larger groups, the United States Sanitary and Christian 
Commissions, with male leadership and largely female rank and file.49 More than two years later, 
feminist icons Susan B. Anthony and Elizabeth Cady Stanton formed the Women’s National 
Loyal League, an abolitionist society with the allied goal of staking a claim for women in 
politics.50 Middle-class females also asserted influence as the authors and subjects of a vast body 
of wartime literature on the nature of duty and sacrifice. Fanny Fern and other female authors 
encouraged their readers to remain true to the cause despite setbacks. Throughout the war, Fern 
used the pages of the New York Ledger to praise men who enlisted and shame those who 
avoided service by hiring substitutes.51 Female approval, in fact, figured greatly in wartime 
writings. Songs, short stories, and novels abounded with scenes of men whose decision to serve 
or not depended on what a mother, wife, or sweetheart said; “perhaps the most important role for 
the patriotic woman” in such literature, J. Matthew Gallman believes, “was to encourage men to 
enlist.”52 The conclusion that northerners connected duty to manliness is inescapable, but female 
participation in recruitment was more nuanced and evolved as the war continued. While some 
popular songs, for example, humorously or touchingly depicted women as patriotic recruiters, 
others acknowledged the alarm and despair of wives and mothers who gave their men to the 
cause.53  
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From the war’s very beginning, males and females alike expected women to perform 
crucial work for the cause, and the language they used early on often cast volunteers of both 
genders as warriors. Newspapers appealed to females to serve as nurses and supply troops with 
clothing, bandages, relief money, and encouragement.54 “Now is the time for action not for 
words in support of that flag the boast of the world,” wrote a Brooklyn woman who offered her 
services as a nurse to the Union Defense Committee. “No man’s ‘Heir or Slave’ I abandon 
Father family and all in its protection.”55 A leading New Yorker wrote to the UDC that his son 
had left with the Seventh Regiment and that his daughter similarly desired to be “on the march” 
to Washington as a nurse.56 The War Department paid nurses of the Women’s Central 
Association of Relief the same wage as army privates, and girls did their best to fool the 
association’s recruiters into thinking they met the age requirement much as did boys seeking to 
enlist.57 Occasionally, female militarization went further. The Garibaldi Guards left for the front 
accompanied by vivandières, women in modified military dress who were married to soldiers 
and meant to carry water and run camp stores. (One young female married a soldier she had just 
met in order to serve as a vivandière.)58  As the wild enthusiasm of the spring of 1861 dissipated 
later that year, female militarization rhetoric appears to have gone out of fashion, though 
women’s crucial participation in the war continued. Many more women, in common with men, 
contributed to volunteer and family relief subscriptions.59   
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Women and girls, like their local editors, politicians, and other community leaders, often 
took it upon themselves to inspire their male kin and acquaintances into enlisting. Where 
inspiration failed, shaming might take its place. Cartoons showing women impugning the 
manliness of men who did not enlist or extend their enlistments appeared in Vanity Fair and 
Harper’s Weekly during critical periods of the war.60 In October 1861, young ladies in the Green 
Point neighborhood of Brooklyn passed resolutions vowing to ignore young men who failed to 
volunteer or avoided danger by joining the home guards.61 Early in the war, a Syracuse 
newspaper commended wives who encouraged their husbands to enlist.62 Not everyone 
appreciated female pressure, however. Decades after the war, an Oneida County veteran recalled 
the “cruel patriotism” of “the ultra patriotic girls of the neighborhood,” who sometimes forced 
enlistment on men whose poor families could ill afford their absence.63 The actual extent of 
female shaming during the war is difficult to determine. It appeared in newspapers, literature and 
political cartoons, but the fact that the majority of eligible northern men did not volunteer leaves 
the commonality and effectiveness of such shaming open to question, particularly after the 
martial euphoria of 1861 dissipated.64 Gallman’s work indicates that northerners’ wartime 
attitudes shifted from an emphasis on individual duty to community obligation.65 In fact, 
instances are often found of women who actively discouraged enlistment of family members and 
others in their communities. An Albany County wife wrote to her soldier husband in September 
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1861 noting that her young brother “is crazy to be in the 3rd Regiment with you” and implored 
him to “write something awful bad to discourage our Tomey from wanting to go to war.”66 
Shame could also be directed at females, as a Herkimer newspaper indicated when it censured 
local women for failing to fill the gap when the state neglected to provide clothing for the town’s 
volunteers.67 More common and positive examples of female inspiration were seen in the 
behavior of the Ladies’ Patriotic Association of Trinity Parish, who gave a pipe and tobacco to 
each of the roughhewn men forming Wilson’s Zouaves, and Mrs. George T. Strong, who 
presented the regiment with a flag before it left for war.68 Women’s roles in mobilization 
mirrored the variation in attitudes and behaviors in northern society as a whole. 
In addition to recruitment, female influence factored in the widespread movements to 
raise relief funds for soldiers’ families. Participants in war meetings commonly combined 
military and monetary volunteering, calling for both enlistments and funds through subscriptions 
and taxes to pay for uniforms, equipment, and family relief while breadwinners went off to war. 
Women headed and staffed many of the societies formed for these purposes.69 One week after 
                                                 
66 Geary, We Need Men, 76, 114; Ellie Goldwaite to “My Dear Husband,” September 29, 1861, in Skipper and 
Taylor, eds., A Handful of Providence, 52 (quote); Lowville Journal and Republican December 2, 1863. Such 
discouragement was not always effective. A young Delaware County recruit who enlisted in October 1861 recorded 
that his sister “advises me not to go to the war, but my mind is made up.” Harvey Henderson, “Transcription of the 
Civil War Diary Notebook of Harvey Henderson,” 1, box 2, Civil War Collection, New York State Historical 
Association. 
67 Herkimer Democrat, June 19, 1861. 
68 “6th Regiment of Infantry New York Civil War Newspaper Clippings;” Gouveneur Morris, The History of a 
Volunteer Regiment: Being a Succinct Account of the Organization, Services and Adventures of the Sixth Regiment, 
New York Volunteers, Infantry, Known as Wilson Zouaves—Where they Went, What they Did, and What they Saw in 
the War of the Rebellion, 1861 to 1865 (New York: Veteran Volunteer Pub. Co., 1891), 28-29. 
69 See for instance May 9, 1861, newspaper notice of a volunteer fund in Colby, The Civil War Papers of Lt. Colonel 
Newton T. Colby, 13; Syracuse Daily Courier and Union, April 25, 1861; (Watertown) New York Daily Reformer, 
April 26, 1861; Third Annual Report of the Bureau of Military Record, 324; New York Weekly Anglo-African, March 
19, November 5, 1864. The extent of women’s participation in reliefs groups is seen in “List of Aid Societies of 
Various Kinds, with References,” Franklin B. Hough Papers, NYSL; Brooklyn Daily Eagle, April 24, 1861; Third 




the attack on Fort Sumter, a Brooklyn newspaper summarized the vitality of family aid to the 
national cause: 
We can conceive of no more timely act than the organization of Societies to look 
after the interests of the soldier and his family. There are thousands of patriotic 
citizens so situated as to render it impossible for them to enter the field, who can, 
and are willing to discharge an equally important duty at home. … There is 
scarcely a young man in the community who would not freely volunteer, if 
assured that those dependent upon his labor for the comforts of life, would be 
properly cared for. 
The paper called on “leading citizens” to take up the movement immediately and noted that 
many businesses in the New York City area were promising to continue employees’ salaries if 
they volunteered.70 Tiffany and Company established a weekly subscription for that purpose; 
meanwhile, William Steinway—a member of the piano-manufacturing family—declined to enlist 
with his brothers but helped manage a fund for the German-American Fifth Militia, handling 
equipment orders and requests for relief from volunteers’ wives.71 One of the principle duties of 
the Union Defense Committee was to provide family aid from the appropriations and 
subscriptions it received, and requests for such relief from officers and individual soldiers poured 
into the committee’s offices.72 A captain in a three-month militia regiment informed the 
committee that 150 of the men in the unit would reenlist for the length of the war, but their 
families needed aid; on another occasion, the UDC registered a claim for $1,300 in relief for 240 
                                                 
70 Brooklyn Evening Star, April 19, 1861.  
71 New York Herald, April 19, 1861; The William Steinway Diary, 1861-1865, http://americanhistory.si.edu/ 
steinwaydiary/diary/?view=transcription&show_anno=true&page=2#dl (accessed October 14, 2015). 
72 Stevens, The Union Defence Committee of the City of New York, 19; Executive Committee report, June 1861, 11-
12, in Correspondence, UDC Records, Ebscohost; James S. Butler to William C. Noyes, April 25, J. B. Bidwell to 
UDC, April 26, David E. Wheeler to John A. Dix, April 26, Charles G. Stone to Chairman UDC, April 27, James B. 




recruits of the Eighth New York, “for want of which these men would disband and be lost.”73 In 
an early case of recruiting fraud, at least one opportunistic officer working in the UDC’s name 
promised prospective volunteers specific dollar amounts for wives and children that had no basis 
in regulations.74 The UDC formed a sub-committee of its members and councilmen from each 
ward to review applications for relief and dole it out to those meeting the criteria. Tensions soon 
developed between city and committee over disbursements. By June, the UDC reported that its 
funds were nearly “exhausted,” that the responsibility for family relief properly belonged to the 
state and federal authorities, and that committee members expected reimbursement of funds the 
UDC had advanced.75  
The post-secession economic malaise still gripping New York City caused hardship for 
families of workers and soldiers alike, and in July volunteers’ wives staged a demonstration at 
City Hall, declaring their intention to discourage enlistments if support was not more 
forthcoming.76 The Common Council publicly criticized the UDC for inefficiency and set up the 
Volunteer Family Aid Fund of the City of New York, a half-million dollars controlled by the city 
comptroller rather than the UDC. A system of district assistant treasurers and ward committees 
was established to investigate applicants and distribute a limit of five dollars per week to each 
family. Further appropriations followed that December and in June 1862. By the end of the war, 
the city had spent roughly six million dollars on family relief.77  
As one historian notes: “Measures for the relief of soldiers’ families similar to those 
taken in New York City were adopted in other communities throughout the state,” including 
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Brooklyn, Albany, and Rochester. In fact, virtually every locality larger than a hamlet had its 
family relief society, and residents and officials proudly took on the responsibility of putting 
their own funds toward the worthy cause.78 Newspapers carried the names of local subscribers 
and the amounts they pledged almost as often as the names of volunteers.79 To family men 
serving in the war, promises of support from hometown societies represented a necessity, an 
obligation, and a contract made with those at home similar to the articles of enlistment between 
the soldier and his government. Soldiers expressed dissatisfaction in the pages of their local 
newspapers when their families did not receive expected aid.80 Rochester residents began a relief 
subscription fund at an April 18, 1861, war meeting, and weekly payments of four dollars to 
soldiers’ spouses soon took such a heavy toll that “the recruiting of heads of families was 
temporarily discouraged,” according to a local chronicler. In another sign of depleting 
enthusiasm, most subscribers failed to deliver the amounts promised, and the city took over the 
fund. As the number of local enlistments and qualified families increased throughout the war, the 
individual payments were gradually halved to two dollars per week.81  
New York failed to take the lead in adopting a statewide plan of family relief despite 
Morgan’s research into other states’ support systems.82 In May 1863, the state legislature finally 
passed an act establishing boards of relief to handle aid disbursement in each locality. Family 
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relief eventually cost the state more than seven million dollars.83 Much like the closely related 
matter of enlistment bounties, relief programs faced complications from fraud and class 
concerns—the latter demonstrated by the Ladies’ Home Samaritan Association, who in May 
1861 offered to take on the responsibility of the UDC’s aid money and purchase articles needed 
by the poor, instead of trusting recipients with the funds.84 Such behavior grew out of upper-class 
women’s desires to control and reform society, especially their less fortunate neighbors, an 
impulse stemming from the Second Great Awakening.85 The state relief agencies that evolved in 
New York and elsewhere were an unprecedented development in American mobilization. But 
non-governmental bodies such as the United States Christian and Sanitary Commissions and a 
host of local groups remained prominent players in relief throughout the war, and the aid such 
societies handled was not limited to money. Early in the war, for instance, Eliza Bayard 
Anderson led New York City women in organizing the “Union Home and School, for the 
Education and Maintenance of the Children of our Volunteers, who will be left unprovided for,” 
and the president of the city’s Free Academy supervised a meeting to address the issue of 
soldiers’ needy offspring.86 For many of the Americans who fought and endured for the Union, 
voluntary and governmental family support was a crucial motivator and an absolute necessity.87  
New Yorkers supported and sacrificed for the war effort in numerous ways, but even 
from the beginning, their commitment to this great struggle was neither universal nor total. In the 
first frenzied months of mobilization, writers and speakers often espoused all-hands-on-deck 
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rhetoric, and it seemed to some observers—especially those witnessing the great war meetings 
and parades in the New York metropolitan area—that every man really was going to the war and 
every woman helping him prepare.88 It quickly became evident that the reality was far different. 
The United States resembled Revolutionary and Napoleonic France in the degree to which calls 
for something like a levée en masse, and later conscription, stalled in the face of logistical, 
political, and social complications.89 Many northerners (perhaps a majority) supported the war 
but did not make major sacrifices. New Yorkers and other Union loyalists made large allowance 
for the many who were unable or unwilling to enlist. Sentiments expressed in a Plattsburgh 
newspaper were typical: “Every man whose business affairs will permit, should rally to the 
defense of his country,” and those who do not go must contribute all the funds necessary to 
provide for soldiers’ families.90 His neighbors were watching, but the man himself reserved the 
right to decide whether his “affairs” allowed him to serve. Constraints on idealism and war 
support such as this impacted mobilization in other northern states as well.91 
The absence of strong governmental or public coercion even affected the volunteer 
militia, not all of whom rushed to the colors. As Lincoln and Morgan issued their troop calls in 
April 1861, the Herald noted that a “volunteer spirit” had taken hold “amongst the people, if not 
amongst the regularly organized militia,” and praised the “becoming dignity” of militiamen who 
waited to be called up rather than volunteer.92 Such stoicism had a strong basis in American 
military tradition and would mark mobilization in later American conflicts as well. Some militia 
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regiments expressed eagerness to enter the fray on any terms, while others were more 
circumspect. In May, the colonel of the German-American Eleventh New York State Militia (the 
Washington Rifles) assembled his men and asked for their response to the government’s request 
that they volunteer for the term of three years or the length of the war. The majority declined 
because “they are principally men of family and could not forsake their various business pursuits 
on account of the same,” but voiced their willingness to go for six months.93 As the vaunted 
Seventh Regiment prepared to return from its brief, bloodless tour of duty, a member noted that 
“most of the men, I am afraid, will be glad to get home again …” A Brooklyn paper warned that 
the men risked “ridicule” if they came back in such a short time and without having fought, but 
in fact New Yorkers greeted the returning guardsmen as heroes.94 (Some New Yorkers, however, 
reacted with frustration when the reluctance of local militia or the state’s failure to call them up 
seemed to threaten community honor.)95  
The movement to join militia and volunteer regiments organizing for the field was 
matched by a parallel impulse to form home-guard forces with little intention of fighting.96 
Students at Hamilton College in Oneida County banded together in a company “not as volunteers 
exactly, but as reserves, to take the field when absolutely necessary,” and a similar company 
formed at New York City’s Free Academy. Prominent businessmen in the city spoke of enrolling 
a Metropolitan Home Guard, twenty thousand strong, with half of them to be equipped with the 
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latest rifles—this at a time when frontline troops were sorely pressed for arms.97 Elsewhere in the 
city, the bankers, insurers, and other prosperous men forming the Union Grays drew up a 
constitution that stipulated regular drilling but barred the unit from volunteering for non-home-
guard duty; individual members could do so with the commander’s consent.98 Interest in field 
service varied considerably among militiamen throughout the war, particularly since those 
willing to fight had many chances to join the volunteers. Despite public scorn occasionally 
directed at the “Stay-at-Home Brigade,” as a Brooklyn newspaper called a local home-guard 
command, such groups flourished.99 Condemnation of militia commands that did not deploy was 
not really fair, as arguably the State Militia’s most valuable service after July 1861 lay not in 
deploying as units but in providing thousands of officers for the volunteers.100 
The war effort in New York was marked by self-interest as well as patriotic sacrifice. The 
state’s independent-minded residents supported mobilization on their own terms. As one officer 
noted of the countless New Yorkers offering to raise their own commands, “the soldier fever was 
on us all, but we were for going to the war in our own way.”101 This outlook inspired nearly 
everyone who enlisted over the course of the war. Finding the right company or regiment with 
the desired duty and length of service, plus the best officers, uniforms, weapons, pay, and living 
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conditions, was paramount.102 Men and boys with education and breeding, or their friends and 
relations, often expected appointments for them as officers, and under such pressure many of 
them declined to enlist (if they believed they should serve at all).103 Some college administrators, 
notably President Martin Anderson of Rochester University, encouraged their students to 
volunteer, but many others saw no need for young scholars to give up their studies for the 
battlefield.104 Even amid the war fever of mid-1861, civilians and soldiers alike recognized the 
importance of joining the right unit, and committees sometimes advised potential volunteers not 
to enlist otherwise.105  Differences between recruiters’ promises and the realities of military life 
in an unprepared nation caused widespread discontent and harmed mobilization.  
 The two most troublesome issues in this regard involved logistics and terms of service. 
Troop raising required immense funds for renting space, advertising, food, and transportation, 
not to mention the even larger sums needed to supply their material needs.106 United States 
authorities leaned on the states especially heavily in the first year, and Morgan’s government was 
responsible for supplying nearly all the wants of New York troops until their muster into federal 
service. Despite appropriations, loans, and subscriptions from non-governmental groups, the 
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state fell short of money for sufficient pay, housing, clothing, food, equipment, and arms for the 
early militia and volunteers. The official report of the Military Board answered accusations of 
slowness by arguing that the thirty thousand two-year volunteers “would have been put on foot 
in one-half the time could supplies have been obtained” and federal support been more 
forthcoming.107 This, of course, echoed complaints that the Union Defense Committee made 
about Morgan’s administration. After the colonel of New York City’s Second Militia made 
public his outrage at supply shortages, Simeon Draper of the UDC met with him and then wrote 
the governor: “950 men passed the night on the Battery in a rainstorm without boards, 
mattresses, sufficient clothing or food—No lights—They are citizen soldiers of New York—
Have you any orders to give in relation to this case[?]”108 Leaders from Secretary of War 
Cameron down sometimes hastily awarded contracts to firms that perpetrated fraud or gross 
irresponsibility.109 In one infamous scandal, New York awarded a uniform contract to four New 
York City businessmen—among them future mayor George Opdyke—who in turn contracted 
with Brooks Brothers to supply the outfits. When the uniforms were issued to four regiments, 
they proved so shoddy that a member of Onondaga County’s Twelfth Volunteers called them “a 
shame to the State of New York,” and all parties involved in the contract became embroiled in a 
very public, months-long dispute.110  
Almost as soon as the first troops signed on, letters warning of dissatisfaction among 
them poured into the offices of the state government and the UDC. As 180 discharged members 
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of an ill-fated force called the Naval Brigade explained in a June 4 statement, the men were 
willing to do their duty if treated right.111 Following the tradition of their colonial forebears, 
soldiers regarded enlistment as a contract with the government, and many deserted or mutinied 
when they believed authorities failed to uphold their end of the agreement.112 Some eager 
recruits whose regiments awaited mustering-in left to join organizations about to ship out, while 
others faltered and decided not to muster in, and some, disgusted, switched regiments when their 
recruiters’ promises went unfulfilled. Still others rioted or deserted because they were suffering 
for want of clothing, pay, and food or out of anger at not receiving the best rifles.113 Troops at the 
Albany rendezvous refused to drill until uniforms arrived to replace their ragged civilian 
clothing; in another Albany case, thirty members of one company “stood shoulder to shoulder, 
ready for an instantaneous march for home, should they longer be fed like swine.”114 The army’s 
Quartermaster General told Cameron: “The want of clothing more than the want of money 
discourages enlistments.”115 Militia commands sometimes declined volunteering when offered 
only infantry duty, and the Ninth New York Cavalry verged on mutiny in May 1862 when a 
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horse shortage compelled the men to serve on foot.116 Soldiers’ hometown communities often 
supported such expressions of agency. Men from Glens Falls deserted after concluding “that 
there was nothing really binding in the articles of enlistment.” When their commanders caught 
the deserters and drummed them out of camp, the local press reacted with “indignation.”117 
The question of term lengths hampered mobilization nearly or quite as much as logistics 
did, and New Yorkers felt its impact most of all. In April 1861, Morgan’s government showed 
foresight in authorizing a force of two-year volunteers to complement the ninety-day militia 
muster. But the plethora of voices calling for troops, from the Secretary of War down to 
recruiters on village street corners, often confused New York’s largely unique volunteer term 
with the federally limited militia term.118 At the first war meeting in Buffalo, a militia officer 
assured citizens gathered to form a unit of “minute men” that the “term for enlistment would not 
exceed three months,” a promise entirely in keeping with American customs but mistaken in this 
case.119 Hattaway and Jones rightfully characterize short terms of service as a major weakness in 
Union efforts during the war, and Marcus Cunliffe in an earlier work cites such limited service to 
argue that Americans were merely “gesturing at war” in 1861.120 As we have seen, however, 
New Yorkers argued for speed as a military necessity. A volunteer languishing at the Albany 
rendezvous maintained: “A short but thorough campaign would, I think, but suit the spirit of our 
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men and the needs of the times.”121 In early May came the Lincoln administration’s switch to 
long-service volunteers, then on July 30 a request from the president that Morgan have some 
three-month troops mustered in for two years. Finally, on August 3, Congress sanctioned 
Lincoln’s May 3 call, which opened the door to converting three-month service into three 
years.122 Imprecision and policy changes in communicating term lengths had calamitous results 
for many men, who enlisted in volunteer regiments on the understanding that they would be 
discharged after three months, only to find that the U. S. government would muster and retain 
them for two or three years.123  
These well-publicized supply, pay, and term problems created scandals that hampered 
recruitment and thus the Union war effort. The Empire State gained an unenviable reputation for 
poorly supplying its volunteers.124 This was especially problematic because commanders relied 
on efficient logistics to attract and hold onto recruits. In May 1861, a colonel informed Simeon 
Draper that he could increase his regiment from 650 to one thousand men provided the UDC sent 
funds.125 Difficulties over pay, supplies, and length of service hurt recruiting into the summer 
and beyond.126 Some recruiters used the state’s logistical quandaries to their advantage. Colonel 
John Cochrane, a War Democrat not inclined to speak favorably of Morgan’s administration, 
made it known that his Sixty-Fifth New York Regiment, or First United States Chasseurs, was 
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organized and supplied under the auspices of federal authorities, “advantages which recommend 
the regiment to all who desire immediate employment, equipments, arms and uniforms.”127 
Probably because it mobilized more troops than any other state, New York was badly beset by 
logistical issues but certainly not alone; Pennsylvanians, for instance, rioted over lack of pay in 
July 1861.128 James W. Geary identifies low, erratic pay as the federal policy that most adversely 
affected recruitment of married men in particular, and the problem was never resolved during the 
war.129 Youngsters living in rural, mountainous Essex County proved susceptible to the seven 
dollars extra per month that Vermont offered its recruits, prompting many to cross the border and 
enlist in organizations that did not help meet New York quotas or burnish local pride.130 
Term-length controversies had a similarly malign effect on New York’s mobilization. 
Militiamen and volunteers imbued with republican and citizen-soldier traditions expected to 
serve the term promised them and not a day longer. In early May, the commander of Ulster 
County’s Twentieth Militia refused to even ask his men if they would enlist as two-year 
volunteers.131 Later, Varian’s Battery, an artillery unit connected with New York City’s 
prestigious Washington Grays, gained notoriety when its men completed their three months and 
marched for home on the very day of the Battle of Bull Run.132 Far greater consternation came 
from enlistment of volunteers who believed themselves entitled to short service, as seen in the 
case of the hapless Second Militia. This largely Irish-American command was initially included 
in the April 1861 call for militia and prepared to deploy after New York City residents raised 
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some $20,000 to uniform and equip its members.133 Then came an order to stand down, and the 
disappointed men began suffering from logistical shortages as they awaited further instructions. 
After several weeks, they were enlisted into the state’s two-year volunteers. Colonel George B. 
Tompkins informed Governor Morgan that his regiment was “willing to go for the war,” 
meaning for three years. “We are fully armed and equipped,” he added, “and can march in a few 
hours [sic] notice. The men are getting dissatisfied because they are kept back. They are in a very 
good state of discipline and will do credit to the state.”134 But Tompkins had misjudged the 
situation. After the Second finally departed New York and joined the Washington defenses, the 
men were taken aback when federal officers attempted to muster them in for three years. The 
event “terminated in a scene of mutiny and confusion,” a New York official noted, “the men 
breaking ranks and utterly refusing to take the oath.” Another effort to muster them resulted in 
four hundred acceding to it and nearly as many declining to serve longer than ninety days. These 
holdouts waited anxiously in camp until the regiment paid their three-thousand-dollar fare for the 
trip back home to New York City, where residents treated them contemptuously. Tompkins 
assured Simeon Draper and the people of the city that his recruiters would take pains to refill the 
Second’s ranks with more reliable men.135  
A wave of similar imbroglios hit the Union Army that summer as New York soldiers 
demanded discharges. Members of two-year regiments circulated a rumor that they could not 
lawfully be forced to serve beyond three months; these men—encouraged in a few cases by 
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officers with legal backgrounds—claimed poor and dishonest usage at the hands of the 
authorities, argued that their rights entitled them to be mustered out, and called the two-year 
contract a “swindle.”136 The same situation occurred among men in militia regiments—including 
Tompkins’s Second—that had enlisted for three years. Members of the Seventy-Ninth New York 
Highland Guard, buffeted by contradictory orders and bad living conditions, wanted no more of 
their three-year enlistment and perpetrated a mutiny that “chilled the patriotic blood of the 
country,” a newspaper observed.137 Experienced New York officers and members of the Military 
Board charged Lincoln’s administration with inciting dissent through incompetent and confusing 
orders that mitigated the advantages of New York’s special two-year term. The state inspector 
general sympathized with the soldiers but predicted that discharges would cause a “general and 
resistless stampede of the New York Troops,” discourage enlistments, and spell disaster for the 
Union.138 Before such could happen, Union generals in Virginia largely tamped down the 
disorder through a combination of severe punishments and promises to ease logistical problems; 
at that point, most of the men involved dropped their activism and accepted mustering in for 
longer terms.139 However, controversies over service agreements and resulting recruitment 
difficulties would dog New York and the rest of the North for the remainder of the war. 
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 Morgan seldom relaxed his vigilance as a war governor, and the eleven months following 
the completion of the two-year regiments became a transition period in which New York’s Chief 
Executive continued promoting innovations in support of the Union cause while simultaneously 
guarding state sovereignty. With enlistments still robust in the summer of 1861, Morgan 
proposed forming a force of reserve companies stationed at rendezvous, where they could 
thoroughly prepare themselves for deployment if needed. The debacle at Bull Run on July 21 
killed this scheme, however, and prompted efforts to form new three-year regiments and fill up 
those already at the front.140 The day after Bull Run, Congress authorized the president to accept 
half a million three-year troops, and a similar push followed on July 25.141 But such 
determination to fight on required practical support. Morgan assured Seward and Cameron of 
New York’s willingness to contribute twenty-five thousand troops, provided the War Department 
supply him with the necessary legal authority and funds, for the state had no more to spare. 
These needs being addressed, New York began efforts to meet its combined quotas (including 
that of May 3) for 109,056 men.142  
 Dramatic expansion of Union forces after Bull Run reinforced the importance of northern 
governors in mobilization, for Lincoln’s administration continued to rely on them for men and 
materiel.143 An historian of New York City’s war experiences further identifies this period as the 
time when “regulation replaced enthusiasm;” the imprudent rush to the field in earlier months 
had sewed exasperation and chaos that required sorting out.144 For the first time, volunteering 
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lagged; in addition to controversies mentioned earlier, too many officers had been authorized to 
recruit, leading to skeleton regiments with little chance of completion. The great time and 
expense involved also dissuaded potential recruiting officers.145 War supporters fretted that 
“rebellious journals in the city [of New York] and elsewhere … have aided materially the cause 
of rebellion, by preventing many from enlisting.”146 In response, officials in Washington and 
Albany sought to clarify their respective responsibilities and keep closer watch on recruitment 
and expenses as they redoubled mobilization efforts.147 In August, Morgan worked with 
Cameron to speed up recruitment and mustering, as his call for twenty-five thousand volunteers 
was not authorized by state law. The governor and his military staff willingly took on additional 
responsibilities in mobilization since the state legislature was out of session and many believed 
federal orders hindered efforts.148  
A War Department general order authorized governors to collect and consolidate skeleton 
units into full regiments. Authorities also launched inspections to check for fraudulent 
practices—such as officers borrowing men from one another to meet the minimum number for 
mustering in—and ordered closer medical examinations. They lifted the ban on non-English-
speakers and lowered the height standard to five-foot-three. Regiments in the field were granted 
permission to send recruiting parties back home to secure replacements.149 Faltering enlistments 
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in the Navy had already prompted that branch to switch from three-year to one-year enlistments 
and accept anyone physically fit and under thirty-five, including novice landsmen.150 At the state 
level, Morgan and State Adjutant-General Thomas Hillhouse issued an order on August 24 
promising a premium of two dollars to anyone who supplied a recruit, as long as that recruit 
passed his examination and mustered into federal service, with a limit of sixty-four dollars (since 
thirty-two men were needed to muster in a company). This plan was dropped on October 19, 
having no basis in federal law, but the federal government would adopt a modified version eight 
months later.151 New York also now required potential officers to take proficiency examinations 
and sought to place all recruiters and mustering officers in the state under the charge of Major 
John T. Sprague, the General Superintendent of the Recruiting Service in Albany.152 As 
previously noted, state officials began to encourage overt targeting of the unemployed. Serious 
concerns over whether the nation, state, and communities could secure enough manpower that 
began after Bull Run never fully dissipated until the end of the war. 
In the meantime, however, concentrated efforts in the late summer of 1861 wrought an 
immediate change. Already on September 10, Morgan informed Cameron that volunteering was 
picking up; nine days later, Seward happily observed that “I think we are passing the dead 
point.”153 Another general order placed persons recruiting in loyal states on War Department 
orders under the authority of governors.154 The importance of New York and its leadership in the 
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war effort was underscored on October 26 when the War Department—at Morgan’s behest—
established the Military Department of New York, headquartered in Albany, with Morgan 
commanding as a major general. This was unprecedented in the northern states.155 Twice that 
fall, Morgan requested sanction to raise twenty-five thousand more men; rebuffed both times, he 
nevertheless informed the War Department of his intention to call for that number on February 1 
if the war was not already won.156 The remarkable extent of New York’s mobilization efforts 
was evident at year’s end. The state had enrolled an estimated 120,316 troops by January 1 (more 
than eleven thousand in excess of quotas), at a time when some states had failed to meet their 
assigned numbers.157 As of December 12, the state comptroller recorded payment of various 
military expenses totaling over $2,800,000.158 In Albany, Superintendent Sprague exercised new, 
federally sanctioned authority to closely regulate recruiting parties.159 Moreover, the new session 
of the state legislature that began on January 1 provided Morgan with an unusually honest and 
competent team of allies, including Democrats who cooperated on war bills.160  
Despite all this progress in picking up the pieces after Bull Run and placing greater 
emphasis on efficiency, for northerners the winter of 1861-1862 was marked by a pessimism 
unseen since that shocking defeat. Citizens’ hard work and sacrifice in mobilization seemed 
wasted as commanders—particularly Major General George B. McClellan of the Army of the 
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Potomac, the force in which most New York soldiers served—failed to move on the enemy. 
Diplomatic relations with Great Britain had soured, raising the possibility of war with that world 
power, and the government faced a persistent money shortage.161 In the Union’s most populous 
state, battles over authority and the direction of the war effort ground on. Morgan and his 
military staff continually sniped with the War Department and the Adjutant General’s Office 
about how much power the governor should hold over federal recruiters in New York. He 
expressed dismay when, on December 24, the Adjutant General removed governors’ 
authorization to raise regiments except on federal requisition, part of a larger federal effort to 
take control of mobilization. Morgan told Cameron that it was better for state pride and 
recruiting efforts to have state agents in charge, but the Secretary of War explained that since the 
goal of five hundred thousand volunteers had been met, the government sought to reduce 
expenses and complete organizations now forming.162 Additionally, political divisions in the 
state were widening. Former governor and Onondaga County native Horatio Seymour had 
emerged as an influential Democratic critic of Lincoln’s expanded powers in silencing dissent.163 
Sickles and the officers of his Excelsior Brigade (formed in heavily Democratic New York City) 
reviled Morgan and preferred that their commissions come from the general government.164 The 
volunteering spigot had once again slowed to a trickle: the State Adjutant General reported that 
the “floating population” who enlisted on impulse “has become well nigh exhausted by previous 
levies,” necessitating more reform in recruitment and greater efforts to appeal to independent-
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minded country folk.165 Two ready manpower sources—African Americans and Indians—
remained untapped due to white prejudice and despite repeated offers of service from their 
communities.166 Logistical problems continued to bedevil mobilization.167 Greater oversight 
failed to halt recruitment fraud, a growing concern that hampered foreign relations. As early as 
May, witnesses had reported U. S. recruiting agents everywhere in Canada. Officials there 
reminded Canadians that, as British subjects, the Foreign Enlistment Act forbade them from 
serving in America’s war, and Seward attempted to paper over the embarrassing scandal by 
discouraging the practice and assuring British foreign officers of his commitment to international 
law.168 But fraud, the diplomatic tensions it caused, and other complications in mobilization only 
increased as the war continued. 
 Northern fortunes turned a corner in early 1862. That January, Lincoln finally sacked 
Simon Cameron and placed the War Department under the more efficient Edwin M. Stanton.169 
Soon afterward, a series of victories in the field restored the confidence of Union loyalists.170 
Morgan, meanwhile, continued his tireless efforts to improve New York’s military capabilities. 
Since October, influential New Yorkers including Horatio Seymour and Judge Advocate General 
William Henry Anthon had pressed for an overhaul of the state’s antiquated militia system, 
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which Anthon called “utterly worthless in an emergency like the present.” Such calls gained 
more urgency with the possibility of war with Britain on New York’s long, undefended Canadian 
border.171 (Recruiters used the specter of an American-British war to recruit Irishmen, with little 
success.)172 By a two-thirds vote on April 23, legislators passed a Militia Act, inspired partially 
by the Prussian Landwehr, which established greater state oversight and encouragement. It 
revised procedures for enrolling and organizing the militia, renamed it the National Guard—
indicating increased appreciation for centralized efforts in war—and incorporated a state facility 
to provide for soldiers’ children.173 The pressures of large-scale war and commitment to state and 
national defense had led the predominantly unmilitary people of New York to accept the value of 
a modern, proficient militia, though implementation lagged behind regulations. 
 Developments far to the south soon placed renewed demand on New York’s soldiery. 
State Adjutant General Hillhouse completed and forwarded the remaining volunteer regiments in 
the state and predicted that “a broad field will be opened for recruiting for regiments now in 
service,” something that federal officials had long urged.174 But this sensible emphasis on filling 
experienced units was suddenly checked on April 3, when Stanton ordered the volunteer 
recruiting service discontinued.175 Historians, particularly James W. Geary, characterize this as 
one of the worst decisions Stanton made during his eventful career as Secretary of War; it 
certainly gave a premature impression of imminent victory and partially dismantled the 
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replacement system deemed so important.176 Stanton himself said on May 1 that he had issued 
the order “for the purpose of compelling returns [i.e. reports] from the respective Governors;” 
now that he had those returns, the governors could be asked to recruit for old regiments again.177 
Since Stanton had ordered recruiters to sell off the public property in their possession, he may 
have intended for the states to resume responsibility for recruitment, thus saving federal costs as 
the war wound down. But Confederates drove Union troops out of the Shenandoah Valley in 
May, eroding northern confidence and threatening the safety of Washington.178 On May 16, 
Stanton asked the governors for new regiments, including six from New York. With the planting 
season on, volunteer recruitment halted, and no state appropriations for expenses, Morgan 
resolved to answer this call with the National Guard. The governors of Massachusetts and 
Pennsylvania did likewise.179 In scenes reminiscent of the year before—and despite the same sort 
of confusion over terms of service—militia regiments (filled in some cases with the sons of 
leading New York families) rushed to the colors. Twelve regiments, totaling over 8,500 men, 
enlisted for three-month tours.180 Americans had once again demonstrated their readiness to offer 
brief service in times of national emergency. 
 Grim necessity would soon draw upon New Yorkers and their fellow northerners for 
greater efforts. On May 21, the Army Adjutant General made a request for more three-years’ 
troops. Two weeks later, the War Department restored the volunteer recruiting service and 
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Lincoln convinced Morgan to authorize Francis B. Spinola to raise a brigade.181 With new 
authorizations granted to thousands of potential company commanders and enlistment offices 
reopened, Stanton confidently informed Ohio’s governor that “if recruits can be had rapidly 
enough to allow all the drilled force to be put into the field the war can be finished up in three 
months.”182 Over the past fourteen months, the Union’s fortunes in the field had been directly 
tied to northerners’ ability and willingness to answer calls for sacrifice. By the midpoint of 1862, 
nearly 150,000 New Yorkers had volunteered for various periods of service.183 But the progress 
of the latest call for three-year volunteers showed that the free citizens of the North still 
responded to the national crisis on their own terms. With planting in full swing and the war’s 
bloodshed ongoing, Hillhouse reported “apathy” and few enlistments in New York.184 Bad 
tidings from the battlefield soon prompted Morgan and his fellow governors to take the lead in 
promoting new innovations and centralized efforts to secure manpower. 
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“POURING IN LIKE THE WATERS OVER NIAGARA”:  
THE GREAT VOLUNTEER DRIVE OF 1862 
 
In July 1862, during one of the war’s darkest moments for Union loyalists, a young 
Episcopal priest named William C. Doane told Edwin D. Morgan that raising new forces hinged 
on two things: offering bounties and keeping the public informed about events.1 This was hardly 
news to New York’s able governor, but Doane’s assertion highlighted both change and 
continuity in northern mobilization. The state would enlist more troops that year than in any 
other and witness a surge of popular commitment, but the process was rife with unprecedented 
controversy and what some viewed as a disheartening turn toward cynicism. Citizens connected 
recruitment with the success or failure of the war effort and demanded that mobilization practices 
be carried out with efficiency, not simple enthusiasm. This involved offering larger practical 
benefits to attract sufficient volunteers and widening the field of potential soldiers. Events and 
attitudes in the second half of 1862 demonstrated how that crucial year turned time and again on 
issues of recruitment. 
For Union supporters in New York and across America, the summer of 1862 was filled with 
anxiety. In June, as northerners awaited news from what seemed to be a decisive campaign 
underway near Richmond, enlistment returns closer to home were disappointingly meager. 
Federal officials finally came around to the necessity for clear and encouraging policies to 
promote volunteering, something that Morgan and State Adjutant General Hillhouse had sought 
                                                 




months earlier.2 Morgan now recommended that volunteers be enlisted for the unexpired terms 
of regiments in the field; this would have a double benefit of providing appealingly short tours of 
duty for potential recruits and quickly strengthening fighting units. He also suggested promising 
three-year enlistees a two-dollar premium and one month’s advance pay; these last two measures 
were adopted.3 Something had to be done to spur interest, but Lincoln worried that issuing 
another large call for men in the face of discouraging war news might cause “panic.”4 Statistics 
here provided a barometer for public support. Between the reopening of the volunteer recruiting 
service on June 6 and July 1—during which time Union troops fled from the Shenandoah Valley 
and McClellan seemed stalled on the Peninsula—New York issued 150 authorizations to raise 
companies but no more than three thousand men signed on to join them.5  
 Now came a turning point. On the night of June 29, as McClellan retreated from the 
outskirts of Richmond, Seward summoned Morgan and Thurlow Weed to a conference at the 
Astor House in New York City. The next day, after they were joined by Governor Andrew G. 
Curtin of Pennsylvania and exchanged telegrams with other governors, Seward drafted two 
documents. The first was a memorial from the governors to Lincoln—backdated to two days 
before so that it would not look like a desperate response to defeat on the Peninsula—urging him 
to issue another troop call and capitalize on this “decisive moment” to end the rebellion. The 
second document was meant to be the president’s response: it approved the governors’ language 
and requested a force of 150,000 infantry. Seward sent the papers to Lincoln for consideration, 
telling him, “I am assured by the good and great men around me that the re-enforcements can be 
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raised through an appeal to the country, which they are prepared to make immediately.”6 Lincoln 
accordingly proclaimed a call on July 1 for twice the number of men originally suggested. 
Northerners then launched another massive volunteering campaign to raise “three hundred 
thousand more.”7 As they did throughout the war, Union supporters and their leaders recognized 
that saving the nation hinged on raising large military forces. 
 Historians have noted that these events in late June and early July opened a new and 
critical chapter in Union war making, one in which the various state forces finally came together 
in a “nationalized army” with standardized incentives and terms and committed to winning the 
war through concerted effort.8 Yet several aspects of the Union’s war remained a decentralized 
affair in which states retained much authority to shape mobilization. The Confederacy had 
adopted national conscription that April, but the Union would not follow suit for almost another 
year; until then, the onus was on the states to cajole and compel their citizens to meet quotas.9 
For confident, energetic Morgan, this had a positive effect. On July 2, the War Department 
placed recruitment and supply in New York “entirely” under the governor’s control and later 
assured him that “nothing will be done by this Department” to interfere with his new 
mobilization plan, which Stanton “cordially approved.”10 On July 3, Lincoln sent his old ally 
Morgan a “private and confidential” request for fifty thousand new men within a month, 
explaining that so many men available so quickly would have a greater impact than the entire 
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force becoming available months later. Seward likewise urged Morgan to concentrate on quickly 
securing men and argued that such a show of force would save the day.11  
 New York faced a quota of 59,705 three-year enlistments. The state’s new militia law 
provided for enrollment of all male citizens age eighteen to forty-five, a process now underway 
but impossible to finish in time to aid in filling the call.12 Morgan’s program for quickly and 
efficiently meeting the quota made adroit use of the community and associational structures in 
which New Yorkers and other Americans approached their lives and social needs. On July 5, 
Hillhouse addressed letters to community leaders throughout New York informing them: “The 
State has been divided into regimental districts, conforming to the present senatorial 
subdivisions, and it is designed to have a regimental camp in each.” Each letter recipient was 
now part of a committee in his senatorial district, “to aid, by their earnest and determined efforts, 
the organization of a Regiment of Volunteers, under the recent call of the President.” 
Committees were to nominate a qualified person to command their regiment and otherwise aid in 
recruiting and organizing it. The war had taken a grim turn, Hillhouse noted, and only through a 
“prompt and patriotic response of the people” could the Union and the Constitution be saved.13 
Letters also went out to town supervisors in which the governor urged them to cooperate with 
their regimental district committee.14 This effective strategy combined familiar calls for patriotic 
devotion and quick action with a more sophisticated employment of local pride and leadership 
than that seen previously. It took several weeks for district committees to come together and 
begin their mission, but once they did, New York saw immediate results in filling its quota.15 At 
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least one other state, Connecticut, implemented a similar plan, and later that month the War 
Department called on other states to adopt it.16 
State influence was seen also in the matter of enlistment incentives. While conferring 
with the governors in late June, Seward informed Stanton that recruiting would be particularly 
difficult in New York and Massachusetts unless the general government offered men $25 of the 
$100 federal enlistment bounty up front. Under the pressure of Seward’s pleading and the urgent 
need for troops, Stanton decided to provide the money out of a departmental recruiting fund.17 
Senator Henry Wilson—probably the most influential figure in northern recruitment next to 
Lincoln and the War Department heads—and Governor John A. Andrew, both of Massachusetts, 
had initiated a campaign to authorize advance bounty payments, and the Bay State and 
Connecticut offered their own bonuses to volunteers.18 Prominent New Yorkers reminded 
Morgan that citizens would not leave their farm work to enlist unless offered bounties; this 
meant the governor must call for an extra session of the legislature to provide bounties through 
taxation; the only alternative was a draft.19 On July 17, Morgan made his move, characteristically 
taking extra responsibility at a crucial moment. He announced that New York would offer fifty-
dollar bounties, advancing the funds from the state treasury and counting on the legislature to 
authorize the payments once back in session. Morgan’s bounty proved popular and decisive.20 
Recruits received a total of ninety dollars upon enlistment, as the state bounty was combined 
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with a portion of the federal bonus, one month’s advance pay, and a two-dollar enlistment 
premium. The remainder of the federal bounty was to be paid upon completion of service.21 The 
state at last had something immediate and tangible to offer potential soldiers. Hillhouse credited 
the promised payments with having a great effect once they got underway, helping to dispatch 
35,000 new men to the front by October 1.22 Morgan’s bounty also brought the Empire State into 
the era of advance bounties and increased incentives for fraud.23  
 In addition to Morgan’s bounty program, July 17 saw the advent of a national law with 
greater influence. On that day, Lincoln signed the Militia Act; as detailed in the next chapter, this 
law provided the groundwork for federal conscription, authorizing the president to call up state 
militias for nine months. The volunteering situation highlighted the need for greater energy and 
centralization. In late July, a cautiously optimistic Morgan informed Lincoln that he expected to 
start sending off new regiments soon, but that enlistments for old regiments remained slow—a 
common report across the North as the harvest loomed and recruiting for field units remained in 
War Department hands.24 Stanton himself was widely blamed for the Peninsula disaster, having 
withheld reinforcements from McClellan, and the Secretary of War now eagerly employed 
powers granted the federal government by the new Militia Act.25 On August 4, Stanton ordered 
the states to supply three hundred thousand nine-month militia. States were assigned quotas 
duplicating those for their three-year volunteers, meaning that New York, for example, now 
faced the task of raising 59,705 men in addition to the previous call for the same number. Any 
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states that failed to meet their July 2 and August 4 quotas by August 15 were to make up the 
difference with another militia draft.26  
The situation that New Yorkers faced in the second half of 1862 revealed more than ever 
before the strengths and weaknesses of northern recruitment. With the machinery for this large-
scale mobilization awkward and new and the numbers involved dwarfing anything previously 
seen in America, citizens remained reliant on community and political leaders to guide them but 
reserved the privilege of determining their own levels of participation. Those turbulent months 
saw great successes in calling out volunteers; they also were marked by intense divisions over 
war aims and the draft, along with an alarming increase in recruiting opposition and fraud.  
 As the Evening Post reminded its readers on July 15, the people of the North, not 
politicians or generals, were the ultimate authors and arbiters of policy.27 Setbacks in the field 
and recruiting offices must be overcome, and once Union supporters received governmental 
guidance in the form of quotas and New York’s senatorial district plan, they met the new 
manpower crisis with a determination unseen in nearly a year. Old and new committees got to 
work with intertwined goals of affirming northern war support and raising more troops. On July 
3, the New York State Chamber of Commerce met in New York City, where they resolved to 
work with other groups in furtherance of the cause and to “preserve and maintain the character of 
this community for patriotism and loyal devotion to the Union;” doing so, of course, meant 
forming more committees.28 Several such bodies, including a temporarily revived Union Defense 
Committee, met six days later and began planning a mass meeting for July 15 in Union Square, 
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site of the monster rally held after Fort Sumter’s surrender. Invitations went out to “all 
Associations, Corporations, and Societies,” as well as citizens, in the city. The organizers asked 
businesses to close an hour beforehand in order to encourage attendance.29 With Mayor George 
Opdyke presiding at the meeting, assisted by an array of vice presidents and secretaries, the 
crowd of thousands was treated to artillery salvoes and rousing speeches on the need for renewed 
devotion and perseverance.30 They then heard resolutions adopted earlier by the convention of 
committees, which called for a united effort to crush the rebellion, backed Lincoln’s call for 
three hundred thousand volunteers, and advised the city to offer its residents twenty-five-dollar 
bounties to join regiments in the field. Further speeches and resolutions led to a recommendation 
that the governor and legislature immediately authorize a state bounty, and this was followed by 
a call from Francis B. Spinola for men to join his new brigade.31 Even as a rainstorm brought the 
rally to a close, those present adopted a final set of resolutions urging the “young men of New-
York” to quickly join their country’s cause and the government “to overstep the constructive 
bounds which prevent the employment of … EVERY means of suppressing this infernal 
rebellion.”32 Attendance and enthusiasm at the July 15 Union Square meeting did not match that 
of fifteen months earlier (though it was said to be the second-largest meeting ever held in the 
city), but it exemplified what the Evening Post called the “Second Uprising of the North.” 
Devotion to the war effort was as strong as ever, the paper maintained, but now “tempered by a 
greater thoughtfulness.” This time around, citizens expected more efficient, systematic, and 
comprehensive war measures bringing all resources to bear.33  
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The front page of that same July 16 edition of the Post featured an anonymous poem, 
“Three Hundred Thousand More.” The work depicted heroic youth from New England to 
Minnesota leaving their farms and families to fight for the Union, punctuated with the refrain 
“We are coming, Father Abra’am, three hundred thousand more!”34 Seldom has a piece so 
perfectly met the needs of the hour, and the poem was soon reprinted, set to music, and sung all 
over the Union. Its author turned out to be James Sloan Gibbons, a leading abolitionist of New 
York City.35 Gibbons’s work not only popularized the image of Lincoln as a father figure to the 
nation’s volunteers; it summarized far more succinctly than the Union Square rally could the 
Union’s pressing need for a greater mass commitment than ever before. But how could 
northerners make the stirring word-pictures of “Three Hundred Thousand More” come to life? 
How could they hope to attract such a large—and, after August 4, twice as large—body of 
volunteers quickly enough to reverse recent setbacks while also avoiding conscription? 
 The key, many believed, lay in strengthening regiments already in the field, offering 
better incentives, and opening enlistment to groups previously excluded. Soldiers and civilians 
alike understood that keeping veteran regiments fully staffed was far preferable to forming new 
commands. As George T. Strong predicted: “Three hundred new regiments, with their officers 
and men all equally raw, will be a mere mob of Bull-Runagates for six months after they are 
mustered into service.”36 Older units, on the other hand, had experienced leaders and men able to 
train recruits and provide a steadying influence in battle. Replacements were essential because 
regiments almost never maintained full strength after their first weeks in service, suffering from 
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attrition in numerous forms. Desertion, for instance, bedeviled the Union forces as early as May 
1861; by late 1862, it would reach almost crippling levels and never abate during the war.37 Even 
the bounty system, meant to stimulate volunteering, encouraged widespread desertions by 
“bounty jumpers” who absconded after receiving advance payments.38 Other forms of wastage 
were possibly even more harmful than desertion. An estimated two-thirds of officers in New 
York’s two-year regiments did not serve their full terms, with half of them resigning in the first 
six months.39 Enlisted men could not resign but nonetheless melted away by the thousands. The 
state’s first regiment formed under the call for “three hundred thousand more,” the 107th or 
Young Southern Tier Regiment, reached full strength by August 7, 1862, receiving a banner 
from Governor Morgan in recognition and inspiring pride in the regiment’s district. After two 
months of rampant illness and hard campaigning, only 250 men remained on duty.40 Recruiting 
parties for various regiments had begun supplying replacements in July 1861, but these small 
groups could not stem the tide of attrition.  
Desertion, disease, and field conditions were not the only culprits. Lax medical 
inspections brought thousands into the ranks who soon fell out, while recruiting officers often 
failed to return to the field promptly with the men they enlisted, and commanders at rendezvous 
sometimes let recruits accumulate instead of sending them forward in groups.41 In September 
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1864, General U. S. Grant would report that less than one in five new recruits actually reached 
the army.42 Soldiers worried that civilians did not fully grasp attrition’s effect on the war effort 
and local honor.43 On July 19, 1862, just as his countrymen geared up to meet the latest call, a 
New York City soldier informed a hometown newspaper that his regiment, the Second Fire 
Zouaves, could muster only 130 men for duty after a year of service. “I think if the Fire 
Department of New York wants us to uphold the laurels we have already won,” he added, “… it 
is their duty to try and fill the thinned ranks of our regiment, which fell in so noble a cause.”44 
Hillhouse’s annual report for 1862 would identify the question of how to replace the army’s 
losses as the single greatest problem facing the national and state governments.45 Attrition 
highlighted the need for effective recruiting policies: without a large and steady supply of new 
men the Union had no chance of victory. 
Strengthening forces in the field with reliable volunteers would be a daunting task: In 
early August, Stanton informed Morgan that more than fifty-four thousand recruits were needed 
to fill New York’s old regiments alone.46 Earlier, General McClellan had advised the governor 
that priority should be given to filling old regiments over creating new ones and to forcing the 
many able-bodied soldiers remaining home on sick leave to return to duty.47 Strong and other 
members of the U. S. Sanitary Commission Executive Committee wrote to Lincoln urging 
policies of filling old regiments and thorough medical inspections of recruits, which the president 
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endorsed.48 “Fill up the Old Regiments” became a mantra across the North that summer and fall 
as communities strove to meet their quotas, preserve local honor, and aid the cause in the most 
effective manner.49 Efforts to fill veteran commands received a boost from Stanton on July 21 
when he acceded to Morgan and Andrew’s requests that they be “authorized to say that new 
recruits for old regiments will be mustered [out] with the regiment.”50 In other words, recruits for 
these units could expect to serve only their regiment’s unexpired term, not a full three years—a 
powerful incentive and one that recruiters exploited to the hilt. (A similar guarantee had been 
held out to volunteers for old regiments the previous year.) After Stanton called for nine-month 
militia on August 4, canny recruiters began enticing volunteers for old regiments with the 
promise that the nine-month term applied to them. “The Term of Service is so short,” declared a 
lieutenant recruiting for a Jefferson County regiment that October as conscription seemed 
imminent, “the Town Bounties so liberal, added to the Certainty of being Discharged at the End 
of the Term, That it is believed men will be readily found to fill up the entire quota in this 
County—a thing earnestly desired by all who wish to spare old Jefferson the disgrace of a 
draft.”51 Officials played another card in late August when they discontinued bounties for 
recruits joining new regiments while keeping them available for those enlisting in old ones.52  
Lincoln and Stanton closely monitored states’ efforts to fill old regiments. Morgan and 
his fellow governors of Ohio and Pennsylvania reported to the president on July 28 that the 
program was proving less effective than hoped.53 The main problem lay in a dearth of officers 
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recruiting for old regiments. Few citizens could be found willing to do the hard work of enlisting 
men who would go to someone else’s unit when they had the more attractive option of forming 
their own companies and regiments. Out of three thousand authorizations that New York’s 
Adjutant General granted from May to December 1862 for recruiting companies, only 150 were 
for companies to be attached to old regiments. This and the many “superior attractions of the 
new regiments,” Hillhouse reported, crippled replacement efforts.54 From the summer through 
year’s end, New York secured roughly fifteen thousand men for regiments in the field, far more 
than any other state enlisted but barely one quarter of the number needed.55 Many of these men 
would receive a rude shock the following spring when the army’s promises evaporated and they 
were kept on for three-year terms. 
Lincoln and Morgan’s calls for volunteers in early July were a tonic to loyal New 
Yorkers, but organizing recruiting committees in the senatorial districts would take time that the 
nation could ill afford. On July 10, the New York City Board of Aldermen directed its Joint 
Committee on National Affairs to meet with the governor and work out an arrangement for more 
quickly meeting the need for troops. Out of that meeting was born Morgan’s July 17 
proclamation, issued without legislative approval, pledging fifty-dollar bounties to volunteers. 
The Board of Aldermen printed thirty thousand copies of its July 21 resolutions supporting the 
governor’s action, promising to provide city volunteers with rapid family support, and 
challenging other counties to meet their share of the debt resulting from the new bounty, just as 
Gotham would. If pressed, New York City could do more, the Committee on National Affairs 
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had acknowledged, and the city “is prepared, should the emergency demand it, to expend her last 
dollar, and sacrifice the last of her sons, in defence of the integrity of the Union; but, in the 
opinion of your Committee, such a sacrifice is not needed at this time.” Instead, the city would 
employ new efficiency and dedication to advance the Union cause and help the Empire State 
meet its quota within thirty days, a policy echoing the resolutions passed at the Union Square 
meeting.56 In August, state legislators advanced the cause by convening an extra session and 
retroactively approving the bounty.57 
The massive effort to meet the Empire State’s quotas finally achieved headway that 
month. “Stimulated by bounties, by the efforts and zeal of local committees, by fear of a draft, 
and the apprehension of unfavorable intelligence at any moment,” Morgan told Stanton on 
August 14, “the reserve power of the State is fairly in motion.” New York had enlisted thirty 
thousand men for the senatorial district regiments and three thousand to fill old 
commands.58 Morgan and Thurlow Weed—whose influence as a public affairs advisor far 
exceeded his official position as an editor—informed the war secretary that their state could fill 
both its quotas within three weeks so long as public zeal was not discouraged; in other words, 
New York must have a free hand to accept volunteers without being weighed down by federal 
regulations.59 “The popular feeling is at high war heat,” Weed declared. “It has cost much to get 
this steam up. Pray do not require the Governor to ‘blow it off.’” He added that New Yorkers 
from all over the state were awaiting Stanton’s decision. The secretary replied that he hardly 
desired to shut down the machinery at such a critical moment. He had already halted bounties for 
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new regiments while continuing them for old ones, given governors authority to apportion their 
quotas among counties and subdivisions of counties, and postponed the draft until September 3 
so that states had more time to fill their quotas with volunteers.60 Stanton called New York’s 
progress “highly gratifying” but urged that more troops be hurried on.61 
 The “efforts and zeal of local committees” and the communities that birthed them did 
indeed go far toward addressing the manpower crisis. J. Matthew Gallman has argued that the 
summer 1862 calls transferred the war’s burdens from individuals to communities.62 But local 
pride had served military efforts well since the war’s beginning as cities, towns, and wards 
connected troop-raising and family support to community honor and Union fortunes. In the 
summer of 1862, however, an adjustment in the community-honor impulse did occur as local 
quotas were established and the draft loomed. Area pride now hinged on meeting the first with 
volunteers in order to avoid the latter, and the possibility of violent opposition to drafting made 
this a practical consideration as well. George Opdyke suggested to the governor that New York 
City wards should be assigned their own quotas (a process already underway); “local pride” 
would be consequently stimulated and the city’s quota filled.63 Endless complaints and 
accusations sprang up about certain locales contributing more or less than their share; residents 
of predominantly Republican Pierrepont felt they had given more men than their duty required 
and should therefore be exempt from the draft, especially since Democratic towns had done 
nearly as much. Republican Senator Preston King forwarded this report to Morgan with 
approval.64 Communities of all sizes offered their own bounties just as they did family aid 
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money. Nineteen men in a Washington County town pledged to pay one dollar each to every 
able-bodied resident who enlisted before September 1.65 Enlistment committees in Brooklyn’s 
Third and Ninth Wards raised more modest bounties through subscriptions. Kings County, home 
to Brooklyn, paid its own bounty to more than six thousand volunteers up to October 15, when 
funds evidently ran out—a common circumstance.66 
Fear of conscription modified but did not supplant idealism. While New Yorkers 
increasingly divided over various war issues, belief in sacrifice for the Union cause remained 
strong with the majority. Some efforts succeeded while others fell short. When Brooklyn’s Third 
Ward Enlistment Committee failed to raise enough money for a bounty, members deposited $500 
in a fund for sick and wounded Kings County soldiers.67 The Women’s Central Association of 
Relief entertained a proposal by one of its members to convince businessmen around the country 
to replace their military-age male workforce with females and have the men enlisted; nothing 
apparently came of this idea.68 In Albany, war committees in the Third and Fourth Wards 
continued raising troops after meeting their quotas; the resulting surplus helped Albany County 
meet its overall quota, and the ward committees used remaining monies for a family relief 
fund.69 Civilians and soldiers alike appreciated esprit de corps: they cheered the achievements of 
local regiments, jealously guarded their honor, and strove to fill their ranks so they would not be 
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consolidated with others. Companies, regiments, and even a few brigades were seen as 
extensions of the civilian communities they came from.70 
Painfully aware that the Union’s survival (and avoiding conscription) depended on 
meeting manpower quotas, citizens not only held rallies and raised money but frequently became 
recruiters themselves. Rochester’s mayor called on the city’s businesses to close early ten days in 
a row in order to encourage locals to raise soldiers, and a city newspaper declared that the “work 
must be carried on like a political campaign or religious revival,” two subjects very familiar to 
Western New Yorkers.71 Community leaders around the state stepped forward with offers of 
private bounties for volunteers. In New York City, editor S. H. Wales of Scientific American 
announced on August 9 the opening of the magazine’s own recruiting office. It proved to be a 
very successful endeavor, with fifty-one volunteers secured in less than a month thanks to efforts 
of the magazine’s staff and the bounty they offered. A fellow editor hailed the example of his 
colleague Wales. “Spontaneous action of this sort adds greatly to the general momentum and 
enthusiasm,” he noted, “and provokes to more earnest effort the regular recruiting officers. When 
the people have a mind for the work, it will move right along.”72  
The work indeed moved right along in August and September as senatorial district 
committees and private individuals all lent their efforts. The wide variety of units recruiting 
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meant that prospective volunteers could choose the organization that best fitted their nationality, 
choice of duty, and even faith. Delegates from New York City and Brooklyn Presbyterian 
churches recruited among their congregations for a regiment called the Monitors, the idea being 
that the men would “monitor” one another to avoid succumbing to the vices of army life.73 (This 
lofty notion failed as the Monitors gained a poor reputation much like that of Ellsworth and 
Wilson’s Zouaves.)74 The Ironsides Regiment—its name evoking Oliver Cromwell’s tough 
Protestant warriors—organized on a similar principle.75 The powerful connection between 
communities and their regiments was demonstrated by the creation and sendoff of Albany’s 
senatorial district regiment, the 113th New York Infantry. Each company of the command 
recruited in a different city ward; thanks to what a newspaper called the “untiring zeal of the 
several Ward Committees, and our citizens generally,” the ranks were filled in thirty days. Ten 
thousand people gathered on August 19 to cheer the 113th as it marched through Albany on its 
way to the front. “No equally intense enthusiasm has marked the departure of any Regiment 
since the war began,” a witness claimed, “and no finer body of men ever went to the tented field 
in any country.” Two years and several bloody battles later, only one of its original officers 
would remain with the 113th.76 
Such “extraordinary exertions” and “remarkable” enlistment rates, as Adjutant General 
Hillhouse characterized efforts across the state, made August and September the most successful 
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months of the entire war in terms of recruiting in New York.77 Relief mingled with pride as many 
districts exceeded their quotas and it appeared the Empire State might meet its huge quotas 
without having to draft. Also encouraging was the fact that most volunteers enlisted for three 
years rather than nine months. As early as August 15, improved recruiting injected confidence 
into the business and financial communities, including a rebound in the stock market.78 By 
October 23, nearly seventy-five thousand men had been raised under the July 2 and August 4 
calls. “No other State can present a nobler record,” an Albany paper declared, although the 
majority of Union states likewise reached their quotas.79 Reality had finally caught up to the 
earnest words of Gibbons’s poem “Three Hundred Thousand More.” 
Alarming developments, however, indicated the drastic financial and social costs of this 
unprecedented mobilization. By year’s end the state would pay nearly three and a half million 
dollars in bounties; raising and tracking this and other recruitment expenses caused endless 
headaches in Albany, as did logistical difficulties at the state and federal levels.80 The people 
were answering the call but Washington failed to meet its own responsibilities, repeating the 
frustrations of 1861. “Our volunteers in many parts of the State are pouring in like the waters 
over Niagara,” Morgan told Stanton in August. “Will they be detained for necessary supplies?”81 
Meanwhile, the rate of volunteering differed widely across the state and some districts would 
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still struggle to meet their quotas after the New Year.82 Even dominantly Republican areas saw 
scattered interference with volunteering, while many citizens lost interest once their local quotas 
were achieved.83 Nowhere was declining enthusiasm for mobilization more obvious and 
consequential than in the New York metropolitan region. Police in the city guarded recruiting 
stations from hostile mobs, while the Democratic press mocked abolitionists, especially Horace 
Greeley, for supporting war on southern slaveholders but keeping themselves out of harm’s 
way.84 Over the course of the war the proportion of Empire State troops recruited in New York 
City dropped to eighteen percent despite the city having over one quarter of the state’s 
population.85 But growing opposition to recruitment was a nationwide dilemma in the second 
half of 1862, particularly in states where drafting occurred. Historians William Blair, Carol 
Reardon, and Mark A. Snell have produced case studies of Pennsylvanians and their reactions to 
the calls for six hundred thousand, demonstrating that community values and localism—in 
addition to the political differences that historians most often cite—inspired resistance to the 
notion of compulsory service.86 As detailed in the next chapter, disputes over quotas and draft 
enrollment brought tremendous strain to New York’s communities throughout the 1862 
manpower drive and beyond.  
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 Soldiers remained part of their home-front communities after they went to war and 
continually expressed interest in the progress of local recruiting and conscription. The majority 
supported renewed manpower calls and a draft, hoping these levies would fill up veteran 
regiments. Soldiers, like civilians, linked recruitment with the survival of the Union and deplored 
eligible men who remained at home and policies allowing them to do so. A naval officer insisted 
that all states should double their quotas. “It is a shame,” he added, “that our brave men in the 
field have been left to combat with overwhelming rebel hosts, while we have had at home such 
an irresistible reserve force.”87 Many soldiers believed that filling the ranks through drafting 
would allow the Union to quickly crush the Confederacy—a variation on assertions that many 
northerners had made in the spring of 1861 when they called for near-total mobilization.88 Yet in 
their private letters home, many men stopped short of calling on their own kin and friends to sign 
on. An officer who had been one of the first in the Southern Tier region to enlist over a year 
before warned his father against allowing his brother to join him: “Tell Henry not to be fooled 
into volunteering for if he does he ought to be hung and will be sorry when it’s too late.”89 
Soldiers often told the folks at home that one family member in uniform sufficed. Such 
prohibitions from soldiers who otherwise supported mass mobilization were extremely common, 
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occurred throughout the war, and may reveal the limits of northern resolve, though it is difficult 
to fault men who had experienced the war’s horrors for encouraging loved ones to stay safe.90  
Recruitment competition and fraud, which became pronounced that summer and 
established trends that only worsened as the war went on, also indicated the limits of 
commitment. Many soldiers and civilians freely indulged in dishonesty for the cause, and soldier 
recruiters often rivaled the notorious brokers in their fierce competition and willingness to bend 
the truth. Officers and enlisted men eagerly sought recruiting duty, seeing it as a chance to relax, 
visit home, and gain promotion.91 Major Harmon D. Hull of the Fifth New York Zouaves 
returned to New York City in August to find replacements for the regiment’s battered ranks. 
After attracting hundreds of men with the Fifth’s renowned uniform and reputation, Hull held 
onto most of them despite orders to forward the recruits to the field, planning to form his own 
regiment. The plot backfired as officers remaining with the Fifth expressed anger and Hull failed 
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to secure enough men. Those he had enlisted were mustered in as a six-company battalion under 
a different officer; outraged, Hull did his best to undermine the new unit.92 Commissioners of the 
New York City Metropolitan Police decided to form their own brigade; patrolmen on their beats 
acted as recruiters, and the deserters they arrested promptly found themselves enlisted into the 
Metropolitan Brigade.93 Nor did New Yorkers confine themselves to their own state, as outraged 
Chicago residents learned when New York officers enlisting for the mysterious “Marine 
Artillery” appeared in the city and drew away men who would now not count toward local 
quotas.94 Competition became a top-down affair that year. On July 5, the U. S. Navy created the 
Bureau of Equipment and Recruiting to address the service’s logistical and manpower 
difficulties. One of the new department’s charges was to encourage transfers of army personnel 
to the navy.95 Similarly, a War Department order issued in October authorized transfer of 
volunteers to regular army regiments. Regular officers and sergeants eagerly took advantage of 
the order—even to the extent of enticing men away from guard duty—until exasperation from 
volunteer officers caused the order’s recall the following February.96 Added to all this was the 
failure of recruiting for old regiments, whose officers often had to pay their own expenses and 
waged losing competition with the better-connected recruiters for new commands.97  
Competition stalked hand-in-hand with fraud. Dire need for bodies in uniform 
encouraged recruiters to adopt lax standards; New York gained an especially poor reputation in 
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this regard.98 Officers on permanent recruiting duty and communities striving to meet quotas felt 
little incentive to accept only reliable men. “When the regiment was recruited,” wrote the 
surgeon of New York City’s 119th Infantry, “they took anything, the old, the weak, the sick—and 
now, of course, they can’t take the extremely strenuous war conditions. … We have fourteen-
year-old boys in our regiment who aren’t even strong enough to carry a gun.”99 Emphasis on 
quantity rather than quality or preparation of enlistees bore evil effects at the front. When 
McClellan faced invading Confederates at the decisive battle of Antietam, Maryland, on 
September 17, more than one-quarter of his infantrymen were new recruits; some of these raw 
soldiers loaded their muskets for the first time as they went into battle that day. Historians 
examining the causes of McClellan’s hesitation in the campaign and failure to destroy the enemy 
often note his great numerical advantage but less often these striking facts.100 
By November, Army Adjutant General Lorenzo Thomas reported that a “system of 
brokerage has sprung up” across the Union in which civilian agents exploited the need for 
manpower, often using corrupt methods to cheat enlistees and towns while lining their own 
pockets.101 This situation was all too common in New York as conscription loomed, especially 
since haphazard recordkeeping made draft enrollment figures unreliable and often prompted 
different towns to claim the same men on their quotas. The ill-advised practice of paying 
bounties up front encouraged desertions and an “organized scheme” of bounty jumping, 
Hillhouse noted.102 On August 23, two separate letter writers warned Morgan that the new 
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competitive bounty culture among counties, towns, and wards damaged home-front morale and 
even recruitment. State and national bounties were beneficial, the state’s assistant inspector 
general noted, providing soldiers with a tidy sum to leave with their families. But ever-rising 
local bounties possibly broke the law and prompted uncomfortable questions about the morality 
of buying citizens for something (army service) that should be considered a patriotic endeavor.103 
The War Department addressed corruption in a major way by founding the Provost Marshal 
General’s Office on September 24, charging the new body with policing deserters, directing draft 
enrollment, and cracking down on recruiting fraud.104 
 One month earlier, a new organization had formed in New York City to reinvigorate the 
public and promote state efforts. Another mass meeting to promote volunteering occurred, this 
time in City Hall Park, on August 27. Attendance was unimpressive and the crowd muted, but 
Hiram Walbridge—a prominent New Yorker who had long championed mass mobilization—
managed to get resolutions passed creating the National War Committee of the Citizens of New 
York. The intended goal of this group was to reinforce the old New York regiments, support 
efforts to form new ones, and help Michael Corcoran complete his new Irish brigade, in that 
order.105 Like the Union Defense Committee had the year before, the new body filled its roster 
with leading local merchants and other elites (many of whom had served in the UDC) and 
adopted a comprehensive approach to serving the cause. Yet the National War Committee was, if 
anything, even farther-reaching and controversial than its predecessor. Several prominent figures 
elected to the NWC refused to serve on it, and August Belmont publicly expressed his mistrust 
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of the organization even as he donated one thousand dollars to its volunteer campaign.106 The 
committee’s membership reflected the increasingly bitter division of Union supporters into 
“radical” and “conservative” factions, which differed over emancipation and how severely 
military power should be applied to the South.107 Mayor Opdyke, committee chairman, and 
several of his fellow Radicals in the NWC went beyond their mandate: taking the “National” in 
their name literally, they denigrated state efforts and argued that efficiency in the war effort 
could only be achieved if the federal government assumed near-total control. One need only look 
to the draconian Confederacy and its battlefield successes over the Union to see the necessity of 
centralization, the NWC leadership asserted.108 Lincoln’s administration must prosecute the war 
remorselessly and hold officers and men strictly to their duties, while “the different cities, and 
villages of the country” should form committees to join forces with the NWC “with the view to 
secure united and vigorous efforts in support of the Government.”109  
NWC members met frequently over the anxious final four months of 1862. Their 
subcommittees determined to “call personally on monied corporations and citizens and solicit 
subscriptions to the Corcoran and General Fund.” They passed endless sets of resolutions 
exhorting loyal citizens to aid recruitment and entertained funding requests from officers. They 
inspected state defenses and new weapons, attempted to reform mobilization in other states, and 
presented Washington officials with a plan for a “uniform depot system” across the North. They 
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even proposed a military operation to redeem West Texas.110 In the wake of yet another Union 
defeat in Virginia, the committee on September 2 publicly requested the New York militia 
regiments recently returned from three-month tours to once again deploy for the front, but the 
militiamen demurred.111 In all of this, the NWC invited widespread criticism for overreach, 
inefficiency, and ignoring its original obligations. The ambition of leading committeemen 
exceeded their resources and tact. One particularly active member was the influential young 
attorney and Radical John Austin Stevens, Jr., previously a leader in the UDC. Morgan, despite 
his desire to assist in filling up the old regiments, had refused to cooperate with Stevens, whom 
the War Department appointed to handle the matter, after Stevens attacked Morgan in the pages 
of the Evening Post.112 (The governor otherwise “cheerfully” assisted NWC efforts.)113 
Committee membership fluctuated as its affiliates argued constantly over the direction they 
should take, while Corcoran’s men grew angry as the NWC failed to deliver promised bounties. 
The committee scrupulously published its activities in public reports.114 Ironically, committee 
members hoped to overhaul northern war making and promote efficiency and transparency in 
mobilization, but their efforts only caused greater confusion and factionalism, achieving even 
less than the similarly controversial Union Defense Committee before it. The quixotic National 
War Committee stopped meeting in December.115 That July, the War Department had suggested 
state governments should appoint committees of their “most reliable and influential” residents to 
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take charge of volunteering, predicting that this would create “a wholesome influence on the 
volunteer recruiting service.”116 The overreaching, abortive career of the National War 
Committee was surely not what department officials had envisioned. 
Who were the new volunteers of 1862, the men and boys brought in by the sustained 
recruiting drive that summer and fall? There is evidence to support Gibbons’s depiction in 
“Three Hundred Thousand More” of “sturdy farmer boys” and townsmen rushing to the call in 
great numbers, motivated by patriotism and group identity. The 154th, composed of men from 
rural Chautauqua and Cattaraugus Counties, contained fifty-eight sets of brothers and eight 
father-and-son pairs. Far to the east, many siblings enlisted together as replacements in the Fifth 
New York Zouaves.117 In November, a Union general gathering a force for the Gulf of Mexico 
noted that these New Yorkers and New Englanders “are new, but of a better class of men than 
those of earlier levies, and the men are earnest for the expedition.”118 But other observers 
differed on the social makeup of the new volunteers versus veterans.119 “An Old Member” of a 
famous Brooklyn regiment attacked Representative Moses F. Odell in the pages of a local 
newspaper for implying that “the scum of Brooklyn came out first, but that the pride of Brooklyn 
came out last.” In fact, claimed this veteran of eighteen months’ service, the new men had been 
attracted by bounties and often malingered in hospitals.120 Edward King Wightman, a college 
graduate and newspaperman, had declined volunteering over the past year because of personal 
commitments and an assumption that there were enough unemployed men to meet the army’s 
manpower needs. After careful thought, Wightman enlisted in August 1862, explaining that 
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many others were not stepping forward and it was “disgraceful … for young men [to be] living 
peacefully and selfishly at home” with the country imperiled. Upon joining Hawkins’ Zouaves, 
the sophisticated Wightman was shocked by the regiment’s new and old men alike. His fellow 
recruits were “rough material” and the regiment’s privates as a whole “disgustingly immoral and 
profane.” Veterans abused the newcomers for being “bounty men” instead of “patriots” like 
them.121 It is unclear how common such behavior was in the army; in the navy, brutal hazing of 
new sailors was a long-established practice.122 Tensions between veterans and recruits 
demonstrated how mobilization practices affected the cohesion of the Union military.123 
The manpower crisis in the summer of 1862 brought new or expanded opportunities for 
marginalized segments of the population, including northern African Americans. Northerners’ 
two great causes—saving the Union and, eventually, abolishing slavery—came together at the 
intersection of mobilization. Henry Wilson’s militia bill of July 1862 included provisions for 
freeing and employing blacks as military laborers and soldiers; the abolitionist senator supported 
these items in his proposal for a draft (something less controversial and widely backed that 
summer) with the goal of enacting some concrete form of emancipation, however limited.124 
When the Militia Act became law on July 17, reaction among white New Yorkers indicated how 
a year of war had changed some attitudes while reinforcing others. As late as July 10, the 
Republican Times had spoken for many when it supported black military labor as part of the 
movement to “adopt any and every means to put down the rebellion” but added: “We believe 
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that, just now, it would be better to employ them in this work than to use them as soldiers, for 
which plenty of far more efficient men can be found.”125 The qualifier “just now” indicated 
willingness on the part of editor Henry Raymond and his paper to change tack on African 
American enlistment should Union fortunes and white volunteering continue to falter. Especially 
strident abolitionists such as Frederick Douglass, on the other hand, deplored the Militia Act for 
only addressing slaves in the Confederacy and offering no provision for northern black 
enlistment.126 
The tide of public opinion was shifting, and war supporters increasingly called for black 
freedom and service as logical and potentially war-winning weapons in the Union’s arsenal. 
People had tired of the government playing at war, noted the Evening Post in the same issue 
containing Gibbons’s poem and coverage of the Union Square rally, and demanded an attack on 
the bondage system buttressing the Confederacy.127 A Western New York soldier writing to his 
hometown paper eagerly espoused black enlistment, saying he preferred their company in the 
army to that of his white friends and predicting they would make better soldiers when stationed 
in the South.128 An array of white New York City residents prepared a petition for Lincoln that 
spoke of “thousands of colored persons in the State of New York, whose attachment to the cause 
of the Union is as great as our own, and who are anxiously awaiting an opportunity to serve their 
country on the battle field [sic],” and asked Lincoln to allow Governor Morgan to form black 
regiments. (The petition took the form of a twenty-five-foot scroll containing eight hundred 
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signatures, but unaccountably was never sent.)129 Morgan himself received several requests to 
grant commissions to white men for raising such forces.130 On August 10, even the Democratic 
New York Sunday Mercury—a favorite journal with soldiers but no friend to Lincoln’s 
government—approvingly quoted the Anglo-African’s call for blacks to serve the Union and 
added: “The darkeys are ready—let Old Abe sound the bugle.”131 
Other Democrats and their newspapers vehemently opposed these suggestions, 
however.132 On August 13, the widely influential Herald expressed shock at a Union general’s 
proposal to recruit slaves in Louisiana, calling it “an act of barbarism” and “a suicidal policy” 
dreamed up by abolitionists desiring a slave insurrection. “It is a libel on the white race of the 
North, numbering two to one of the inhabitants of the Southern States …” the Herald opined, “to 
say they cannot put down the rebellion without arming the slaves against their masters' wives and 
children …”133 Such objections merely previewed the uproar that greeted news of Lincoln’s 
Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation on September 22. Nothing except the draft so outraged 
conservative Democrats like this announcement that slaves in rebellious states would be free on 
January 1, 1863—despite the document making no mention of black military service, which 
would only be authorized by the final proclamation issued that day.134 On September 24, the 
president suspended habeas corpus and sanctioned a crackdown on disloyalty, defined to include 
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opposition to volunteering and conscription.135 Republican and Democratic daily newspapers in 
Rochester had held a truce since July, but from late September on, they became more bitterly 
partisan than ever.136 New York’s Peace and War Democrats begrudgingly reunited and would 
help turn the fall elections into an acrimonious referendum on Lincoln’s policies and the war’s 
progress. The Copperheads, incensed by emancipation and draft proposals, had emerged as a 
potent force under gubernatorial candidate Horatio Seymour.137 The spirit of cooperation in the 
cause that Republicans and Democrats had fostered that summer was falling apart, and this 
would have ill effects for Lincoln and Morgan’s party in November. Battles over black freedom 
and service that deepened divisions in the North were inextricably linked to issues of 
mobilization and commitment to the war effort. 
The question of African American participation was not the only factor that made 
mobilization a diverse and controversial affair. During the four years of the war, some eight 
hundred thousand immigrants came to the United States; of these, over 180,000 served in the 
military alongside many more who had immigrated previously.138 The great contribution of 
foreign-born Americans to the northern war effort is well known, but historians differ on 
immigrants’ motives, the extent of their involvement, and whether it helped them assimilate into 
larger American society. A growing band of transnational historians have shown that the Civil 
War must be placed in the context of the revolutions of 1848 and other examples of “a bloody 
worldwide process that existed outside the control of historical actors in any one nation,” as 
Patrick J. Kelly notes. Bruce Levine anticipated this school of thought in a study of German-
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American craft workers and their injection of “the spirit of 1848” into northern white labor’s 
opposition to the expansion of slavery.139 Thomas Bender took a broader view in explaining 
how, far from being exceptional, the American Civil War was part and parcel of a global 
movement toward nationalism and centralized, liberal government. Andre Fleche pushed this 
point by averring that the “fight over the future of republican government in America can also be 
seen as a fight over the legacy of 1848 and the meaning of nationalism and revolution in the 
Atlantic world.”140 Transnational historians provide more explanations for how America 
descended into conflict and emerged, arguably, a stronger nation. 
Evidence from the Union’s most diverse state complicates the story of immigrant 
participation in the conflict. Historian Don H. Doyle has partly resurrected old assumptions that 
immigrant soldiers in the Union military were motivated primarily by loyalty to their adopted 
nation and that their service did much to break down nativist prejudice.141 Other scholars’ 
findings and conditions in wartime New York weaken these notions. Doyle does not argue such, 
but it should be noted that immigrants did not universally welcome the chance to fight for their 
new country, including many of those who supported the Union cause; German males, in fact, 
commonly left their homeland to avoid service and to secure the freedom and financial reward 
that America offered—opportunities that might be jeopardized by enlistment. Among Irish and 
                                                 
139 Patrick J. Kelly, “The European Revolutions of 1848 and the Transnational Turn in Civil War History,” Journal 
of the Civil War Era 4 (2014): 431-443; Bruce Levine, The Spirit of 1848: German Immigrants, Labor Conflict, and 
the Coming of the Civil War (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1992). 
140 Thomas Bender, A Nation Among Nations: America’s Place in World History (New York: Hill & Wang, 2006); 
Andre Fleche, The Revolution of 1861: The American Civil War in the Age of Nationalist Conflict (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 3 (quote). 
141 Don H. Doyle, The Cause of All Nations: An International History of the American Civil War (New York: Basic 
Books, 2014), 165, 170. For findings similar to Doyle’s, see Paludan, “A People’s Contest,” 284; Mahin, The 




Germans alike (along with the native-born), some were motivated to enlist out of patriotism, 
some for pay; many did not enlist at all.142  
In the first full year of the war, New Yorkers drew inspiration from the wonderful 
commitment of Germans, Irish, French, Scots, and other immigrant communities.143 Immigrants 
had been heavily represented in New York’s military forces since the colonial era, and the 
regular army and navy nearly resembled foreign legions despite regulations such as the army’s 
prohibition on non-English-speaking recruits.144  Neighborhoods of the foreign-born and their 
children embraced the associational culture that so profoundly shaped nineteenth-century life and 
public responses to war. In churches, beer halls, and meeting rooms across New York, German-
Americans in all their diversity cultivated a wide variety of groups, or vereine, that included 
unions, shooting and singing clubs, debate societies, fire and militia companies, and, most 
importantly, the Turner societies promoting what one historian calls “muscular 
republicanism.”145  As with associations formed of the native-born and others, this culture 
bonded nationalities and ethnicities; additionally, exclusive associations brought their members 
into American society while simultaneously building walls. New York’s German speakers 
seemed united by a common language and nothing else; other historians, however, demonstrate 
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that German-Americans could unite when they wished.146 Evidence indicates that Germans 
marched to war under Franz Sigel, Carl Schurz, and other icons of the Forty-Eighter movement 
in part to gain political capital and to assimilate themselves into a German-American identity 
supportive of liberty and other democratic values.147  
Cultural ties, associational culture, and language barriers prompted the formation of 
several regiments that were wholly or largely Teutonic, and two historians of German service in 
the war posit that “the German regiments were little more than an extension of traditional 
German associations and clubs, adapted to the war situation.”148 Five days after the outbreak of 
war, the president of New York City’s Turner Society called upon his fellow members to enlist 
for the Union; this resulted in a meeting where two hundred Turners promised to form a regiment 
and a committee of five got the unit underway. Subscriptions and support from the Turner Sisters 
helped complete the project, which also brought in Turners from Brooklyn, Albany, and other 
localities. The resulting regiment, the Twentieth New York or United Turner Rifles, failed to 
secure Sigel as colonel (he was busy recruiting in St. Louis) but mustered in that May as one of 
the state’s two-year regiments.149 When their muster-out time approached two years later and the 
government seemed about to renege on its promises to the regiment, the men of the United 
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Turner Rifles would mutiny, receiving encouragement from home-front vereine.150 The Forty-
First or De Kalb Regiment—one of several named for Teutonic heroes of the American 
Revolution—departed the city in July 1861 escorted by the New York Liederkranz and other 
German-American societies.151 Eventually over two hundred thousand German-Americans 
served in the Union forces.152  
The second-largest group of foreign-born volunteers, Irish-Americans, also flocked to the 
colors in 1861 through the influence of community leaders and associations. Seeing service as a 
chance to improve their economic condition, weaken native-born hostility, and drub Britain 
(whose leaders often supported the Confederacy), Irish New Yorkers followed their hero 
Michael Corcoran into the ranks of the Sixty-Ninth Militia and other regiments. Corcoran 
encouraged the formation of wholly Irish units in order to raise the profile of their service to the 
Union.153 In September 1861, Morgan accepted an offer from Irish expatriate and Sixty-Ninth 
veteran Thomas F. Meagher to raise a full brigade of his countrymen in thirty days; the Irish 
Brigade would go on to forge a legendary reputation and suffer higher losses than any other 
brigade.154 The exclusive ethnic character of many urban regiments like the Forty-First, the 
Sixty-Ninth, and the Seventy-Ninth often declined as they suffered heavy casualties and received 
replacements from varied backgrounds. Within one year of mustering in, the Seventy-Ninth—a 
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famously Scottish command called the Highland Guard—began receiving Irish, Canadians, 
Germans, English, Swiss, and Italians alongside Scots.155 
The rhetoric and actions of native-born Americans toward their immigrant neighbors in 
the war’s first year almost give the impression that nativism was extinct. Recognizing immigrant 
communities as valuable allies in the war effort, especially since many foreign-born men had 
military experience, influential northerners enthusiastically encouraged their participation.156 
Corcoran, as colonel of the Sixty-Ninth, had been arrested in 1860 for refusing to parade his 
regiment in honor of the visiting Prince of Wales, an incident that exacerbated ethnic tensions 
already strained by Irish Democrats’ sympathies for the South. As New York geared up for war 
the following April, all seemed forgiven, and Morgan ordered the charges against Corcoran 
dropped. The colonel immediately began recruiting his command up to war strength and received 
over six thousand applicants within days even though he discouraged enlistment of Fenians. The 
Sixty-Ninth left for Virginia escorted by two thousand members of Irish societies.157  
The federal and state governments received a surge of offers from the foreign-born to 
raise and command troops, favoring any that promised to bring much-valued experience and 
volunteers to the cause.158 Secretary of State Seward took a special interest in encouraging 
immigrant involvement, sponsoring a German-American regiment called the Seward Infantry 
and recommending to Morgan and Cameron that they appoint a Prussian prince and several other 
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distinguished foreigners who offered to help secure troops.159 (Seward even motivated Cameron 
to act by warning that foreign military professionals would go over to the enemy if the Union did 
not hire them.)160 In 1861, when immigration flagged in response to the war’s outbreak, there 
was a minor push to encourage migrants from Europe and therefore offset the loss of agrarian 
and industrial workers who enlisted.161 The Secretary of State would go further in August 1862 
by using the Homestead Act to entice foreign recruits, an example of the exploitation and 
controversy characterizing immigrant and native-born relations throughout the war.162 Inquiries 
by the British Parliament into American targeting of the Irish began in the war’s first year and 
did nothing to relieve tensions between Britain and the United States.163 Nor were Irish the only 
immigrants ensnared. “As soon as you set foot in the country,” said a native of Schwerin who 
arrived in New York City in July 1861, “the recruiters come at you from all sides. Since I didn’t 
know the slightest thing about American recruiting tricks, I did the same thing as so many 
others;” he enlisted into a regiment of “Americans and Irishmen” where he felt unwelcome. 
Within a few months, he deserted and joined a German-American artillery battery.164 
This volunteer’s story exemplifies the complications undergirding immigrant roles in the 
war. The onset of war weariness after the Bull Run disaster affected immigrant communities just 
as it did others. Meagher quickly organized a new Sixty-Ninth for his Irish Brigade that fall, but 
the brigade’s two other regiments took much longer to fill. In Rochester, Father Daniel Moore of 
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St. Mary’s Church and other leading citizens attempted to create their own Irish brigade but 
could enlist only three companies.165 Such difficulties may have resulted from ethnic divisions, 
which did not disappear but arguably swelled under the stresses of mobilization. On July 19, 
1861, the War Department directed: “In the future no volunteer will be mustered into the service 
who is unable to speak the English language.” The extensive immigrant press across the North, 
particularly that representing German-Americans, led an immediate fight against an order they 
perceived as motivated by nativist prejudice. The War Department repealed the directive on 
August 7 but counseled prospective recruits to “enlist under officers whose language they speak 
and understand.”166 The next February, however, the Adjutant General turned down Meagher’s 
request that all Irish regiments be brought together under his command, fearing that it would 
undermine unity in the army.167 Whatever unity existed between nationalities was already weak. 
An officer in New York’s Lincoln Cavalry testified that German and native-born men in the 
regiment had their own officers by agreement and recruited separately in the summer of 1861 
due to the “bad feeling between us.” Relations between German and Austrian-born officers in 
another New York cavalry command were similarly bitter.168 Two German historians conclude 
that “in the Union army general fraternization across ethnic lines simply did not happen.” 
Scholars of the German and Irish-American experience in the war have demonstrated that 
nativist contempt increased as the conflict went on, prompted by growing Irish opposition to 
recruitment and rumors of German cowardice in battle.169 However, it is clear that the roughly 
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half-million men of foreign birth who fought for the Union contributed vitally to the war effort 
and helped make it “an international struggle,” as Doyle notes.170 
Among the masses of New Yorkers who answered their country’s call in the second half 
of 1862, immigrants figured prominently. Once again, foreign officers applying for commands 
found audiences in Albany and Washington, while dozens of ethnically themed regiments 
formed. From New York City, Mayor Opdyke informed Morgan that the cousin of Italian patriot 
Giuseppe Garibaldi wished to raise a regiment; the power of the Garibaldi name might bring 
forth many immigrants who would not otherwise volunteer. (Nothing, however, came of this 
offer.)171 Opdyke also alerted Albany officials to what may have been the most outlandish plan 
of all. In early December, the suitably named General De La Guerra proposed to bring ten 
thousand Cuban ex-soldiers to New York City disguised as immigrants; there, they could be 
turned over as recruits to fill the city’s quota. De la Guerra’s reward was to be a generalship and 
a bounty for supplying each man. The state judge advocate general rejected the offer as improper 
and potentially disastrous.172 The War Department, wary of scandals like that over Canadian 
recruitment, turned down a similar plan involving Swedes coming to New York.173 Nevertheless, 
tens of thousands of the foreign-born helped to meet state and local quotas. While the Union 
benefited substantially from their commitment, inefficiency and ethnic tensions swelled thanks to 
prejudice and simple cultural differences.174 Most immigrant soldiers did not serve in exclusively 
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foreign-born or ethnic regiments, but they drew attention—much of it increasingly and unfairly 
negative—wherever they went. 
From the war’s beginning, Irish-Americans had enjoyed a high profile as warriors for the 
Union cause. By mid-1862, however, their attitudes toward the war and military service were 
souring, which in turn threatened to exacerbate native hostility. On July 25, General Meagher 
gave a characteristically passionate speech in New York City to raise replacements for his 
battered Irish Brigade. Listeners reportedly were moved, but few volunteered. Slackening Irish 
enlistment rates had begun earlier in the Midwest and now appeared in the nation’s largest Irish-
American community.175 Several factors were at play. Irish soldiers’ complaints in letters home 
discouraged further recruitment in their neighborhoods, as did Democratic opposition, according 
to Meagher and Daniel Sickles. An improved economy meant that fewer men of all backgrounds 
sought army employment. Most troublesome of all for Meagher particularly was Corcoran’s 
return from enemy captivity and his determination to raise a new brigade of his countrymen. 
With messages of Irish and American patriotism—messages enjoying excellent press and 
attention from the city’s recruiting committees—Corcoran’s Irish Legion drew off over two 
thousand fresh volunteers who could have been put to better use in Meagher’s veteran brigade.176 
But most Irish-American men refused to enlist in any command. Colonel Silas W. Burt, 
Morgan’s Assistant Inspector General, toured the mountainous mining country of Essex County 
in August and warned the governor that “scarcely a single Irishman, citizen or alien, has been 
enlisted since July 1st … in spite of every inducement and appliance.” Burt explained that 
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“powerful” voices discouraged Irish volunteering with a variety of arguments, including threats 
of looming economic competition with freed slaves. That nearly all local Irishmen should be so 
influenced at a time when other immigrants enlisted in great numbers was “mysterious and 
alarming.” What was more, the Irish miners were said to be threatening violent opposition to 
conscription. All the signs pointed to a secret, organized opposition movement, Burt believed.177 
Events in the following months raised Irish opposition to the war to an unprecedented level, 
particularly the release of the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, McClellan’s removal 
from command of the Army of the Potomac, what they perceived as unfair targeting of Irish in 
state drafts, and a bloody Union defeat in the Battle of Fredericksburg. Irish-Americans traced 
most of their people’s wartime woes back to mobilization and emancipation; their understanding 
of the connection between these movements was seen when an Irish mob attacked the home of 
James Sloan Gibbons, noted abolitionist and author of “Three Hundred Thousand More.”178 
 The outrage and opposition to recruitment exhibited by many New York Irish in 1862 
was a highly visible instance of a nationwide movement among Democratic sympathizers. But 
the Irish were no more a monolithic bloc than any other people, as the success of Corcoran’s 
Legion showed. German-Americans also voiced exasperation at the lack of progress in the war 
while continuing to send forth volunteers.179 The determined, widespread response to Lincoln 
and Morgan’s calls showed that the spirit of 1861 survived—albeit in modified form—among 
immigrants and the native-born alike. As a new regiment organized in Buffalo in September 
1862, a German-born member marveled at the great extent of support for the cause and how the 
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city’s elite families cared for the men of his unit. He resolved to fight for America out of 
gratitude for taking him in.180 
Ironically, given the Union’s eagerness to employ new Americans in the war effort, 
descendants of the first Americans received little encouragement until mid-1862. In this era, 
American Indian nations in New York were shadows of what they had once been. After long 
years of exploitation and epidemics, New York’s recognized nations survived on far-flung 
reservations across the state. Amid the population boom of the mid-century years, New York 
Indians barely grew in numbers at all, while disease, land loss to railroads, and outward 
movement continued to exact heavy tolls.181 Some, particularly Oneidas and Mohawks, migrated 
in search of economic opportunity, while others eked out precarious lives on small patches of 
farmland. Men from Long Island’s Shinnecock Reservation went to sea as whalers.182 Members 
of the once-powerful Six Nations of the Iroquois exemplified the unsure position of New York’s 
native population in the sectional crisis of 1860 and 1861. Continually beset by land loss, 
isolated from larger society, denied citizenship (a status most did not desire anyway), and 
unaffected by slavery or secession, Iroquois nevertheless followed national events keenly. The 
breakup of the Union seemed to leave the future of federal and state Indian agencies in doubt; 
moreover, some Six Nations people considered themselves patriotic Americans and allies of the 
Great Father in Washington, their protector against rapacious New York officials and land 
magnates. Young Iroquois men, motivated by warrior traditions, expressed the same eagerness to 
enlist as did Indians (and people of other races, for that matter) throughout the northern states.183  
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In the war’s first year, white prejudice stalled New York Indians’ willingness to serve the 
Union. Within days of the war’s outbreak, Chippewas nominated one of their chiefs, George 
Copway, to go to Washington and offer the services of 250 Chippewa volunteers. Copway 
received an endorsement from Hiram Barney, Collector of the Port of New York and the most 
powerful patronage holder in the state.184 In an action matched by communities of all ethnicities, 
residents of the Cattaraugus Reservation organized a war meeting on April 18 and, in the words 
of a newspaper, “resolved themselves ready to raise a full regiment to defend our flag and our 
country.” The next month, the Union Defense Committee heard a proposal to recruit Indians.185 
But Secretary of War Cameron curtly rejected enlistment of “savages,” and Indian recruitment 
received no better encouragement in Albany.186 Those who enlisted received prompt discharges; 
according to a frustrated Isaac Newton Parker, an Iroquois of the Seneca Nation and brother to 
Sachem Ely S. Parker, mustering officers “could not accept me because there is no regulation, 
that is no law for accepting the ‘red man’” in the military.187 Prohibitions on Indian service were 
not so strictly enforced outside New York. After seeing regiments from other states with Indians 
in the ranks pass near their Western New York reservation—and despite a highly discouraging 
December 23 order from New York’s Adjutant General forbidding the practice—the Parkers and 
other leading Senecas persisted in efforts to recruit Indians. Their relentless campaign gathered 
support from prominent whites, and in April 1862 the War Department finally authorized 
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acceptance of up to three hundred Native volunteers in Buffalo.188 Yet this did not end the saga, 
as the government soon went back on its word and Seneca recruitment was further set back by 
infighting of the sort that plagued white officials as well.189 
 Not until the call for “three hundred thousand more” in July 1862 did the Parkers and 
other New York Indians finally get a real chance to fight for the Union. From that point on, 
Indian volunteers increasingly saw the same exploitation as men of other ethnicities, possibly 
worsened by Indians’ poverty and vulnerability. The recruiting committee for Buffalo’s 
senatorial district convinced Seneca community leader Chauncey C. Jemison to attach his 
“Indian Company” to their regiment. But Jemison soon learned that a “Tuscarora rascal,” a chief 
named Cornelius C. Cusick, had colluded with whites to have Jemison’s men mustered in under 
his name and thus gain a commission. These twenty-five Native soldiers were joined by Parker 
as sergeant and integrated into a company of German-Americans from Brooklyn. Jemison, 
angered by this scheming and integration, asked Parker, “When will we Indians cease to be tools 
for these white devils?” and determined to recruit another company of his people.190 Despite its 
inauspicious beginning, Cusick’s “Tuscarora Company” distinguished itself in the field and 
enjoyed unusually harmonious relations with white comrades.191 As recruiters continued 
exploiting Indians and families suffered at home, Native communities would call for the 
discharge and return of their men at the front.192 
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By late November, loosening of restrictions and standards, along with patriotism, 
bounties, and draft wariness, had helped New York raise over 86,000 troops toward its summer 
quotas.193 As the year ended, Morgan prepared to turn the governorship over to Horatio 
Seymour, whose tensions with the Lincoln administration promised to inject new complications 
into mobilization. The considerable achievements of Morgan and his military staff in the war’s 
first two years could not have occurred without the support and sacrifice of New Yorkers of all 
classes, who understood keenly that the Union’s survival rested on raising large forces with 
greater efficiency than seen in the heady days after Fort Sumter. Volunteering had fallen short 
despite the numbers secured, however, and New Yorkers finally faced long-feared conscription. 
                                                 





“THE MEN WILL DO ANYTHING RATHER THAN GO TO WAR”:  
CONSCRIPTION AND EVOLVING WARTIME COMMITMENT 
 
 In June 1863, the Army of Northern Virginia, recently triumphant at Chancellorsville, 
crossed the border into Maryland. Northern officers and politicians sent frantic messages across 
the Northeast calling for troops to counter the raid. At Camp Sprague outside Rochester, New 
York, Colonel William B. Barnes had spent six months raising men for his new regiment, the 
Eleventh New York Heavy Artillery, with promises of easy and safe duty in the forts guarding 
New York Harbor. On the night of June 15, however, State Adjutant General John T. Sprague 
sent the ambitious officer an unexpected telegram: “Colonel Barnes will have his regiment 
mustered at once; will proceed immediately to Harrisburg, Pa., and await orders.”1 This stunning 
order, combined with poor discipline in camp, caused the outraged men of the Eleventh to 
mutiny. Only with great difficulty did Barnes and his officers assemble their men and leave for 
the front.2 In Pennsylvania, the Eleventh mutinied again when ordered to face the enemy, earning 
a poor reputation for themselves and their commander.3 “The experience with the 11th artillery 
should serve as a warning against future deception in recruiting men,” a Rochester newspaper 
noted. “The insubordination of that regiment did not arise directly from the fact that it was sent 
to ‘defend the State of Pennsylvania from invasion,’ but from the promises made its members 
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that they were to be employed exclusively in garrisoning forts and upon no other duty.”4 The 
unfortunate story of Barnes and his regiment played out during the advent of federal 
conscription, a time when self-interest overtook sacrifice in northern rhetoric. This philosophy 
embraced, according to historian Joan E. Cashin, “beliefs more durable than the appeal of public 
duty,” including family loyalty and “the self.”5 Thanks to its widespread unpopularity, federal 
draft legislation succeeded by encouraging volunteering. In 1863, Union supporters largely gave 
up on trying to make the war effort a total commitment. New Yorkers, from Governor Horatio 
Seymour down to privates reluctantly shouldering muskets in the Eleventh, participated in a 
culture of reckless promises and uneven results, designed to spare the state and its communities 
from a feared draft and forced service. 
It is frequently noted that the Enrollment Act of March 1863 instituted America’s first 
national draft, but precedence had existed at the state level for many years. Compulsory service 
had deep roots in New York and elsewhere.6 In the late seventeenth century, laws in the colony 
required militia service by males age fifteen to sixty and storage of arms and ammunition in 
houses, but also provided for substitution. Militia and volunteer laws were frequently revised in 
times of emergency, especially quotas, lengths of service (never more than one year for 
volunteers), and taxes for meeting expenses. In 1701, New York officials doubled down on 
compulsory militia duty in the wake of widespread evasion.7 The pressures of the Revolutionary 
War prompted large-scale conscription in several of the newly formed states, including New 
York, which enacted a law drafting every fifteenth militiaman for nine months’ duty in the 
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Continental Army and made further drafts for state defense. Those exempt from service, such as 
Quakers, must contribute to military expenses, and each class of militiamen had to furnish a 
soldier or face a fine. A host of related legislation provided for bounties and substitution and 
permitted militia courts martial to sentence deserters to Continental service.8 Throughout the 
long, wearying years of the struggle for independence, privileged men in New York and 
elsewhere increasingly avoided service by paying fines or providing substitutes, while 
communities sometimes resorted to illegal methods in compelling others to join the 
Continentals.9 Incentives also grew as the volunteering rate declined; a 1782 New York law 
granted six hundred acres of land for every militia class providing a man for three years’ 
Continental service and 350 acres for a two-year recruit. While European powers had come to 
depend on regular armies, Americans continued to rely on short-term citizen soldiers raised 
largely through the states. In the last year of the war, New York passed an act limiting the 
governor’s power to call up the state militia to six hundred men for no longer than eight 
months.10 As the Old World tore itself apart in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars 
and several nations instituted severe conscription, the United States remained a bastion of 
federalism where the principle of universal service continued its slide into archaism.11 As we 
have seen, the militia acts of 1792 and 1795 and the experience of the War of 1812 only 
reinforced reliance on volunteer state forces over regular national forces or obligatory service. 
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The special challenges of the vast war that broke out in 1861 inspired new consideration 
for drastic measures. Beginning that fall, politicians and editors made increasingly strident calls 
for conscription, and the State of Ohio started planning for a possible draft.12 Even as Lincoln’s 
administration led a new push for volunteers in the face of battlefield setbacks the following 
summer, drafting looked harder to avoid than ever. In early July 1862, Henry Wilson, as chair of 
the Senate Military Committee, introduced a bill in the Senate authorizing a national draft.13 
Remarkably, this game-changing proposal was not the most controversial aspect of the bill. With 
Wilson’s support, two senators, including Preston King of New York, suggested amendments 
providing for African American military service and freeing black service members and their 
families. These amendments, which reflected Wilson’s original goal of emancipation, caused 
uproar and sustained debate in the halls of Congress. The emancipation portions of the act 
advanced the antislavery cause and indicated a path toward black service, in time a decisive 
weapon in the Union’s favor.14 Another reason for the relative lack of controversy regarding the 
conscription portions of the bill (which Lincoln signed into law on July 17) was their limits: 
while the Militia Act authorized enrollment of military-age male citizens and gave the president 
power to call on state militias for up to nine months, it did not permit him to compel governors’ 
cooperation.15 This law hearkened back to the centuries-old principle of universal military duty 
but echoed American (and, in the context of 1862, specifically northern) fears of the 
consequences of switching to conscription and centralized control.16 Nevertheless, the time was 
ripe in the summer of 1862 to adopt sterner measures than seen to date. Morgan and many other 
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influential New Yorkers supported federal provision for a draft, hoping it would not be needed.17 
Seward “feared a draft might be found indispensable” but believed “we must first prove that it is 
so, by trying the old way.”18 
The Militia Act made volunteering (“the old way”) attractive as a method for avoiding 
conscription. For the first time in the war, federally assigned quotas had teeth, since citizens 
would be motivated to fill quotas with volunteers rather than enforce a draft. In a year full of 
turning points, the North had reached yet another. War Department General Order 99 of August 
9 laid out regulations for the looming draft in states that did not have their own conscription 
mechanisms, including appointment of commissioners and enrolling officials in each county, 
exemptions for certain federal employees, and allowing drafted men to send substitutes. Yet 
these draft orders—products of the Militia Act—adhered to custom as well, for they gave wide 
responsibility and latitude to the states. Governors and their staffs were enjoined to select draft 
officials who would conduct an enrollment of all their eligible citizens; Stanton’s department 
would also work with them in appointing provost marshals to enforce conscription, and states 
could determine their own standards for additional exemptions.19 With one foot planted in the 
future and one in the past, federal authorities counted on states and communities to continue 
shouldering the main burden of mobilization through the old tactics of appealing to patriotism, 
community spirit, and self-interest, now with the added wrinkle of threatened conscription. The 
Militia Act increased the scope of federal authority, but it was a reluctant, halting, limited 
development.20  
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 That summer, New Yorkers across the state regarded an impending draft with either 
dread or guarded optimism.21 “Everybody thinks that the Government will have to draft,” an 
Albany County woman wrote to her soldier husband in August. “The newspapers is all for 
drafting. If the drafting comes, there will be a great many go off to Canada. … I tell you, the men 
will do anything rather than go to war.” She worried that her brothers would be drafted.22 This 
woman was far from alone in fearing conscription, and her prediction of widespread flight across 
the northern border was echoed by others in a position to know. Lincoln and Stanton both 
anticipated an exodus of military-eligible men to Canada or overseas. On August 8, the war 
secretary instituted strict regulation and detention for military-age male citizens wishing to leave 
their counties and states of residence—an order that had to be dropped due to a lack of authority 
to enforce it.23 The Executive Committee of the Sanitary Commission exemplified public unease 
when it argued against the draft in a letter to Lincoln; conceding that all citizens were soldiers in 
theory, committee members nevertheless maintained that conscripting three hundred thousand 
unwilling men would not solve the army’s crippling attrition problem. Instead, they proposed the 
creation of a national militia, one million strong, to be called up as needed to fill gaps in old 
regiments.24 This inspired if impractical plan failed to gain traction but anticipated in some ways 
the Selective Service program adopted fifty-five years later. At a September 8 meeting of the 
National War Committee of the Citizens of New York, John Austin Stevens, Jr., expressed 
wariness of the Pandora’s Box of draft enrollment. When another member proposed the 
committee advance the city funds to complete the local enrollment then underway, Stevens 
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argued that promoting a draft was not the committee’s mission; while he personally supported 
conscription, the National War Committee had been created to help secure enough volunteers to 
avoid it. The original motion was withdrawn.25 But numerous Union supporters of all classes 
pushed for a draft, believing it would bring much-needed forces into the field and deal the rebels 
a knockout blow.26 
Conscription loomed whether New Yorkers welcomed it or not. Hillhouse confidently 
told Stanton on August 5 that New York’s militia enrollment under the state legislation passed 
months earlier would be finished in ten days.27 But this painstaking project had already proved 
too slow and inaccurate to aid in meeting quotas, prompting Morgan to drop it in favor of War 
Department draft guidelines, to be implemented alongside his senatorial-district program for 
promoting volunteering. A state general order announced this new enrollment on August 13.28  
From top to bottom and across the state and nation, draft registration was onerous and 
divisive. Inevitably, officials and citizens complained about assigned quotas. Four New England 
governors, for instance, protested to Lincoln that their quotas were unfair, not accounting for 
thousands of naval personnel enlisted in those states.29 The size and expense of this new 
endeavor proved equally if not more demanding than quotas. Manhattan banker and lawyer 
William Henry Anthon, in his role as provost marshal of New York and Kings Counties, 
reported to Morgan on August 23 that the “Enrollment officers of New York and Brooklyn are 
now thoroughly organized and in active operation.” He went on to warn the governor that the 
means on hand could not meet ambitions. Morgan’s administration had determined to canvass 
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one quarter of state households so that no family would be overlooked; following this policy in 
Anthon’s area, however, required a great deal of money that he did not feel authorized to raise 
through his bank. Anthon thus found himself in the “extremely unpleasant position” of paying 
some of his four hundred enrollment staffers out of his own pocket while the rest went unpaid. 
“What then is to be done?” Anthon asked. “The work in which I am employed is novel and the 
amount of labor unprecedented.” Anthon, it is worth noting, had additional responsibilities as the 
State Judge Advocate General.30  
Later, the Albany City Bank partially aided Anthon with small loans for enrollment 
expenses in his districts, but these did not suffice. Reports that the War Department would refund 
his costs went unfounded, and as late as the following January, Anthon complained of constant 
harassment from his clerks over missing pay.31 Underscoring the lack of infrastructure, Anthon 
even felt compelled to personally request the governor’s authorization to sell rubber bands no 
longer needed for bundling draft tickets. Simultaneously with enrollment, provost marshals had 
to investigate numerous reports of fraud and possible insurrection should a draft be ordered. 
Despite such hindrances, enrollment in New York’s two largest cities was complete by late 
September, with the names of those registered filling nearly six hundred ledgers.32 The 
metropolitan area remained additionally important as a gathering place for New York and New 
England troops. As noted earlier, the War Department instituted the office of the Provost 
Marshal General on September 24. First appointed to the role was Simeon Draper—formerly a 
leading member of the Union Defense Committee—who, like Anthon, held a dual appointment, 
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in Draper’s case as provost marshal of New York State. Draper’s time was so consumed with 
appointments, desertions, and fraud cases in the nation’s largest city that his office in Manhattan 
essentially functioned as a second Provost Marshal General headquarters.33 
The matter of exemptions introduced still more controversy into enrollment. Exemption 
by means of paying a fee (commutation) or belonging to a protected class was a long-running 
American institution, and in 1862 figures ranging from Henry Wilson to James Gordon Bennett 
advocated its inclusion in draft legislation. War Department draft instructions in August gave 
some latitude to states having enrollment laws in place to draw up their own exemption 
guidelines in addition to exemptions for congressmen and some other federal employees.34 New 
York was one such state, and its list of exempt groups was long and varied. Unsurprisingly, 
representatives, state workers, current and honorably discharged members of the U. S. military, 
and those unfit because of physical or mental infirmity, being habitual drunks or paupers, or 
having serious criminal convictions, were all exempt. But Albany officials took the extra steps of 
exempting Quakers and Shakers, educators and students in all types of school except private 
institutions, ministers and preachers, physicians and nurses in public hospitals, members of the 
organized militia, and discharged officers, all without requiring exemption fees.35 These 
allowances cut deeply into available manpower but allowed New York to escape the kind of 
bitter protests erupting in other states where several of these groups were subject to fees or not 
exempt at all.36 (Exempting uniformed militiamen also benefited the state, as their units must be 
kept intact in case of call-up.) If volunteering ultimately would not stave off conscription, 
Empire State leaders clearly reckoned, this necessary evil should be made as painless as possible. 
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Limits existed to the spirit of generosity, however; firemen were exempt from ordinary militia 
duty according to state law but enjoyed no such protection from the new enrollment.37 
Exemption, while necessary, spawned complications. For months before the new 
exemption guidelines were released, newspapers printed constant discussions about what classes 
would be exempt and how citizens could obtain the coveted status.38 Before it became widely 
known that New York was authorized to widen the field of exemptions, some draft supporters 
confidently predicted that all military-age, able-bodied male citizens would “be run through the 
crucible of this draft,” a prospect alarming to other people.39 When the truth was revealed, a 
Buffalo newspaper opposed Morgan’s plan for “sweeping exemptions.”40 In Brooklyn, persons 
who had gotten themselves appointed enrollment commissioners placed advertisements for 
exemption certificates in the military columns of local journals alongside recruiting notices for 
Corcoran and Spinola’s brigades.41 Morgan and other officials received countless letters whose 
writers sought exemption for themselves or others. Administrators of New York Hospital wanted 
to know how conscription of doctors might be avoided. From New York City, George Opdyke 
asserted to the governor that men who furnished a volunteer should be exempted, while one 
hundred Jewish men offered to recruit one hundred volunteers by paying an extra premium, their 
condition being that they themselves be exempt from the draft.42 A deputation of city firemen 
traveled to Albany to make a similar offer.43 These petitions reached Morgan during the same 
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late August days when Silas W. Burt reported on the alarming rise in competitive bounties and 
Irish opposition to recruitment and conscription.  
Additionally, possibilities for fraud and avoidance abounded. Hearings for New York’s 
potential “exempts” began in mid-October.44 After learning that many men sought to bribe 
doctors into awarding them disability certificates, the state surgeon general advised Morgan that 
the duties of enrollment surgeons were different from those of their recruiting service colleagues; 
they should be selected from among the “representative men of the profession in each locality,” 
reputable physicians with both the public and the public good on their side.45 As anticipated, 
hordes of citizens and naturalized immigrants (who were subject to conscription), known as 
“skedaddlers,” fled their neighborhoods for fear of the draft. In August, steamships leaving New 
York Harbor filled with stowaways avoiding enrollment.46 Countless deserters and draft evaders 
from New York and other bordering states wrought havoc in Canada by lowering wages, 
committing crimes, and inviting the disgust of locals already wary of American recruiters.47 
Draft resistance, along with volunteering opposition, inspired Lincoln’s highly controversial 
suspension of habeas corpus and ordering of tribunals for suspected enemies of the war effort in 
September.48 
Many New Yorkers feared enrollment as the first step to conscription. As we have seen, 
however, others welcomed it as a potentially war-winning measure; still others viewed 
enrollment and the draft as a personal opportunity. Numerous individuals wrote to Morgan 
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seeking positions in the large enrollment bureaucracy.49 More importantly, the threat of a 
disgraceful draft in 1862 and afterward provided powerful impetus to support volunteering 
efforts, particularly after the War Department agreed to count excess volunteers under the July 2 
order toward the August militia call.50 Watertown’s Northern New York Journal, like numerous 
newspapers, filled its columns throughout the summer and fall with items on state and local 
quotas, volunteering, and the coming draft. On August 19, an editorial noted that Massachusetts 
and Illinois were about to meet their quotas through volunteering while the possibility of 
conscription haunted large, “unwieldy” New York. “The Empire State ought to avoid a draft,” 
the journal declared; the state’s honor, history, sons serving in the field, and importance as an 
example to the nation and the world all meant that “[s]he must answer the demand upon her 
patriotism without compulsion.” The Union must demonstrate to the rebels that northern resolve, 
including that of the most populous state, could answer the calls for six hundred thousand men 
with willing patriots. Jefferson County, the Journal concluded, had its own part to play by filling 
the local town quotas.51 For the remainder of the war, fear of conscription would motivate 
members of nearly all communities to aid voluntary enlistment. 
On October 14, a state general order proclaimed enrollment nearly complete, identified 
draft officials, and announced a draft for November 10 to fill quotas.52 Two weeks later, 
however, volunteering remained so high that conscription began to look unnecessary, at least in 
the Empire State. Morgan predicted to Stanton that five-sixths of New York’s combined quota 
would be met by November 10; at that point, he continued, high demand for agricultural labor 
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would have ended and even bounties would not be needed to secure volunteers. Should the 
nation still require a draft by the time Congress reconvened in December, it would be wise to 
amend the Militia Act “to conform to the habits of our people and to systems of conscription in 
other countries.” Most importantly, the term length should be doubled to eighteen months.53 In a 
season marked by the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation, Confederate invasions of the 
Border States, and Lincoln’s suspension of habeas corpus, the governor of New York 
encapsulated national anxiety over yet another turning point.  
Countless New Yorkers had demonstrated such anxiety during the enrollment process as 
they feared an impending draft. In New York City, a Prussian who had left his native land to 
avoid military service reported to his parents that Gotham’s residents were extremely opposed to 
conscription and would probably riot should it be implemented.54 Adjutant General Hillhouse, 
citing problems in obtaining accurate returns of county enlistments in order to determine draft 
quotas, indefinitely suspended the draft on November 9.55 According to Hillhouse, enrollment, at 
least, was highly successful, with three quarters of a million men enrolled—judging by census 
figures, a ratio of nearly one in every five state residents. Deducting those exempt, five hundred 
and fifty thousand New Yorkers were now registered as subject to military duty. This was a far 
larger figure than the state militia enrollment had achieved.56 But sheer numbers did not tell the 
whole story, especially in the seven Provost Marshal districts of New York City, where the 
figures gathered were riddled with discrepancies.57 Nationally, turmoil over numbers and quotas 
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lasted into the fall.58 Though enrollment officials had achieved much, the semi-organized chaos 
of their undertaking foreshadowed even greater difficulties in 1863. 
Since the late summer, Morgan had continued to address manpower needs with energy 
and initiative. He had refused to attend a conference of loyal governors at Altoona, Pennsylvania, 
on September 24—where those present issued public support for the Emancipation Proclamation 
and called for the creation of an “army of reserve”—maintaining that states’ first duty was to 
supply the six hundred thousand men called for.59 The governor had also discouraged 
recruitment of nine-month volunteers under the August 4 militia call-up until mid-September, by 
which point he had helped convince the War Department to put excess three-year men toward 
nine-month quotas and to accept nine-month volunteers in lieu of conscripts.60 New York thus 
secured more long-service soldiers for the war effort and avoided the situation in Pennsylvania, 
where whole regiments were formed of unreliable, short-term conscripts. Fewer than four 
thousand nine-month men mustered in New York (exclusive of those unfortunate three-year 
volunteers who mistakenly thought they owed only nine months), mainly for these reasons but 
also because volunteering of militiamen had so drained the National Guard that few of its 
regiments were available for call-up.61 The governor had also encouraged arrests of enrollees 
fleeing to Canada and, as his term of office ended in late December, authorized bounties for 
volunteers not meeting the criteria of his July 17 order so that the men would not “suffer.”62 
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 Much had occurred in the months leading up to that December order that would make it 
one of Morgan’s last acts as governor. That fall, Democrats and Republicans squared off in 
contentious elections across the North, including gubernatorial and senatorial contests in New 
York. Morgan ran for and won a Senate seat instead of campaigning for reelection.63 Results 
were much less successful for many other Republicans, however, as the fall elections turned on 
bad news from the battlefront and the highly controversial policies of Lincoln’s party. The 
Democratic challenger for governor was Horatio Seymour, who had served a previous term in 
the office and now ran on the slogan: “Restore the Union as it was, and maintain the Constitution 
as it is.”64 New York Republicans attacked Democrats (unfairly in many cases) for not heartily 
supporting recruitment, and officials postponed drafting in order to avoid political fallout.65 
Morgan’s continued haste in sending troops to the front caused Republicans to complain that he 
was removing supporters of their own party.66 At least one recruiter in New York City blamed 
his lack of success that fall on “the politicians of both parties [who] were hindering enlistments 
for fear some of their followers might get off to the war before election.”67 The final results gave 
Seymour a narrow victory over his Radical Republican challenger, General James S. Wadsworth, 
though Seymour’s party failed to seize the state assembly or senate.68 Democratic victories 
stemmed not only from grim war news but also from the simple fact that so many Republicans 
were away with the army and unable to vote; as Silas W. Burt had pointed out earlier, one of the 
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war’s unfortunate effects was drawing supporters of the administration out of the state.69 The 
elections from first to last had hinged on issues and effects of mass mobilization. 
By December, New York had not fully met its quotas despite earlier indications that 
volunteering would prove sufficient. Administrators cautiously revived plans for a draft. Major 
Sprague, superintendent of the General Recruiting Service in the state, appointed officers on 
December 3 to take charge of conscripts at the various recruit rendezvous.70 As Hillhouse later 
pointed out, drafting was a dicey proposition not only because of its inevitable social disruption 
but because New York—like many northern states—could register people but had no law to draft 
them; legal authority would have to rest with federal statutes alone.71 On December 9, as Morgan 
prepared to hand his office over to Seymour, he suggested to the Governor-Elect that the state 
draft be postponed until after the new year. Ironically, the man soon to become the standard 
bearer of northern draft opposition refused to take this responsibility. “I do not know what the 
wants of Government are with respect to men,” Seymour explained, “neither am I sufficiently 
familiar with the subject to know how much delay will grow out of a postponement.”72 Seymour 
had long vocally supported enlistment and may have hoped that fear of a draft would soon bring 
in enough volunteers to meet state quotas. At any rate, Albany suspended the state draft yet again 
later that month.73 Unlike several other northern states (or the entire Confederacy), New York 
did not draft in 1862 and would continue to rely on volunteering for the time being.  
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 As Morgan had indicated in his October letter to Stanton advising modifications to the 
Militia Act, federal and state draft policies were limited, imperfect instruments. Moreover, the 
spirit of cooperation and support for drafting among Democrats and Republicans during the July 
crisis had disappeared soon afterward, never to reemerge during the war. Large troop calls 
combined with threats of conscription failed to produce the numbers sought and did not prove 
the decisive, war-winning factors in 1862 that many Union supporters had hoped.74  
The experiences and rhetoric of New Yorkers during the introduction of enrollment and 
conscription indicate that Union supporters—except, notably, most soldiers—dropped the 
philosophy of all-out mobilization that had colored their language since April 1861. Their 
acceptance of bounty culture and generous enrollment exemptions along with widespread fears 
of conscription meant that the majority of eligible men who did not enlist, along with their 
communities, essentially agreed to let others do the fighting for them. The National Guard, 
meanwhile, remained a slightly tarnished but mostly acceptable alternative to national service. In 
July, an Oneida County militia colonel confidently believed young men would have “too much 
pride” to be drafted and would volunteer for the organized National Guard instead. “In these 
days,” he went on, “no young man who can possibly join a military organization, should be 
longer ignorant of the use of arms. Those who cannot join our armies in the field, should at least 
prepare themselves to defend their homes.”75 Even during this grave moment for the nation, New 
Yorkers commonly expected some level of commitment to the war but continued to cast it in 
voluntary terms. Notions of total mobilization would almost completely fall by the wayside in 
1863. None of this, however, diminishes the widespread and continuing loyalty to the cause in 
the face of adversity that most people felt. And as ever, New Yorkers relied on their communities 
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and close networks to survive the war’s hardships. When a breadwinner enlisted, for example, 
family members left at home sometimes moved in with neighbors or extended family.76 
 In his New Year’s Eve report on the previous year’s operations, New York State Adjutant 
General Hillhouse captured the emerging consensus among war supporters. Hillhouse noted that 
Governor Morgan’s “wise use” of discretionary powers had greatly aided volunteering. But the 
population of those liable to volunteer had mostly been drained, causing “scarcity of labor in the 
field and workshop” and consequent wage increases. Hillhouse reported that old regiments 
needed a better replacement plan, predicted that the burden of enlistment would now fall on 
middle-class citizens with little interest in serving, and hinted that only through drafting could 
the state meet any future manpower calls.77 War disrupted society, Hillhouse continued, “but this 
is an additional reason why its effects in these directions should be avoided as far as possible and 
its ravages confined to the narrowest circle.” Citing policies in several European nations, the 
adjutant general suggested that compulsory service be made easier to bear through age 
classifications, exemptions, and substitutions that would keep family heads and valuable 
members of society out of uniform. Moreover, the lack of state authority to draft meant that 
conscription would have to be federal.78 At the same time, Brownson’s Quarterly Review, 
published in New York City, made a bit more extreme argument for federal conscription by 
urging the country to “do away with the elective principle, and to make the army national,” 
because the Union was fighting for its life against an excess of state-centered democracy.79 
Hillhouse and Brownson’s words support the argument of historians Herman Hattaway and 
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Archer Jones that the draft failed in 1862 thanks to Washington’s policy of leaving it in states’ 
hands.80 But even as the war’s scope grew in 1863 to include federal conscription, New Yorkers 
finally abandoned the heroic ideal of total, if voluntary, commitment. 
Eighteen Sixty-Three opened with another season of gloom and uncertainty for Union 
loyalists. A stunning year of highs and lows in the war effort had been capped by the terrible 
defeat at Fredericksburg and bitter controversy over the direction of the war effort. In response to 
grim news from the battlefield, recruitment once again slowed to a trickle across the North.81 
Meanwhile, opposition to the Lincoln administration’s policies increased among both 
Copperheads and other Democrats inspired by Seymour, Representative Clement Vallandigham 
of Ohio, and Ben Wood’s New York Daily News.82 In the sharply divided Empire State, 
Republicans saw their champion, Edwin D. Morgan, leave to take up his senator’s seat in 
Washington as Seymour assumed the governorship. As Hillhouse had indicated, drafting seemed 
the only answer to the Union’s manpower needs. In late January, during the last session of the 
Thirty-Seventh Congress, Henry Wilson put forth a new draft bill to address manpower needs. 
Precisely who crafted the enormously consequential Enrollment Act that passed in March 1863, 
and how they determined its provisions, is lost to history. What is clear is that Secretary of War 
Stanton and other influential figures pushed for a bill that would place drafting firmly in federal 
hands, quickly fill the ranks of old regiments, replace many thousands of soldiers whose terms 
would expire that spring and summer, and capitalize on the authorization of black service that 
Lincoln had made in his revolutionary decree.83 Over the course of a month of congressional 
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wrangling, Democratic representatives secured three crucial modifications to Wilson’s bill: the 
legislation provided for calling out the “national forces” rather than militias, authorized 
commutation payments, and subjected only conscripts who failed to report to military discipline 
before enlistment.84 The House and Senate passed the bill and Lincoln signed it into law on 
March 3.85 Federal enrollment and conscription were now the law of the land. 
The Enrollment Act was an awkward, mainly “symbolic” instrument for compelling 
service, in the words of one historian.86 Despite its familiar rhetoric that “all persons ought 
willingly to contribute” to national defense, the act’s provisions reflected northerners’ emergent 
desire to compartmentalize mobilization. The Provost Marshal General’s Bureau would conduct 
a new enrollment in every congressional district. Able-bodied male citizens and foreigners who 
had declared intent to become citizens, age twenty to forty-five, now belonged to the “national 
forces” and were subject to call-up by the president. They were divided into two classes: first, 
married and single men up to the age of thirty-five and single men thirty-five to forty-five, who 
were to be drafted first; the second class, composed of married men age thirty-six to forty-five, 
was not to be called up until after the first class had been exhausted. The law allowed for 
commutation, substitution, and certain exemptions. If a district could not meet its quota with 
volunteers within fifty days, it must make up the difference by holding a draft in the form of 
choosing lots among enrollees.87 The new legislation granted federal authorities more drafting 
power than ever before; like the militia laws it replaced, however—and unlike the Selective 
Service Act of 1917—the Enrollment Act operated under the old assumption that compulsory 
                                                 
84 Geary, We Need Men, 53-56. 
85 Ibid., 62-65. 
86 Chambers, To Raise an Army, 51. 
87 Chap. 75, “An Act for Enrolling and Calling Out the National Forces, and for Other Purposes,” Statutes at Large: 
37th Cong., 3rd sess, 731-737, https://www.loc.gov/law/help/statutes-at-large/37th-congress/session-3/c37s3ch75.pdf 




service was a discreditable, necessary evil and it made no allowance for civilian defense work.88 
In granting districts time to fill quotas with volunteers and authorizing exemptions, commutation, 
and substitution, the system put in place by the Enrollment Act “was not conscription at all, but a 
clumsy carrot and stick device to stimulate volunteering,” in the words of historian James M. 
McPherson.89 Crucially, the law’s wording made no mention of race, meaning that African 
Americans were subject to enrollment and drafting and less burden need be placed on whites in 
each district. The law also sanctioned federal bounties and furloughs for all enlistees, offered 
amnesty for returning deserters, and ordered consolidation of weak regiments.90 The Enrollment 
Act embodied the paradox of northern attitudes in the war’s third year: it was a draft law 
designed to avoid drafting, and it widened options for filling the ranks so that many could avoid 
having to join those ranks. 
 Carrying out the Enrollment Act revealed several counterproductive flaws in the 
legislation and the Provost Marshal General’s policies. Men could not claim exemption until they 
were drafted; when drafting did occur, so many of those called up gained exemption that districts 
were subjected to extra-large quotas and supplemental drafts, which inevitably caused local 
resentment toward draft officials and the system. Less excusable was the act’s neglect of the 
United States Navy. Neither naval personnel nor Navy Department clerks were exempted. In 
some cases, staffers of the Provost Marshal General’s Bureau removed sailors from United States 
vessels because their names had been drawn for army service.91 Nor were credits awarded for 
navy volunteers; since many thousands of enlistments occurred at naval rendezvous in New 
York, the state’s residents naturally were dismayed to receive no credits for these men on their 
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local or state quotas. Commutation (finally set at three hundred dollars on June 30) and 
substitution invited charges that Lincoln’s administration targeted Democrats and the poor, while 
the method of apportioning quotas to districts seemed to satisfy almost no one and brought 
endless abuse upon Provost Marshal General James B. Fry and his agents.92 Enrollment and 
drafting inspired waves of defiance from a variety of Americans, and this resistance often put the 
Empire State at center stage in the struggle over who would fight for the Union. Congress 
amended the Enrollment Act three times during the remainder of the war; necessary as several of 
these changes were, they caused widespread confusion and further hurt the law’s effectiveness.93 
States and smaller communities, especially those like New York boasting large populations, 
continued to guide mobilization as the war grew in scale, and Union efforts rested on their desire 
and ability to carry out the orders of the Provost Marshal General. 
Another paradox in federal conscription involved Governor Seymour, its leading 
opponent. Seymour was a man of contradictions who—despite bitterly rejecting several 
Republican policies, sometimes at inopportune moments for the Union cause—enjoyed excellent 
relations with Edwin D. Morgan and had long supported the war effort, militia reform, and 
government troop calls. He had even helmed Oneida County’s recruiting committee, and after 
his election appointed Major Sprague as state adjutant general in order to maintain dialogue with 
Lincoln’s administration.94 During his term of office, Seymour’s strenuous efforts to secure 
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volunteers in order to avoid the draft he hated helped to lessen the draft burden on his state and 
thus fit into one of the main goals of the Enrollment Act’s architects.  
The new governor made his views clear in an inaugural address to the legislature in 
January, taking a hard line against the draft, emancipation, and Lincoln’s crackdown on dissent. 
Noting that the Empire State had sent more than two hundred thousand of its citizens to the field, 
Seymour said he owed it to these men to ensure their liberties survived when they returned 
home. The governor also criticized inequities in the state’s militia law and its quotas under the 
Enrollment Act.95 The address received wide attention; despite their disagreements with 
Seymour on national affairs, many Republicans applauded his demands for reform and fair 
treatment for their state.96 Seymour interpreted his election victory as a mandate and believed 
federal officials owed more respect and deference to him and his state in exchange for New 
York’s contributions. (He incorrectly claimed that New York had more than met its quotas and 
that “the State had sent off a greater number of three-years’ regiments in proportion to her 
population than any other State in the Union.”)97 He missed an opportunity for smooth working 
relations with the president early in his administration, however. Lincoln wrote to the governor 
asking for his cooperation in the war effort; Seymour rebuffed this overture with what even a 
fawning biographer called a “cold, guarded letter.”98 As in his opposition to African American 
recruitment, Seymour’s behavior toward Lincoln’s government demonstrated that the war effort 
was not always a priority for him. Like his predecessor, however, Seymour worked tirelessly for 
                                                 
95 Horatio Seymour, “Annual Message,” in Lincoln, ed., Messages from the Governors, 5: 445-520. 
96 Brummer, Political History of New York State during the Period of the Civil War, 258; Mitchell, Horatio Seymour 
of New York, 268-271; Albany Morning Express, January 12, 1863. 
97 William Henry Aspinwall to Edwin D. Morgan, n. d. (early to mid-1863), box 1, EDM Papers, NYSL; OR, ser. 3, 
vol. 3, 210 (quote); Mitchell, Horatio Seymour of New York, 278. 
98 Lincoln to Seymour, March 23, 1863, in Lincoln, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, 6: 145-146, and 
Seymour to Lincoln, April 14, 1863, in ibid., 145n1; Wall, A Sketch of the Life of Horatio Seymour 1810-1886, 29 




the welfare of his state; in this, he had bipartisan support from Senator Morgan and Albany 
lawmakers. Beginning in February, the legislature legalized all county bounty laws; in April, it 
passed an act offering veterans reenlistment bounties and authorized allotment commissioners to 
inspire volunteering and ensure New York soldiers got all monies due them.99 Thinking 
“injustice had been done to New York” in the matter of its quotas, Seymour asked Morgan to 
investigate how they had been fixed. The ex-governor’s work on the issue adjusted New York’s 
credits for the time being.100 Seymour met every subsequent troop call with efforts to get state 
and county quotas and credits “fixed,” which would mean a lessened burden on his constituents. 
On two separate occasions in 1864, New York City officials passed resolutions thanking the 
governor for getting their quotas and expenses reduced. Seymour believed the draft was 
unconstitutional, promoted volunteering as an alternative, and considered New York’s manpower 
contributions one of his greatest achievements in office.101 
Better efforts to promote enlistments were direly needed in the spring of 1863. In Albany, 
lawmakers cooperated on bounty bills but little else, prompting a later historian to call the 1863 
legislature “perhaps the most disorderly in the history of the state.”102 Copperheads, who had 
been on the rise ever since the advent of conscription, vehemently opposed the Enrollment Act as 
an attack on the liberty of working-class whites. Led by Vallandigham and Fernando Wood, 
Copperheads specifically protested the three-hundred-dollar commutation clause as class 
legislation by Republicans wanting to get rid of poor Democrats who could not afford the fee; 
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they also expressed alarm at the prospect of black enlistment and portrayed the array of provost 
marshals and enrollment officials as an emerging police state.103 When federal troops arrested 
Vallandigham in May on charges of aiding the enemy, Democrats held a protest in Albany and 
Seymour became an outspoken critic of the government’s action. Across the North, enrollment 
so alarmed many people that violent resistance seemed likely to follow any announcement of a 
draft.104 Volunteering had stagnated and New York’s thirty-eight two-year regiments were due to 
be discharged between April and June.105 General Meagher attempted to rebuild his battered Irish 
Brigade, but the War Department rejected his requests to bring the brigade home to New York 
City to refit and recruit; this was a factor in Meagher’s decision to resign his command. It is 
unlikely that Meagher’s efforts would have found a receptive audience among Irish-Americans at 
home.106  
In response to lagging recruitment, communities in New York and elsewhere launched 
new efforts in the spring of 1863 to take advantage of bounty laws and other encouraging 
legislation and avoid the draft. A glimmer of the mass war enthusiasm that had colored earlier 
trying periods began in early spring with the rise of Union Leagues. In a movement that began in 
Illinois and quickly spread through the North, leading Republicans organized political societies 
that promoted the Lincoln administration’s policies and attacked dissent as treason. Union 
League members took on troop raising as one of their primary missions.107 A Loyal Union 
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League formed in New York City in March, quickly followed by a Loyal National League and 
similar clubs across the state.108 Union Leagues frequently held rallies reminiscent of the mass 
meetings of April 1861 and July 1862.109 The Union League movement demonstrated the vitality 
of northerners’ voluntarism and community spirit to mobilization. 
 Idealism melded with self-interest to an unprecedented degree in 1863 as communities 
and recruiters strove to fill their quotas. State governments challenged the War Department’s 
quota and credit figures, localities offered increasingly high bounties and undercut neighboring 
towns and counties in efforts to draw recruits, and recruiters made extravagant promises to 
potential volunteers while overlooking disqualifying defects in many cases. The focus 
overwhelmingly was on achieving credits rather than providing fighting men for the cause.110 A 
tendency developed to accept men and boys of any background and condition so long as they 
counted toward the local quota. In March, as northerners reacted to impending enrollment, the 
Albany Morning Express summarized the attitudes of Republicans and War Democrats by 
praising commutation and substitution and urging readers to help catch deserters. “For every 
deserter returned to the army,” the paper noted, “there will be one less citizen to be drafted.” 
Reenlisting veterans were also expected to help mitigate conscription’s effects on the city.111 
After a deserter who had seized the lucrative opportunity to return to the front as a substitute was 
recognized and arrested, a Western New York paper printed a letter from a local soldier advising 
any deserter who “intends to come again as a soldier, to enlist [in a new regiment] and receive 
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the big bounties rather than come as a substitute, for it has been clearly illustrated that it is 
dangerous …”112 This soldier’s philosophy captured the pervasive dishonesty of recruitment 
across the North in 1863. Fraud and minimal oversight had been evident since the war’s 
beginning but approached crisis in 1863 and afterward. Citizens and officers took in whoever 
was willing to enlist (and some who were unwilling) in order to gain credits and save 
themselves, family members, and neighbors from service. This caused an influx of unreliable 
manpower that downgraded the army’s effectiveness and jeopardized the Union cause. 
A War Department general order on May 1 placed the Provost Marshal General’s Bureau 
in charge of volunteering in addition to its enrollment and policing responsibilities.113 Fry and his 
staff certainly had their hands full. Fraud, for instance, was endemic, as a government 
investigator had shown in a report released in late December. The agent estimated that more than 
half of the six million dollars the federal government had spent on boarding and lodging recruits 
in New York City had been wasted on dishonest contractors and speculators, who numbered 
some one thousand and growing.114 Recruiting officers and civilians seeking to fill local quotas 
frequently employed three main strategies in the spring and summer of 1863: attempting to 
reenlist veterans, enticing prospective volunteers with promises of high bounties and appealing 
duty, and accepting recruits who were not fit for service. “Very liberal bounties will be given to 
those who will engage in the national service,” Governor Seymour told the Secretary of War on 
May 20, adding that he was “organizing a vigorous system for recruiting, which I hope will do 
away with the necessity for making any draft in New York.”  Seymour and his military staff 
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planned to attract veterans by using three million dollars that the state legislature had 
appropriated for bounties.115 Earlier in the year, as Congress deliberated over federal 
reenlistment incentives, officers of the veteran 30th New York Infantry had signaled to the War 
Department their men’s willingness to reenlist if permitted to return home before their first 
enlistment expired. They also expressed an attachment to their regimental number and wanted no 
other organization to bear it. Stanton denied these proposals but his department eventually 
adopted a version of them for all troops eligible for reenlistment.116 Most men in two-year 
regiments did not intend reenlistment, at least not without seeing home again for a time. “Even 
though I will never regret having been a soldier,” a veteran of New York City’s First German 
Rifles told a relative, “nothing in the world could make me want to go through what I 
experienced again, and when a friend of mine says he wants to go, I advise against it as strongly 
as I can …”117  
The previous chapter described how recruiters in the summer and fall of 1862 had 
reinforced the two-year regiments by promising new volunteers they would only have to serve 
the remainder of their unit’s term. As the armies prepared for campaigning in the spring of 1863, 
these regiments were abuzz with speculation about whether newer men would be permitted to 
return home with their veteran comrades.118 The War Department, it developed, had other ideas, 
ordering the retention of these men for their full three-year enlistments, while veterans had to 
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remain in the field until their muster-out date or even later. Some members of the elite Fifth New 
York Zouaves mutinied when ordered to fight at Chancellorsville while awaiting discharge.119 
Outrage among veterans over the army’s actions in May 1863 persisted for decades.120 After the 
two-year regiments were discharged, the army transferred their three-year members to other 
units. These men seethed and often refused to perform duty, but most eventually accepted the 
situation and agreed to serve their full terms.121 The words of one New York soldier indicate the 
frustration many felt at the cynical turn in mobilization: “The keeping of three-years’ men 
belonging to two-year regiments, was a great blunder of the War Department and about as mean 
a piece of business as the National Government has been guilty of. … [It is] enough to extinguish 
all the patriotism that a man is capable of holding.”122  
Stanton’s department acted decisively on June 25 with a general order offering an 
incentive package for reenlistment, including furloughs, $300 bounties, and the title of “veteran 
volunteer” for any soldier who signed on for another three years. Provost marshals had already 
received instructions to facilitate reenlistments, while recruiting officers published posters and 
newspaper advertisements calling on two-year veterans to join new commands and secure a 
handsome profit.123 Within weeks, old soldiers encouraged by state and federal incentives began 
reenlisting in large numbers.124 Given that men from working-class families—the army’s largest 
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source of manpower—survived on an average yearly income of $600, and that most northerners 
saw their standard of living drop during the war, the attractiveness of bounties is 
understandable.125  
 Eighteen sixty-three also witnessed the flowering of another recruiting tactic that almost 
amounted to a media blitzkrieg: innumerable appeals to the male population of the North 
offering them safe and easy service by joining particular regiments or service branches. Heavy 
artillery service was attractive to many, for instance, due to the belief that such soldiers spent 
their tours manning cannon, building fortifications, and performing guard duty instead of 
marching and fighting. Those prospective recruits, including many veterans of the two-year 
infantry regiments, who were not averse to fighting often chose the cavalry because riding to 
battle on horseback seemed more pleasant than slogging on foot under a heavy knapsack. By 
1863, infantry officers returning home to organize new units typically chose the more popular 
cavalry or heavy artillery. As the survivors of the two-year Thirteenth New York Infantry 
returned to Rochester that May, a newspaper noted that many of the veterans wished to reenlist. 
But there was “some doubt whether a regiment of infantry could be organized here now,” and the 
writer opined that the men, who were “after their gallant service entitled to the most favorable 
positions the government can offer,” should have the choice of joining the heavy artillery.126 
That year, recruiters in New York created fourteen new volunteer regiments of cavalry, five of 
heavy artillery, and only one of infantry.127 (The infantry did, however, receive some benefit 
from ongoing efforts to strengthen old regiments.)128 The branch of service suffering the heaviest 
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losses in the field was receiving the smallest reinforcement, and this concession to recruits’ 
preference over military need would have dire effects when the 1864 fighting caused enormous 
casualties. 
 In Rochester, Colonel William B. Barnes exemplified this new trend and its malign 
consequences. Barnes—locally renowned for his recruiting abilities—had been given sixty days 
to form a new regiment, the Eleventh New York Heavy Artillery, in the area. Rochester residents 
expressed delight with these developments, for having a regimental headquarters in town was 
good business. “It is very greatly for the interests of the city that the regiment shall be retained 
here until filled up,” the Evening Express pointed out. Government contracts for “the feeding and 
supporting of so large a number of soldiers will bring a great amount of trade to our dealers and 
business men,” whose city was mired in a recession.129 Barnes attracted volunteers by claiming 
Adjutant General Sprague had promised the regiment “would not go out of the State, but as soon 
as organized would be sent to the Forts in New York Harbor for the defense of that place,” thus 
avoiding service at the front.130 Barnes, his officers, and the city press all collaborated in 
extolling the benefits of joining the Eleventh. Lieutenant James B. Root, for instance, advertised 
his “crack company” in a notice offering a range of promises: 
His experience fits him for the position; and those wishing to enter a branch of the 
service where picket duty and carrying a heavy knapsack is unknown, had better 
call upon him. He affords all the bounties or emoluments to be found in any other 
service; while the regiment is not to go outside of the State. Avoid the draft and 
enrol [sic] your name with Lieut. Root.131 
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Such claims benefitted civilians as well as recruiters, for they attracted large numbers of 
volunteers and thus made a local draft less likely. The reality of garrison life had less appeal than 
writers claimed. Barnes and Root had served together in a heavy artillery regiment that often 
performed dangerous, uncomfortable picket duty outside the Washington defenses.132 In 
addition, what was missing amid all the appeals to self-interest in this and countless other notices 
was anything about emancipation or preserving the Union—the causes for which northerners 
were ostensibly fighting the war. Indeed, scores of men joined regiments such as the 11th to 
avoid having to fight at all. Heedless promises of comfort and safety were not unique to New 
York’s enlistment efforts, but the large quotas needing to be met made such tactics especially 
prevalent in the Empire State.133 When a Rochester newspaper predicted the men of the Eleventh 
New York would “give a good account of themselves by the time they reach ‘the forts in New 
York Harbor,’” the quotation marks around the promised duty station indicated that it had 
become a cliché.134 Most officers could not promise state service but made similar claims of easy 
duty in their organizations.135 
 Barnes and his officers embraced another common, yet reckless tactic: enlisting virtually 
anyone who offered himself, whether fit or not. As described earlier, lax recruitment and 
inspection standards had harmed the volunteer force from the war’s first weeks as many too old, 
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too young, or otherwise outside the Union Army’s standards found themselves in the ranks. By 
August 1862, examinations in New York’s recruiting stations had become so perfunctory, the 
American Medical Times noted, “that the most obvious defects are overlooked. The army is 
being filled with old men and boys,” while other recruits were getting through with serious 
disabilities.136 The War Department and affiliated authors published updated guides for recruiters 
and inspectors in 1863.137 Despite ostensibly greater oversight, the problem of unfit recruits 
worsened that year and negatively affected operations, as the rivalry between Barnes and a 
fellow colonel illustrates.  
In June, Colonel Elisha G. Marshall arrived in Rochester to serve as mustering and 
disbursing officer for the area; additionally, Marshall had orders to form his own heavy artillery 
regiment. After inspecting Barnes’s men prior to mustering in, Marshall reported to the army 
adjutant general in Washington that Barnes’s regimental surgeon was passing as fit for service 
men with various disabilities, along with underage boys. Marshall also informed the authorities 
that Barnes and his officers were bringing men into the Eleventh under the false understanding 
that they would not have to serve outside the state. One of the men Marshall inspected turned out 
to be a deserter and was missing “all the toes of both feet—also having had one of his legs 
broken & still extensively ulcerated.” 138 In mid-June, Barnes’s regiment received unexpected 
orders to report for field duty in Pennsylvania. Marshall arrived to inspect them prior to 
mustering-in and rejected several hundred men he identified as too old, too young, or physically 
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unfit. The whittled-down battalion of accepted men soon left for the front, with Barnes and his 
officers under a cloud of suspicion.139  
Marshall’s next move exemplified one of the major shortcomings in mobilization. 
“Feeling certain that the proofs I have sent concerning the Battalion of the 11th Heavy Artillery 
will cause the dismissal of Major Barnes & Staff,” he wrote a general, “I hope you will intercede 
with the Secretary of War and have that Battalion assigned to my command the 14th NY Heavy 
Artillery, now forming.”140 This conflict of interest did the career officer little good. The 
Eleventh was not assigned to Marshall’s command; what was more, his own officers indulged in 
the same offenses that caused his rival’s downfall. Recruiters for the Fourteenth made identical 
promises of safe, comfortable duty in New York Harbor—while they had orders from the army 
high command backing them up, making such claims to secure enlistments violated 
regulations—pledged bounties not available to new recruits, and accepted numerous underage, 
overage, and unfit volunteers.141 The situation in the regiment was worthy of scandal. Before 
mustering in, Company G, 143 men strong, lost thirty-seven to desertion. When the company 
was mustered in that December, examiners rejected a total of fifty-seven privates for a range of 
conditions: 
Too feeble, under age, over age, rupture, excision chord instep, loss of teeth, 
disability, too old & feeble, loss of fingers, tremor & debility, hernia, lame & 
feeble, injury tendon Achilles, too slight, blind right eye, deformed hand, 
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secondary syphilis, epilepsy, inveterate disease of skin, defective vision, varicose 
leg, injury of knee, chronic ophthalmia, appearance of imbecility, 
worthlessness.142 
Other companies were similarly afflicted, but replacements poured in. The Fourteenth proved 
popular with volunteers in New York and neighboring Pennsylvania thanks to the attractive 
benefits it advertised, and Marshall and his officers were so overwhelmed with recruits that he 
asked the Provost Marshal General to transfer out over twelve hundred surplus men.143 Marshall 
declared that he had “successfully raised as fine a command of 1800 men which has ever left the 
State,” but the Fourteenth was destined to see hard times when abruptly transferred to frontline 
duty.144  
The irresponsibility of officers in the Eleventh and Fourteenth when raising troops was 
far from exceptional. Deceit on the part of brokers and recruiters only grew after the summer’s 
draft as communities winked at such activity and honed strategies for increasing their credits; 
additionally, mustering officers were spread too thin and had difficulty monitoring conditions in 
their districts.145 In October, Provost Marshal General Fry estimated that officials across the 
country had enlisted or drafted one hundred thousand unfit recruits since the war’s beginning; 
these men had to be discharged and cost the government some forty million dollars.146 Later, a 
board of medical officers charged with overhauling enrollment and fitness standards studied 
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exemption and rejection in the French military, concluding that stringent physical requirements 
were best—something that regular army officers had long known. The Provost Marshal 
General’s Bureau adopted modified height and weight standards for enrollment and recruiting, 
but they had little effect.147  
 The growth in such heedless behavior on the part of authorities and communities in 1863 
occurred in the context of federal enrollment and conscription, which produced one of the most 
anxious periods in New York history. Provost Marshal General Fry planned for nationwide 
enrollment soon after his appointment in March.148 Due to New York’s large size and population, 
Fry’s bureau divided the state into a Southern, a Northern, and a Western Division, each of them 
headed by an Acting Assistant Provost Marshal General.149 Fry made two of his most important 
appointments when he assigned former State Adjutant General Frederick Townsend as AAPMG 
of the Northern Division and Colonel Robert Nugent, a veteran of the 69th, as AAPMG of the 
Southern Division. Fry asked Seymour to cooperate with these “officers of superior ability and 
gentlemen of attainments,” as he called Townsend and Nugent, and directed them to do all they 
could to gain trust and acceptance from the state government and the people. The two would find 
themselves in the center of a maelstrom when drafting commenced.150  
Before a draft could be ordered, provost marshals had to carry out the daunting task of 
enrollment in New York’s thirty-one districts and elsewhere in the Union. This involved 
establishment of enrollment boards in each district, followed by registration conducted by 
enrolling officers journeying through sub-districts and noting names and physical details of every 
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military-age male resident.151 This dangerous, frustrating work was made particularly so in areas 
such as the nine districts under Nugent’s responsibility, where he dealt with innumerable cases of 
men enrolled twice and others resisting registration. Provost marshals had authorization to arrest 
those who refused to comply; the U. S. district attorney in New York City, however, “declines to 
prosecute” those arrested, Nugent reported, because they had not violated the draft law.152 
Simultaneously, enrollment officials had to contend with widespread mistrust and hostility from 
the public and state lawmakers, a situation not helped by the law’s confusing provisions and 
Fry’s inability to clarify them or determine accurate credits and deficiencies.153 Chief among the 
bureau’s opponents was Governor Seymour, who told New York’s division chiefs he would 
continue to push volunteering but considered the Enrollment Act unconstitutional; he also sent 
the state adjutant general on an unsuccessful mission to get the draft suspended in New York.154 
State leaders embraced the veteran volunteer program, as previously noted, and anxiously 
stepped up support for recruitment of African Americans; these efforts were not enough to 
prevent conscription.155 At the federal level, the newly formed Invalid Corps—a highly 
professional command of disabled veterans charged with noncombat duties—aided provost 
marshals in enforcing enrollment and the draft and apprehending deserters.156 Despite the uphill 
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battle they waged and the imperfect figures yielded, provost marshals had completed enrollment 
in New York City by mid-June—though the process stretched on in other locales—and drafting 
was set to begin almost immediately afterward. In Nugent’s Southern Division alone, enrollment 
resulted in 291,526 names registered for the draft.157 
 By this point, stunning news had already reached New Yorkers that the Confederate 
Army of Northern Virginia had invaded the North. Seymour and his military staff acted 
decisively upon requests of Lincoln’s administration and Governor Andrew G. Curtin of 
Pennsylvania to dispatch troops for the defense of that state. For the third instance in as many 
years, Empire State militiamen rallied to the call and hastily departed, this time confidently 
expecting exemption from the draft. Twelve thousand ill-equipped men, mostly from New York 
City, left for Pennsylvania within ten days and nearly fourteen thousand by July 3, along with 
over eighteen hundred volunteer troops.158 Seymour received thanks from Lincoln as a result, 
while Curtin praised the New York National Guard.159 This large-scale deployment drained the 
city of organized troops just before they became desperately needed. In the meantime, however, 
Union victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg suddenly filled northerners with hope, and the 
Herald and many other journals called for the impending draft of three hundred thousand men to 
go forward as planned in order to demonstrate northern resolve and finish the war that year.160 
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Editors speculated that more decisive victories were imminent and conscripts would not have to 
go to the field. But many leading Democratic voices deplored drafting methods and the 
commutation clause as unjust and dangerous provocations.161 
 On July 6, New York’s three division heads received orders to begin the draft. 
Rendezvous for conscripts were established at Buffalo, Elmira, and Riker’s Island in New York 
Harbor, details from regiments in the field sent parties to collect men at these points, and Fry 
made certain the draft would be “highly public,” with names of conscripts and exempted men to 
be printed in their local newspapers.162 As reports of impending violence by the Irish and other 
enemies of the draft reached him on all sides, Nugent ordered his provost marshals to quickly 
begin drafting in the most hostile New York City districts first, in hopes of containing any 
opposition before it could spread.163 The city superintendent of police warned the secretary of 
war against marching a black Massachusetts regiment through the streets on its way south; 
officers already had their hands full protecting the city’s African Americans from assault. Far to 
the west, race riots in Buffalo on July 6 left two black men dead and others injured.164  
Most New York City residents did not believe a draft would really happen until the first 
names were pulled on July 11. Despite warning signs, they were caught off guard by the intensity 
of the violence that began two days later.165 The four-day orgy of destruction and bloodshed that 
rocked the metropolis in mid-July has symbolized Civil War-era draft resistance ever since. 
Scholarship long ago evolved past the once-popular idea that objection to universal service and 
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the commutation clause were the main motivations for rioters.166 Iver Bernstein, the leading 
historian of the New York City Draft Riots, demonstrates that the draft commencing on July 11 
was the immediate instigation but not the only or even largest cause. The riots grew out of “three 
explosive issues” among Gotham’s population: rich versus poor, black versus white, and the city 
versus federal authorities. This was an “era of politicized social conflict” when communities, 
especially in urban areas, were deeply divided along ethnic, religious, and political lines and 
jockeyed for power and opportunity. When unpopular agents of Lincoln’s government carried 
out long-feared conscription, members of the white working class rioted against what they saw 
as a Republican plot to take their liberty, weaken local (Democratic) government, and empower 
African Americans over them.167 While Irish-Americans conspicuously participated in the 
violence and received most of the blame, many different communities of working-class New 
Yorkers with “a multiplicity of grievances against Republican rule” took part.168 As other 
scholars have shown, unstable economic conditions and endless exploitation during the war 
years inspired greater organization among labor across the North even as military service drew 
off a large portion of workers.169 Draft resistance was far from confined to New York City. It 
occurred on a smaller scale in Rondout—a village on the Hudson where Irishwomen instigated 
violence and “hurrahed for Jeff. Davis and Lee”—and in Albany, Troy, Glens Falls, and a host of 
downstate towns and villages. Rumors of an Irish anti-draft meeting caused anxiety in 
Binghamton, while Townsend reported from Albany that the remaining local militia was 
“unreliable” due to sympathy with the mob. Disorder also broke out in Boston and elsewhere 
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across the North.170 With the National Guard severely depleted thanks to the Pennsylvania 
campaign, order was only restored in New York days later by remaining militiamen, small units 
of volunteer recruits, and veterans from the front.171 Citizens in towns and cities organized 
temporary organizations to protect their neighborhoods.172 Fry’s suspension of drafting in New 
York City, Buffalo, and Brooklyn also gradually helped restored peace to the streets.173  
The summer draft riots had many effects other than widespread fear, loss of life, and 
property destruction. The violence temporarily halted drafting in key areas but proved a public-
relations disaster for Democrats, particularly because of Seymour’s sometimes tone-deaf 
attempts to placate draft opponents and the unfair Republican perception that he sympathized 
with rioters.174 A New York City soldier voiced a common theme in the ranks when he likened 
draft opponents, violent and otherwise, to southern rebels and hoped they would be drafted, 
“with Seymour and the Woods in the first rank.”175 New Yorkers in uniform expressed shame for 
hailing from the state that now symbolized anti-draft violence.176 Shocking attacks on African 
American communities in New York during the disorder made fledgling black recruitment more 
difficult, part of an overall culture of discouragement for potential black volunteers.177 Riots 
formed only the most extreme in a long array of methods, legal and illegal, for groups and 
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individuals to resist conscription. The most common illegal means of resistance among drafted 
men of all backgrounds was evasion—fleeing or otherwise declining to present themselves to the 
local provost marshal’s office after receiving a draft notice.178 Western Division AAPMG 
Alexander S. Diven had warned Fry that unless guards were stationed along New York’s long 
Canadian border, “there will be a great accession to her Britannic Majesty’s subjects about the 
time of the draft,” a natural prediction to make since about half of New York deserters were 
already in Canada.179 Once enrollment, the first draft, and widespread opposition revealed the 
weaknesses in the Enrollment Act and the offices enforcing it, communities honed tactics for 
avoiding drafting and disorder, such as paying commutation for drafted residents and offering 
increasingly large volunteer bounties.180 (As the Enrollment Act was meant to encourage 
volunteering and thus avoid conscription, these local actions did not really constitute draft 
resistance.) In its various shapes, opposition to the federal draft demonstrated a situation seen 
throughout the war: New Yorkers and other northerners approached wartime mobilization as 
members of communities and worked within them to achieve and preserve their desired level of 
participation. 
 Draft-inspired riots were dramatic but generally localized affairs, and most towns and 
villages did not witness violence. Except in major cities like Buffalo and Albany, where 
anticipated trouble had prompted Fry to suspend it, initial drafting had proceeded well in 
predominantly Republican Northern and Western New York.181 But New York City, with its 
large, diverse population, functioned as a barometer and lodestar for conscription across the state 
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and beyond. “The enforcement of the draft throughout the country depends upon its enforcement 
in New York City,” the governor of Iowa telegraphed Secretary of War Stanton. From Elmira, 
Diven concurred, telling the Provost Marshal General that if the government yielded to the 
rioters, resistance and claims for local exemption would spread across the Union. On July 18, 
Nugent reported all districts in the Southern Division except the Ninth ready for a resumption of 
the draft. Officers decided to restart the process there, then move westward across the state.182  
Soon, however, the New York Democracy made their continual opposition known, and 
subsequent events illustrated persistent political divisions in mobilization and the draft. Early 
August was another anxious period of slow progress at recruiting stations and in the field, which 
contributed to falling gold prices.183 On August 1, Seymour formally asked Lincoln and Stanton 
for a delay of the draft.184 He then initiated a lengthy correspondence with the president and 
other officials, essentially refusing to cooperate with the draft. To those inclined to doubt 
Seymour, a general lack of support seemed to emanate from the state government.185 Fry 
complained that New Yorkers erred in thinking their problems with quotas, credits, and other 
draft-related matters were egregious compared to other states, but under Seymour and Lincoln’s 
influence his bureau agreed to improve recordkeeping and communication with governors, and 
the Adjutant General’s Office closely monitored recruiting and mustering in New York.186 On 
August 19, the draft began anew in New York City; with thousands of troops on standby and the 
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governor reluctantly urging compliance, the renewed draft went as smoothly in Gotham as it did 
throughout the state.187 When each name was pulled and read aloud in Poughkeepsie, the 
assembled citizens applauded. That evening the conscripts paraded through town and enjoyed a 
supper courtesy of the commissioner of the enrollment board.188  
Localities made strenuous efforts to avoid drafting, however. In Syracuse, the mayor had 
won election on a promise of getting previous volunteers credited so that the city would be 
spared conscription. Syracusans donated funds for a cash prize to the first one hundred local 
volunteers for the Fifteenth New York Cavalry and sought to convince Diven that a draft would 
be unnecessary.189 Providing conscripts with funds with which to purchase commutation or a 
substitute became common practice by late summer, with churches and commutation clubs 
pooling their resources, women working to earn the necessary money for drafted relatives, and 
towns raising funds through bonds and real estate taxes.190 New York became second only to 
Pennsylvania in the amount of commutation paid, totaling nearly five and a half million 
dollars.191 To many, public provision for drafted men belonged to the same movement as 
supporting soldier’s families. When Brooklyn aldermen voted for a three million-dollar 
appropriation for conscripted residents, they sought to “assist the poor man who may be drafted, 
that he would not be taken from his home, family and friends against his will.” Others echoed 
this notion and protested late in the year when federal authorities proposed abolishing 
commutation.192 Opponents of Lincoln’s government, however, often opposed both the draft and 
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any efforts to work within the system through commutation and taxation for local bounties.193 
Scholars have demonstrated how the Enrollment Act represented a leap forward in centralization 
of power, but actions of local governments and communities to minimize the law’s effects 
showed their continued, even increased influence in mobilization in the war’s third year. 
 Conscription was a complicated issue for soldiers just as it was for civilians, but often for 
different reasons. Servicemen’s opinions on the draft paralleled how they felt about volunteering. 
Having long believed that winning the war was a matter of securing large and constant 
reinforcements, soldiers closely followed draft news from home and mostly supported the draft 
and bringing their regiments up to strength with conscripts.194 Yet many of these same men 
approved of friends and loved ones avoiding conscription through commutation or securing 
substitutes.195 The fewer than fifty thousand men who actually entered service as conscripts 
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under the federal draft (three thousand of whom came from New York) were destined for a very 
difficult experience.196 “If the boys of Oneida know their biz they will never go into the Army as 
conscripts,” wrote a soldier from that county in December 1863, for volunteers subjected 
draftees to suspicion and abuse. (This attitude, however, was not universal among soldiers.)197 
New York regiments in the field received large reinforcement from the draft depots in the late 
summer and fall. So many of these substitutes and conscripts were unfit, however, that many 
underwent another medical inspection.198 After many more went absent from their regiments, the 
Army of the Potomac executed five deserters—all of them recently arrived from draft depots—to 
serve as an example to conscripts and substitutes.199 Some drafted men thought they only had to 
serve nine months; feeling betrayed when told they would have to serve full three-year terms, 
many deserted, or at least threatened to, rather than be “misused like dogs.”200 The relative 
handful of New Yorkers who joined the army as conscripts usually did so voluntarily, deciding 
not to take advantage of commutation or substitution, and guarded their liberty with the same 
spirit of other American soldiers. 
 July 1862 had seen the debut of a thirteen-month period packed with events, many of 
them driven by controversies over the draft. Despite—even because of—common anxieties about 
conscription, residents of New York and their fellow northerners found ways to mitigate its 
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effects and preserve social stability. The Enrollment Act was designed to function as motivation 
for volunteering and to deploy the draft as a last resort should communities fail to meet their 
quotas. Faced with a draft law and its potentially dangerous effects, citizens worked through their 
communities to meet the challenge and ensure that very few of their sons and neighbors would 
serve under duress. Fewer than one quarter of enrollees had their names drawn; of that group, 
fewer still—amounting to one in forty-seven among New York enrollees—entered the army as 
conscripts. Just one resident of Manhattan’s infamously poor Five Points neighborhood did so.201 
In 1863, northerners largely came to accept the world of recruitment fraud and skyrocketing 
bounties as a price that must be paid to keep mobilization voluntary. 
                                                 





“IF THE PEOPLE OF NEW YORK WANT THE WAR TO CLOSE,  
THEY MUST FILL UP THE RANKS OF OUR REGIMENT”:  
BITTERNESS AND RELIEF, 1863-1865 
 
By late January 1864, Thomas and Robert Hamilton, abolitionists and editors of the 
leading African American newspaper in New York City, had received many reports of black 
soldiers cheated of their pay and otherwise abused. On January 30, the Anglo-African printed a 
letter from a member of the Fifty-Fifth Massachusetts Infantry who, like his comrades in the 
regiment, had refused to accept anything less than full compensation. “We did not enlist for the 
pay. Any man would be foolish to risk his life for from $13 to $21 per month,” he explained. 
“We enlisted because we considered it our duty, and all we ask is to be treated as men should 
be.”1 In commentary on the letter titled “There’s Money in It,” the editors praised soldiers of the 
Fifty-Fourth and Fifty-Fifth—many of whom hailed from New York State—for standing up for 
their rights. “Two grand passions have grown up in our present war,” they declared, “the passion 
of patriotism, and the passion of making money,” with the latter now strongest. Whereas men 
had rushed to the colors in 1861 with no thought of payment, now recruits expected bounties in 
“colossal sums …” But members of the Massachusetts black regiments were different: “They are 
fighting for rights, not for money, they are soldiers of the United States, not mercenaries.”2 
While soldiers had expected proper benefits from the war’s beginning, the Hamiltons articulated 
a rising concern among northerners over corruption in mobilization—something especially 
familiar to black soldiers and their supporters. Two weeks later, a recruiter responded to the 
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editorial with a letter admitting that while just compensation was important, enlistment carried 
many other advantages as well, including the privilege of serving the nation.3  
These three pieces of writing exemplified the complications of wartime mobilization and 
tensions between individuals’ wants and those of state and nation. By recruiting men and then 
failing to pay them, Union authorities demonstrated that the war effort did not necessarily 
improve in efficiency as they organized a force of United States Colored Troops and took on 
other large responsibilities. To a considerable degree, mobilization remained a localized and 
state-run affair, and tensions between citizens and all levels of government worsened even as 
Union forces drove onward to victory in late 1864 and early 1865.  Together, however, the war’s 
final grim years saw federal and state governments attract enough men with the sort of benefits 
discussed in the Anglo-African to eventually prevail. 
In the late summer of 1863, war supporters agreed that recruiting had stalled and the 
armies needed a large influx of men to make decisive progress. Many veteran regiments were 
due for discharge in the coming year, which caused additional concern. On September 3, the 
state Republican convention in Utica attacked Governor Seymour for obstructing the draft and 
supposedly encouraging the Draft Riots.4 As the draft continued in several New York City and 
Brooklyn districts, even the Democratic Herald—calling for “a few blows more, and the bogus 
confederacy will fall into ruins”—blamed Seymour for New York’s failure to meet its quotas 
without drafting, even as the paper endorsed his party’s platform.5 Such accusations were not 
entirely fair to Seymour but reflected war supporters’ frustrations with hardline Democrats. 
Leaders of the latter faction tried to spark outrage by claiming New York would not be properly 
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credited for draftees who commuted and that a new draft impended. Provost Marshal General 
Fry ordered his three division chiefs in the state to address these falsehoods publicly.6 Democrats 
also interpreted Lincoln’s call for troops in October as a sign of failure.7 Nevertheless, the Union 
Party—as the Republicans had renamed themselves—swept the fall elections in New York and 
across the North.8  
Meanwhile, federal and state officials launched new efforts to reform mobilization 
practices and bring in troops. Lincoln, aware of Seymour’s sensitivity to perceived slights toward 
New York, ordered a new enrollment for certain problematic districts and invited the governor to 
monitor it.9 Noting that the Enrollment Act was meant to reinforce the armies, Fry deplored the 
“system of raising new and disbanding old regiments … calculated to keep us forever at 
disadvantage with an enemy who pursues the opposite and wiser policy.” On October 17, 
Lincoln called on the governors to supply three hundred thousand men for units in the field. 
States and districts failing to meet their new quotas would face a draft beginning January 5, 
1864. New York’s quota was 60,378, and the state still had deficiencies to meet under the 
summer draft.10 Seymour issued a proclamation calling on New Yorkers to obey their “duty” and 
give generously for the large bounties needed to meet the call with volunteers and avoid a 
tyrannical draft.11 In November, Fry told his officers it was “the desire of this Bureau that 
Governors of States from which troops are required shall take the leading part in the work.” 
Seymour had recently made several campaign speeches denouncing manpower calls as wastes of 
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life, but now he endorsed a state plan to offer bounties for veterans and recruits, assign quotas to 
towns, and fill old regiments. Gratified, Fry ordered provost marshals in other states to adopt a 
version of this program and agreed to consider revising New York’s ever-controversial quotas.12  
New Yorkers farther down the chain matched these endeavors. For months before 
Lincoln issued his October troop call, communities had sought to meet their quotas by providing 
local conscripts with money for commutation or finding substitutes.13 They generally switched 
back to concentrating on securing volunteers after October 17 as commutation became more 
controversial.14 Community bounties combined with state and federal offers soon bore fruit in 
the form of rapid volunteering.15 Localities continued these efforts into December, driven by 
what Adjutant General Sprague called “a growing energy and a determination to fill the quota” 
of the state and escape the “iron yokes” of conscription.16 The village of Turin in Lewis County 
voted to pay each recruit a $200 bounty, while Monroe County offered $300. One of many 
enterprises in New York City involved a committee of the Union League, which published a 
notice (endorsed by black abolitionist Henry Hyland Garnet among others) seeking honest white 
and black recruiters to go among their neighborhoods promoting special family relief and the 
$300 county bounty.17 Soldiers at the front, angered by what they considered small-mindedness 
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among civilians, reminded those back home they must either send more troops or sign on 
themselves. A member of New York City’s renowned Fifty-First noted: “[I]f the people of New 
York want the war to close, they must fill up the ranks of our regiment, and that will be doing a 
share toward it.”18 As 1863 ended, the state adjutant general estimated the Empire State had 
secured over sixty-nine thousand enlistments during the year, including ten thousand 
reenlistments, for a total of nearly 292,000 since the war’s beginning. One policy improvement 
involved forming infantry companies to be embedded in veteran regiments rather than creating 
new regiments, though the latter system unfortunately continued for artillery and cavalry.19 
Federal authorities pushed back the January 5 volunteering deadline, but citizens soon faced 
additional quotas.20 
 The period from late 1863 to early 1864 saw the full implementation of several initiatives 
meant to increase Union forces without conscription. That fall and winter, army camps hummed 
with the reenlistment question.21 With more than two hundred thousand battle-tested veterans 
eligible for discharge within one year, federal and state authorities acted decisively late in 1863 
to retain their valuable services. The commander of the famous Mozart Regiment told Seymour 
that permission to bring his entire unit home to recruit “would be a greater inducement to the old 
soldiers who have been so long in the field than any other.” Other veterans maintained that 
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furloughs to visit home would be a far more attractive incentive than bounties or anything else.22 
In November, the War Department announced that, in addition to existing benefits, reenlisting 
soldiers would be awarded four-hundred-dollar bounties and furloughs of at least thirty days. 
Furthermore, units in which three-quarters of members reenlisted could go home in a body “to 
reorganize and recruit,” and these commands would have “Veteran Volunteer” added to their 
titles; regiments failing to secure the minimum three-quarters would cease to exist at the end of 
their terms and the remaining men transferred elsewhere. Reenlisted regiments would be credited 
to the states and, where possible, to the districts and sub-districts they came from.23 That winter, 
the Union high command worked hard to encourage reenlistments.24 Results were uneven, with 
some regiments meeting the three-quarters reenlistment mark and others failing. “In our regiment 
re-enlisting goes on very slowly at present,” wrote a soldier in Sickles’s old Excelsior Brigade. 
“All we want is some patriot from New York to come out here and make a stirring speech.” An 
artilleryman noted that many soldiers refused to reenlist when promised benefits failed to 
materialize. Some infantrymen wanted transfers to different service branches, while other men 
simply had no desire to serve another three years. These attitudes reflected the challenges of a 
nation in its third year of war.25 Yet in the end, government incentives, combined with the 
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patriotism of many veterans and their sense that one more effort would crush the rebels, had 
great effect: in the Union Army as a whole over half of eligible men reenlisted, securing credits 
for their localities and their services for the nation. New York’s 20,518 veterans reenlisting in 
1864 constituted about half of those eligible.26 Historians identify this renewed commitment as a 
great inspiration and practical benefit to the Union, as well as further proof that ordinary northern 
fighting men were devoted to their country’s cause.27 A Yates County soldier sent the names of 
the reenlisted in his regiment home to be printed in a local newspaper and promote 
volunteering.28  
 The long process of opening the Union ranks to African American men was finally 
underway in the northern states by late 1863, and it ultimately had an even greater impact than 
reenlistment efforts. Soon after the Emancipation Proclamation had authorized black service, 
their recruitment began in earnest.29 Initially, however—and despite strident support from 
Rochester resident Frederick Douglass—the War Department did not include New York among 
states permitted to organize black troops; this was no doubt due at least partially to Seymour’s 
opposition.30 That the Empire State did not lead in black recruitment was a matter of shame and 
regret to Douglass, who nevertheless stepped up his efforts.31 Though black recruitment 
remained controversial among whites until war’s end, in early 1863 more and more in New York 
of both major political parties supported the policy, often for hard-nosed reasons. A pro-war 
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Democratic paper in New York City claimed society would be seriously damaged should any 
more whites leave for the army and that drafting them would be “preposterous” when so many 
blacks stood available.32 Abolitionists such as Douglass and Henry Highland Garnett had more 
idealistic motivations as they strove to find recruits in New York for the first black regiments 
formed in the northeastern United States, the Fifty-Fourth and Fifty-Fifth Massachusetts. 
Douglass’s widely known address “Men of Color, to Arms”—released one day before the 
Enrollment Act became law—linked loyalty to the nation with social revolution, told readers this 
was no longer exclusively a “white man’s war,” and advised them to join the Bay State’s 
regiments.33 In an essay published the following month, Douglass answered the common 
question “Why Should a Colored Man Enlist?” Chief among reasons, he asserted, were the 
obligation of every man to serve his country no matter his race; additionally, in fighting for their 
own freedom blacks would ensure their citizenship and dignity in American society.34  
Douglass, Garnett, and their allies faced an uphill battle in New York. The war had 
brought improved economic opportunities that discouraged volunteering among the state’s 
estimated nine thousand military-age black men. Unequal practices in the military and outright 
hostility from many whites repelled potential enlistees as well. The War Department authorized 
black troops a lower payrate than whites, no enlistment bounty, and no opportunity for officer 
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commissions.35 Beginning in May and stretching into the autumn, two committees of leading 
New Yorkers, one made up of African Americans and the other of whites, petitioned Lincoln and 
Seymour to authorize a New York black regiment. Lincoln, ever careful to retain the governor’s 
support, deferred to him on the matter, while the bigoted Seymour ignored it.36 This lack of 
federal and state support, combined with the chilling message of the Draft Riots, made Douglass’ 
promises ring hollow to both his audiences and himself. The great activist gave up his northern 
recruiting mission in August, though he later promoted efforts in the South.37 Writers in the 
Anglo-African expressed frustration both with Douglass and their state government. When 
Douglass and other prominent African Americans signed their names to a recruiting call in 
Philadelphia, a letter writer attacked them for exhorting other men to fight while failing to go 
themselves—a criticism white abolitionists like Horace Greeley knew all too well. Douglass 
protested that his work at home was too important to abandon, while his two sons serving in the 
Fifty-Fourth gave him adequate representation at the front.38 On September 26, the paper carried 
news of “Colored Men Drafted in Herkimer and Otsego Counties.” Noting the hypocrisy of 
Albany officials who allowed conscription of black citizens while denying them equal terms of 
enlistment, the editors advised their male readers to forget state pride and enlist for Rhode Island, 
which offered its black recruits bounties, family support, and good officers.39 African American 
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New Yorkers, like people of other races, expected elites to provide leadership and just benefits in 
exchange for their involvement in mobilization. 
 Ventures to improve and expand black recruitment were already underway. Under 
pressure from industrialists seeking to preserve their white labor force, the federal government 
assumed a guiding hand. In May, the War Department established the Bureau of Colored Troops 
and issued strict regulations for selecting qualified white officers to command them.40 Gallant 
fighting by black regiments in the field inspired and increased their supporters.41 On July 15 and 
16, while the Draft Riots raged to the south, a large convention of black citizens met at 
Poughkeepsie to plan Colored Troops recruitment and ensure they received excellent leadership 
and “the remuneration and protection which belongs to a Citizen Soldier of the Union.”42 In 
November, after Seymour refused to authorize a black regiment, sixty-six leading New York 
whites—among them Daniel Sickles, Peter Cooper, P. T. Barnum, and William Cullen Bryant—
formed the New York Association for Colored Volunteers to make “a prompt and vigorous 
movement” securing the services of black New Yorkers; this would ensure their state gained the 
credits instead of others. “Our country’s interest and self-interest here unite,” read their 
published appeal.43 After Stanton approved their request to raise Colored Troops, Seymour 
changed his tune somewhat, refusing to have anything to do with the project but not blocking it, 
as the men so raised would be credited to New York.44 The Volunteering Committee of New 
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York City’s Union League Club, headquartered on Wall Street, switched its efforts to black 
recruiting and united with the association in raising a regiment.45 Considerable doubt existed in 
the War Department and elsewhere that a city which had seen vicious attacks on black people 
mere months earlier could organize a black regiment, and many whites in that city disapproved 
of the effort.46 By early January 1864, however, a month of determined recruiting, state and local 
bounties, and new willingness among black New Yorkers to enlist had brought some seven 
hundred recruits to the regiment’s camp on Riker’s Island.47 George Bliss, Jr., a leading architect 
of the project, predicted this would be “the best officered regiment that ever left the State of New 
York,” adding: “The men are physically equal to any, and manifest great intelligence in learning 
their duties.”48 The presentation of colors to the Twentieth United States Colored Troops by local 
white ladies and its departure from New York City on March 5, 1864, were spectacles rivaling 
the march of the Seventh Regiment through the same streets nearly three years before. “NEW 
YORK REDEEMED!” declared the Anglo-African, and many other witnesses also remarked on 
the dramatic shift in white perception toward black troops.49  
Even before the Twentieth mustered into service, so successful was the Union League in 
creating the first black regiment from the Empire State that the club obtained authorization from 
the Bureau of Colored Troops to raise two more regiments.50 In mid-1864, the main effort of 
recruiting African American soldiers shifted from northerners at home to officers and civilian 
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agents in the occupied South.51 New York ultimately received credit for 4,125 of the nearly 
180,000 U. S. Colored Troops raised during the war.52 Their recruitment highlighted the 
continued importance of associations and determined citizens as prime movers in the war effort. 
“Without the constant political agitation from influential whites, the Department of War would 
probably never have consented to authorize the recruitment of New York’s Afro-Americans,” 
historian William Seraile reflects. “Yet all of their efforts would have been for nothing if blacks 
had not been willing and even eager to confront the slaveholder’s wrath on the battlefield.”53  
From 1864 on, however, black enlistment in New York and other northern states suffered from 
the same inefficiency and corruption marring recruitment in general—with the added element of 
pervasive white enmity, even among those who accepted black recruitment. Support among 
whites for the ceremonies honoring the Twentieth was far from universal.54 Irish-American 
officer Charles G. Halpine’s popular poem “Sambo’s Right to be Kilt” used familiar racist 
language to convince northern whites to accept black troops willing to put their lives on the line, 
no matter how repugnant that idea might be to whites.55 Despite such tensions, black 
communities in the North took to volunteering with gusto in late 1863. Drawing on their tight-
knit communities and desire to achieve emancipation, demonstrate manhood and independence, 
and prove their fitness for equal rights, black northerners enlisted at a higher rate than whites and 
exhibited more discipline in service.56 Thirty-six out of thirty-nine men from a black 
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neighborhood in Westchester County volunteered within a three-month period, and so many 
enlisted in Ithaca that a resident felt “lonely.”57 Remarkably, not one among two thousand black 
recruits encamped on Riker’s Island deserted.58 The Navy had a long history of black service, 
and staffing problems during the war prompted the service to drop its five percent black 
enlistment cap and to hire recruiting agents in the South. By 1865, one in five sailors was 
African American.59 
Blacks were not uniformly enthusiastic about serving the Union, however, and their 
recruitment soon suffered from the government’s failure to sustain its promises.60 Historian 
Joseph T. Glatthaar asserts that “the conduct of recruiters affected every other officer and man in 
the USCT.”61 White soldiers, recruiters, and provost marshals insulted black men, accepted some 
who were in poor physical condition, and robbed many of their bounties, leaving the men and 
their families destitute. Even the renowned Twentieth regiment was partially filled through fraud 
tolerated by General Francis B. Spinola, who headed recruitment in New York City; the 
regimental recruiting committee reimbursed those affected. The vigilant Anglo-African 
frequently warned its readers about such abuse and assisted black soldiers by helping them 
secure their full payments and printing the recruiting regulations.62 Just as damaging was official 
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contempt in the form of unequal pay and no provision for federal bounties. Black and white 
editors alike agitated for reforming these outrages, which discouraged black enlistment and thus 
hurt the war effort.63 On July 15, 1864, the Secretary of War finally authorized equal benefits for 
United States Colored Troops.64 But back pay was slow to arrive, and conditions for recruits 
remained deplorable in many instances. In January 1865, an officer lured a southern freedman to 
a Chenango County town with promises of farm employment, then sold him to a substitute 
broker for $900; the black man received none of it. In reporting the incident, the Anglo-African 
remarked: “If we are to be bought and sold in New York it seems useless to abolish slavery in 
Maryland.”65 Challenges for the state’s black communities in wartime often were more extreme 
than those for whites, but they, too, relied on family and group support networks and participated 
in sanitary relief fairs.66 
 These quandaries of black recruitment belonged to larger, disturbing trends in 
mobilization. In a classic work, Fred A. Shannon identified 1863 as the year when a “mercenary 
factor” overtook efforts, especially in New York and New England, where communities 
concentrated on meeting their quotas through ever-higher bounties and the system attracted men 
motivated only by money.67 While historians sometimes overlook the importance of financial 
reward in recruitment from the war’s earliest days, it is true that bounties came to dominate 
northern mobilization to an unprecedented and damaging degree. The War Department increased 
its own bounties but sought to mitigate desertions by paying out bounties in regular installments 
over the length of a soldier’s enlistment. The original $100 enlistment bounty grew to $300 for 
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new recruits and $400 for veterans in 1863, then dropped thereafter.68 In the four troop calls from 
the midpoint of 1863 to war’s end, provost marshals in New York City’s First District enlisted 
6,061 men and paid out bounties totaling nearly three million dollars. The average bounty 
awarded rose with each call, beginning at $276.53 and reaching $746.18 by the final call.69 
Congress did not authorize bounties for naval service until February 1864; until then, the Navy 
enticed men with a slippery tradition of awarding prize money for captured property like ships 
and cotton bales. For sailors, the wait for prize money due them could be long and aggravating.70 
James W. Geary has questioned why the government did not simply raise pay rates to make 
service more attractive during the first manpower crisis in 1862 and suggests the answer lay in 
the “dire straits of the federal treasury.” (Total U. S. bounty payments of three hundred million 
dollars were “as much as the pay of the entire Union army and five times the cost of its 
ordnance,” Hattaway and Jones point out.) Another, related reason probably lies in national 
authorities’ desires to leave the heaviest burdens of mobilization in state hands.71 The War 
Department did not control state and local bounty policy. When Governor Andrew and Senator 
Wilson of Massachusetts led a push to set up advance payments in May 1862, they opened the 
floodgates to cynicism on a grand scale.72  
By early 1864, northern community efforts to meet troop quotas were tinged with more 
desperation, resentment, and tolerance of corruption than ever before, particularly after Lincoln 
made two additional calls for a total of seven hundred thousand men. Counties and towns tackled 
their quotas either through the old method of holding town meetings, where those present usually 
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voted to raise subscriptions for a bounty, or by appointing bounty committees to handle the 
work. Committees also paid sums, usually $300, to draftees who found substitutes.73 “Every man 
joining his company is one the less to be taken from our midst by a draft,” ran a typical notice for 
a recruiter in a Lewis County paper. “The bounties are munificent, enough to purchase a farm.”74 
Local bounties skyrocketed throughout the war’s final two years as communities indebted 
themselves and competed with one another for available manpower, while brokers plied their 
schemes and advance payments encouraged bounty jumping. As with family and soldier relief 
efforts, war supporters believed their bounties reflected large and sustained devotion to the war 
effort.75 While this may be accurate, most citizens did not have to contribute much. In New 
York, money was largely raised through real estate taxes. Moreover, many New Yorkers 
resented being taxed to provide bounties, while public interest in bounty loans and bonds 
dropped sharply once quotas were met. In the winter of 1864-1865, even generous interest rates 
and projected state reimbursement often failed to attract enough loan subscribers.76 Bounty 
committees and the larger public did little to promote enlistments when there was no threat of a 
draft and recruit brokers saw their business suffer at such times, while veteran volunteers felt 
slighted when they did not receive the local bounties awarded to new recruits.77 After receiving 
many queries about whether the local quota could be filled, a Queens County newspaper in early 
                                                 
73 Three undated clippings (May 1864 and January 1865), CW-BHS; “Minutes of a Town Meeting held at Highland 
(N.Y.), Signed by Stephen St. John Gardiner and dated Aug. 4, 1864,” Stephen St. John Gardiner Collection, N-
YHS (accessed online via EBSCOhost); Lowville Journal and Republican, December 16, 1863. 
74 Lowville Journal and Republican, December 2, 1863. 
75 Marion H. Brophy, The Town of Otsego: Home Front, 1861-1865, Compiled from the Freeman’s Journal and 
Otsego Town Records, http://www.rootsweb.ancestry.com/~nyotsego/cwotsego.htm (accessed March 21, 2016). 
76 Murdock, Patriotism Limited, 33, 36-37; “76th Regiment New York Volunteers Civil War Newspaper Clippings,” 
New York State Military Museum and Veterans Research Center, https://dmna.ny.gov/historic/reghist/civil/infantry/ 
76thInf/76thInfCWN.htm (accessed March 10, 2017). 
77 Brooklyn Daily Union, September 6, 1864, January 21, 1865, CW-BHS; “2nd Regiment Artillery (Heavy), NY 
Volunteers Civil War Newspaper Clippings,” New York State Military Museum and Veterans Research Center, 




1865 admitted that “the efforts of the Town Officers are not met with that cheerful alacrity by 
our monied men, that characterized them on previous occasions. The Board, for the want of 
necessary funds, are literally doing nothing towards providing recruits.” Unless the rich took the 
county bonds to provide bounties, a draft would occur and every local man might “have to 
shoulder arms and go to the front.”78 Americans had addressed wartime manpower needs with 
bounties ever since the seventeenth century, but the system was not designed for the strain of 
mass mobilization.  
 Of all the groups involved in Civil War mobilization and bounty culture, none have 
attracted more notoriety than recruiting agents—better known as brokers—who made it their 
business to entice other people into service as volunteers and substitutes. Eugene C. Murdock, 
the leading historian of the brokerage system, called it “a disgraceful method to raise an army.”79 
Brokers, who were widely despised as unprincipled opportunists, became prominent during the 
summer 1862 volunteer movement and grew in numbers and influence thereafter. They 
advertised in newspapers and operated under a patina of honesty, but their criminality was 
widely known and harmed countless lives. In March 1864, a gang in Watertown plied a fourteen-
year-old boy with liquor and cigars until he was intoxicated, then convinced him to sign an 
enlistment form.80 Other brokers kept large portions of recruits’ advance bounties and enlisted 
many who were unfit to serve.81 Numerous government employees worked in league with 
dishonest brokers. A policeman at the Brooklyn Navy Yard formed two “rings” with other men, 
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one of which involved shoddy supplies and the other “buying and selling substitutes for the 
Army and Navy and collecting prize money.” The men stole the bounties of volunteers they had 
secured for the military and sold their enlistment forms to numerous other brokers, who in turn 
sold these “paper credits” to upstate towns. Those involved were investigated but released, and 
reaped fortunes. This was far from the only incident of corrupt recruitment at New York’s naval 
rendezvous, which seethed with iniquity and intimidated potential volunteers.82 The most famous 
victim of fraudulent recruitment in New York was nineteen-year-old Cornelius Garvin of Troy, 
known as the “Idiot Boy” after his mother publicized his case. The supervisor of the Rensselaer 
County Poor House abducted the mentally challenged Garvin and sold him into service in 
September 1863. After he went missing, Garvin’s mother, Catherine, launched a tireless 
campaign to find him and became a familiar sight in Washington and the camps of the Army of 
the Potomac. Cornelius was never located and was believed to have died in battle.83 
Shocking as such cases are in their details and sheer number, it was the widespread 
tolerance and collusion among the populace that really made the brokerage system “disgraceful.” 
For most of the war there were no federal or state laws regulating brokerage. Many bounty 
committees and draftees desiring substitutes relied on brokers despite their unsavory methods 
and came to resent federal crackdowns. The chief recruiting officer in Brooklyn received praise 
from some quarters and criticism from others “because he refused to accept and muster in thieves 
and drunkards brought to his office by policemen,” and members of New York County’s 
volunteering committee claimed their honest practices in 1864 hurt recruiting, as brokers would 
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not work with them. The previous year, however, General John A. Dix had to intercede with this 
committee after it allowed brokers to take full bounties off recruits’ hands.84 When Dix heard in 
March 1864 that several Southern New York towns were offering recruits a three-hundred-dollar 
bounty but letting brokers manipulate them into giving up most of it, he ordered that provost 
marshals not accept recruits from such towns unless they received full payment directly into their 
hands. Dix later extended this instruction to Connecticut. But Provost Marshal General Fry had 
the order countermanded, observing that “though it prevents frauds, it stops recruiting—it cures 
the disease by killing the patient.” Securing volunteers had become nearly impossible without 
brokers.85  
Established agents did not have a monopoly on such practices, however, for officials and 
civilians of all types engaged in questionable tactics. During the war, several hundred thousand 
boys under eighteen joined the Union military, often under the influence of guardians and other 
adults. Exercising the law of in loco parentis, reform schools frequently enlisted their inmates 
into the army and sometimes kept the bounties. Colonel William B. Barnes’s Eleventh New York 
Heavy Artillery gained several recruits from the Western House of Refuge in Rochester.86 
Officers of the Fourteenth Heavy Artillery found themselves embroiled in scandal late in 1863 
when parents complained of underage sons enlisted into the regiment thanks to falsified 
signatures of consent on the enlistment forms.87 The provost marshal of the 28th Congressional 
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District reported “many cases of hardship” in his area due to families losing their underage boys 
to the army. After Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus in September 1863, parents had 
little chance of prosecuting those responsible.88 A July 1864 amendment to the Enrollment Act 
forbade enlistment of anyone under sixteen, with or without parental consent, but the ban had 
little practical effect.89 Native Americans often entered the army as substitutes—they were not 
citizens and thus not eligible for the draft—only to be cheated by brokers. Chief Samuel George 
of the Onondaga took up the cause of underage and swindled Iroquois in service after forty-three 
requested discharge; George obtained Lincoln’s influence to get his people released from 
service.90 While many soldiers gained through the brokerage system served creditably, the 
concentration on speed and quantity over quality of manpower undermined both the Union’s war 
effort and its ideals of freedom, patriotism, and self-sacrifice.91 In the spring of 1864, the 
Fourteenth New York Heavy Artillery was taken from its New York Harbor forts and assigned to 
infantry duty—much to the men’s shock—and suffered severe casualties during the relentless 
Overland Campaign.92 After the failure of an assault on Petersburg, Virginia, their corps 
commander blamed the several artillery-turned-infantry regiments under his leadership, calling 
them “worthless … they didn’t enlist to fight and it is unreasonable to expect it from them.”93 
This characterization, while somewhat unfair, spoke to unhealthy mobilization practices and the 
anxieties they bred. 
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In an era when mass media was in its infancy, provost marshals needed assistance in 
recruiting. They tried to hire only honest and efficient agents and investigated cases of fraud. 
Public outrage against bounty jumpers and corrupt brokers intensified in the war’s final two 
years. Some bounty committees and individuals remained honest, and newspapers frequently 
called for justice and advised potential enlistees on where they could expect fair treatment.94 The 
government punished bounty jumpers with much greater severity than brokers, as they were 
subject to military law and widely regarded as cowards. Michael Thomas Smith cites harsh 
treatment of these reprobates to argue that for northerners, fraud in mobilization, especially by 
the largely city-bred bounty jumpers, summarized their fears of urbanization, commercialization, 
and threats to morality and manhood.95 Nevertheless, governments and community groups 
tolerated, even relied on brokers because they brought in manpower, and relatively few faced 
prosecution despite their reputation as con artists and human traffickers. Many people at the time 
recognized the brokerage system as one element in a vast culture of corruption in mobilization, 
but neither government power nor the public will were sufficient for reform. New Yorkers and 
their fellow northerners treasured their independence and localism too much to permit a total-war 
commitment. Brokers, bounty jumpers, and dishonest recruiting officers thrived as a result.  
 In early 1864, Union supporters prepared for what they hoped would be a final, war-
winning campaign with measures for strengthening the armies. On advice from Fry and Stanton 
that recruiting was going well and should be maintained, Lincoln on February 1 ordered a draft 
for half a million men to begin on March 10; this draft was suspended when requests came in to 
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allow additional time for volunteering. In mid-March, the president ordered another draft for 
April 15, with the deadline for federal bounties extended once again so that quotas might be 
filled with volunteers.96 Congress, meanwhile, passed a sweeping set of amendments to the 
Enrollment Act meant to reform many of its worst provisions, and Lincoln signed it into law on 
February 24.97 Citizens had their part to play as well. The Provost Marshal General authorized 
the commanders of the Second and Ninth Army Corps—famous, battle-tested organizations—to 
recruit up to fifty thousand men each in the northeastern states, concentrating on filling old 
regiments first and cooperating with governors and local recruiting officers.98 General Winfield 
S. Hancock, a Democrat, established Second Corps headquarters at Tammany Hall, which hosted 
a “great war meeting” of party members on March 7. Hancock and other Democratic speakers 
employed familiar language to argue a quick victory would be achieved if New Yorkers filled 
the Union ranks.99 The Committee to Recruit the Ninth Army Corps was formed of city leaders 
with primarily Republican sympathies, including George Opdyke, John Austin Stevens, Jr., and 
other familiar names from the days of the Union Defense and National War Committees. A large 
list of subscribers contributed to the Ninth Corps recruiting fund; by August, they had secured 
667 men for the Ninth’s New York regiments and earned the gratitude of corps officers.100 
Conscious that Confederates were preparing for a desperate fight by putting all their available 
men in the field, Union authorities under the influence of newly appointed General-in-Chief 
Ulysses S. Grant ordered garrisons in New York City and elsewhere combed out for heavy 
artillerymen and other soldiers to send to the front—part of Grant’s strategy of concentrating 
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resources for a coordinated, decisive campaign.101 Recruits poured into the Army of the 
Potomac’s camps that spring to join the ranks alongside veterans. While this reinforcement 
raised hopes for success, lack of training and discipline among new men in the Ninth Corps and 
other units boded ill for the army’s efforts.102 The painful lessons of the Antietam campaign in 
this regard had not been absorbed. 
 On the home front, manpower quotas caused endless disquiet. New Yorkers and other 
northerners expected political leaders to get local requirements reduced wherever possible.103 
Seymour, who hoped to secure the Democratic nomination for the 1864 presidential election, 
never ceased protesting to Lincoln and Fry that New York’s quotas and credits unfairly targeted 
Democratic districts.104 This irritated War Department officials who were nevertheless mindful 
of needing to maintain the support of Seymour’s state. In December, Stanton had agreed to 
appoint a special commission to study and revise New York’s enrollment and quotas.105 After 
two months of investigation, the commission delivered a report that lambasted the state’s 
enrollment and provost marshals’ methods of determining it. New York City and Brooklyn in 
particular, with their “large floating population” of immigrants and others, had prompted 
enrolling officers to copy election poll lists and pull from other outdated sources. The effect was 
to drive up the city and state’s enrollment of first-class men to an excessive, inaccurate 
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percentage compared with other states; small wonder that these were the districts where “the 
results of the draft were the least favorable to the government [and] the fewest men were 
obtained …” The commission concluded that enrollment by draft eligibility and classes was 
inherently erroneous and recommended that future quotas be determined by population.106 Fry 
admitted that current enrollment methods were not ideal but strenuously rejected claims that 
New York’s quotas were unfair or that enrollment needed a drastic change in methodology. The 
Provost Marshal General was coming around to the notion that leaving recruitment in the hands 
of states was bad policy and that the actions of his bureau proved the necessity of federal control. 
Lincoln, too, disliked the commission’s findings—“Not going forth to find men at all, they have 
proceeded altogether upon paper examinations and mental processes,” he remarked—but still 
found the report valuable and worth considering.107 Disputes between Albany and Washington 
over numbers and policy never subsided for the remainder of the war, yet New York managed to 
meet and even exceed its February, March, and July quotas.108 
New regulations for counting naval enlistments afforded some relief for quota and credit 
anxieties. States and localities originally received no credits for recruitment of sailors, which 
gave citizens little incentive to promote it and left the Navy starved of manpower. In response to 
agitation from Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, the February 1864 Amendatory Act 
authorized naval credits, bounties for enlistment, and transfers for soldiers desiring sea 
service.109 New Yorkers—especially those living in districts with seaports—expressed relief that 
some of their draft burden would now be lifted. One month later, however, a War Department 
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solicitor added complications by determining that since the Navy enlisted men for one year’s 
service, it would take three naval enlistments to equal one draft credit. Furthermore, only 
residents of a district who shipped (joined the Navy) in that district could be counted toward its 
quota, a strange and disappointing rule considering sailors’ well-known tendency to lead 
peripatetic lives. Policies like these increased New Yorkers’ frustrations with their national 
government and its drafting mechanism.110 Some town councils appropriated large sums for local 
naval bounties, while the Navy Department continued to attract volunteers with promises of prize 
money.111 The enrollment amendment did, however, go far toward addressing the navy’s 
manpower shortage by late 1864. Over the course of the war, some thirty-five thousand men 
joined the navy in New York, accounting for more than one third of the service’s enlistments.112  
 Events in the spring and summer of 1864 reiterated the fact that issues of mobilization 
affected military campaigns, and vice versa, just as they did political contests. In May, Union 
forces launched coordinated, relentless offensives that Grant intended to tie down and deplete the 
Confederacy. But endless fighting, particularly that taking place around the Confederate capital 
of Richmond, Virginia, revealed flaws in the commanding general’s strategy of attrition. While 
the North’s population and other resources outmatched those of the rebels, this could not 
compensate for inferior tactics and mobilization.113 By June, weeks of incessant movement and 
combat had cost the Army of the Potomac terrible casualties and exhausted its survivors. “I am 
very sorry to say I have seen but little generalship during the campaign,” reflected a brigade 
commander from Western New York after another fruitless assault, adding: “Twenty thousand of 
our killed and wounded should to-day be in our ranks …” Yet he held out hope “that mere 
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numbers will yet enable us to enter Richmond.”114 As the Virginia campaign transitioned into 
siege warfare that summer, the strain told seriously on an army reeling from heavy losses and 
largely composed of recent recruits. Officers in the Army of the Potomac reacted to breakdowns 
in discipline with milder punishments than the traditional discharge or confinement; this impulse 
partly came about “in view of the interests of the service which requires the service of every man 
in the ranks,” as a division commander explained.115 
 The summer of 1864 saw northerners adopt a variety of schemes for replenishing 
shockingly high casualties and winning the war without conscription, but class and political 
controversies dogged these efforts. Ever since the advent of the Enrollment Act, opponents had 
deplored its commutation or exemption clause as class warfare—“three hundred dollars or your 
life,” as Vallandigham defined it. Others criticized commutation for discouraging the raising of 
troops. Exemption, however, had a strong basis in American and European custom as a measure 
by which employers, family men, and the unfit could be protected and social cohesion preserved. 
The three-hundred-dollar commutation clause kept down the price of substitutes and thus gave 
the non-wealthy a chance to avoid service, especially in communities that awarded this sum to 
drafted men.116 Congress endlessly debated the issue from late 1863 to early 1864. The February 
amendments to enrollment retained exemption but shortened it to one year.117 As sustained 
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fighting erupted in May, War Department officials pushed for a draft. Lincoln hesitated to make 
such an unpopular move, and Senator Morgan stepped in on May 23 with another amendatory 
bill that repealed commutation, among other reforms to enrollment. For nearly six weeks, the 
proposed amendments consumed much attention in legislative chambers and among the 
public.118 Former State Adjutant General John Watts de Peyster forcefully protested repeal, 
warning Morgan his bill would leave the middle class (the “best blood” of the North) to fight and 
die, benefitting only those who could afford substitutes. De Peyster cited the example of a forty-
year-old family man who had been drafted and was saved when neighbors pooled their resources 
to pay for his exemption. Had the man been forced to serve, de Peyster wrote, “I cannot see any 
other result than the pauperation of his family of little ones. There are thousands such cases.” 
Many single men remained idle at home while soldiers’ families suffered. De Peyster further 
warned that loyal Republicans would turn on Lincoln in the coming election should commutation 
be repealed.119 But the need for men rather than money could not be denied, and the new 
amendatory act passed on July 4, ending commutation except for conscientious objectors.120  
 Repealing exemption was buffered for public consumption with a range of more 
appealing reforms, including graduated bounties for years of service, cutting the draft term to one 
year, letting draftees choose their units, and authorizing states to recruit in most areas of the 
South.121 Northerners seized upon southern recruitment in particular as the answer to their quota 
dilemmas. On authority from governors, communities sent agents to find men in specific regions 
of southern states; these brokers and their activities were subject to regulation by the local Union 
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commander.122 A special committee of the Kings County Board of Supervisors appointed seven 
agents (one for each assembly district) to recruit in the South among “negroes, refugees, and 
prisoners;” the seven expected to profit by providing southern substitutes to Brooklynites at a 
fixed rate.123 But southern recruitment failed miserably: the brokers involved proved just as 
corrupt as their colleagues in the North but far less successful. Concentrating on enlisting 
African Americans, they often seized them by force and subterfuge and impeded military 
operations while securing few men. Altogether the agents in the South wrote a bitter chapter in 
the history of Civil War mobilization; referring to the brokers sent by its own city, a Rochester 
Democratic newspaper called their hunts for southern blacks worse than slavery.124 This charge, 
while an exaggeration, indicates the poor reputation the program and its agents gained. State 
recruitment in the South was finally stopped in March 1865.125  
 Other initiatives in mid-1864 had nobler impulses but similarly disappointing results for 
the Empire State. In April, the governors of several midwestern states offered to raise a large 
force of infantry “for the approaching campaign,” to be mustered in for one hundred days’ 
service; these men would receive no bounties and not count toward state draft quotas.126 Lincoln 
accepted the proposal and, when Confederates launched a raid into Maryland in early July, called 
on other states to supply one-hundred-day men. New Yorkers, true to form, complicated matters. 
Seymour first asked if men would be accepted for a shorter period.127 On July 8, he issued a 
proclamation urging New Yorkers to fill up the National Guard and respond to this fourth call 
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upon the state’s militia. Noting that the metropolitan region had borne the brunt of previous 
militia call-ups, Seymour suggested a more proportionate response from all the state’s counties 
this time.128 The old question of whether militiamen could be ordered to serve outside the state 
delayed New York’s response, as did Seymour’s attempt to get them exempted from the draft 
when Lincoln issued another troop call on July 18.129 Despite heavy National Guard recruitment 
over the past year, lack of numbers, equipment, and interest caused New York to contribute 
fewer than half of the twelve thousand troops requested. Seymour, smarting over Fry’s refusal to 
exempt them, would not permit his one-hundred-day men—most of whom hailed from New 
York City despite his wishes—to reinforce the national capital.130 But the turnout of the National 
Guard looked magnificent compared to a different volunteer program begun in June. In response 
to requests, the Provost Marshal General announced that individuals unfit for service or 
ineligible for the draft could “procure at their own expense and present for enlistment recruits to 
represent them in the service;” those supplying men would have their names noted in the 
soldiers’ records.131 This appeal to “practical patriotism,” as Fry called it, elicited barely a 
murmur from the public. Residents of New York, the most prominent of whom were Peter 
Cooper and Reuben E. Fenton, accounted for just 119 representative recruits.132 Had they been 
issued two years earlier, the one-hundred-days and representative recruit proposals likely would 
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have drawn a large, enthusiastic response from New Yorkers. But in the changed atmosphere of 
1864—and without the pull of self-interest in the form of bounties or exemption—they failed. 
 With war and draft-related weariness rising and no end to the fighting in sight, the 
summer of 1864 saw the most severe tensions over the draft in a year. A preview of these 
troubles came on May 17 when two conservative New York City newspapers printed a supposed 
announcement by the president of a draft for four hundred thousand men. Lincoln and the War 
Department moved swiftly to disclaim the spurious document (which Stanton called “a great 
national crime”) and arrest the perpetrators. (Lincoln, in fact, had planned to issue a troop call on 
the same day but decided against it.) Apparently, the publisher behind the so-called Bogus 
Proclamation hoped to profit from a rise in gold prices.133 By late June, a new enrollment and 
indications of an impending draft were whipping up resentment and Republican concerns over 
their prospects in the fall elections. Fry received word of Irish-American “friends of 
Vallandigham” in New York City gathering weapons for a “grand riot” should a draft be 
ordered.134 Lincoln, however, saw no option but to make a call for half a million troops on July 
18, with a draft to begin fifty days later in areas not meeting quotas. The number called for was 
large and commutation no longer available for most, but the administration tried to soften the 
blow with other stipulations made possible under the July 4 amendatory act. State quotas would 
be deducted by subtracting naval enlistments and excess credits from previous calls, while 
volunteers had the option of enlisting for one, two, or three years.135 The Herald, exasperated by 
the recent rebel incursion into Maryland, argued the president’s proclamation came too late and 
the new troops it called out would not become available for several months. But New York 
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City’s excess credits under the last call gave reason to hope that the local quota could be met. If 
residents contributed all they could toward bounty bonds and helped find volunteers, there need 
be no fear of a draft. “Whatever may be said or thought of the President’s call,” the Herald 
concluded, “it is certain that more men are needed to end this war, and New York should supply 
them, as she has hitherto done, cheerfully and without compulsion.”136 
 The tense period following this editorial gave reason to doubt that the North would meet 
the call for manpower, cheerfully or otherwise, or that there would much longer be a Union 
cause to fight for. Union forces seemed stalled in front of Petersburg and Atlanta. Once again, 
New York soldiers agitated for the right to go home with their veteran regiments instead of 
serving full terms, while their governor disputed the status of his one-hundred-day men. The 
various terms of service authorized in July led to complications and legal challenges in 
determining credits and quotas, and Democrats and Republicans alike worried that faulty 
enrollment and quotas led to inordinately high taxes to provide bounties.137 Even areas of the 
country with Republican majorities saw a high rate of draft skedaddling. On August 5, Frederick 
Townsend reported that in the Nineteenth District “a stampede is going on that threatens to be 
serious unless checked.” Soldiers, as usual, expressed outrage at the thought of young men in 
their hometowns shirking duty, but citizens speculated that a draft could only be enforced in the 
northeastern states through a heavy military presence. Dix expected violence in New York City 
and requested ten thousand troops.138 The Secretary of State invited criticism in his hometown of 
Auburn when he speculated in a speech that no more drafts were forthcoming, an ill-advised 
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action under the circumstances.139 Meanwhile, Republican prospects in the coming elections 
looked bleak. Townsend considered the draft issue “vastly more delicate” than it had been the 
previous year and told his superiors that if conscription went ahead, Lincoln would lose 
reelection.140 “The people are wild for peace,” Albany editor Thurlow Weed informed Seward 
and Lincoln on August 22, adding that citizens were frustrated by the president’s refusal to give 
up emancipation in negotiations with the Confederacy. Four days earlier, Syracuse had hosted a 
large peace meeting at Fernando Wood’s instigation. Lincoln considered his reelection 
impossible.141 Seymour condemned New York’s latest quotas, encouraged the mayors of New 
York City and Brooklyn to resist the looming draft, and attacked Lincoln’s administration in a 
speech at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago. The Democrats nominated General 
McClellan for the presidential contest, giving the vice-presidential candidacy to George 
Pendleton, a Copperhead.142 In the six weeks following Lincoln’s July 18 call, the Union cause 
possibly came nearer defeat than at any other time during the war. 
 It is well known that northern fortunes rose decisively—and virtually overnight—in early 
September when Sherman’s army captured Atlanta. The welcome news caused a series of events 
leading to Lincoln’s nomination for a second term, confirming Republican support for 
continuing the war to victory. Democrats, their claim of a failed war effort shattered, were 
doomed to defeat in the elections. Historians often describe these September 1864 events as 
decisive to the war’s outcome.143 This interpretation contains much truth but discounts issues of 
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mobilization that loomed large that late summer and fall. The leading scholar on the Union 
governors, for instance, asserts that after Atlanta “[t]he conflict was no longer a matter of putting 
regiments in the field,” a statement that ignores continued efforts under Lincoln’s July 18 
proclamation and an additional call and threatened draft in December.144 In the tense days of July 
and August, even as they considered the strong possibilities of Lincoln’s defeat and a negotiated 
settlement with the South, federal officials investigated ways to improve recruiting and 
communities girded themselves to meet local quotas. The War Department and state 
governments, in fact, continued dispatching new regiments and recruits for old units until April 
1865. This was part of a process that began in late July as states and their communities 
reluctantly undertook to fill new troop quotas. The period from August 1864 to April 1865 saw 
stunning contrasts as the North enlisted hundreds of thousands at the same time mobilization 
spurred public frustration and class conflict.  
New York faced the task of raising 77,539 men under the July 18 call—the largest single 
quota of any state during the entire war, though excess credits lessened the burden in many 
districts. On July 30, Fry authorized Seymour “to raise 100 new companies of volunteer infantry 
… The term of service will be for either one, two, or three years, as the recruits may elect.”145 
Evidently, the intention was to meet the remainder of the quota with recruits for veteran units. In 
August, towns and cities across New York undertook these daunting assignments with two very 
different but familiar tactics: offering competitive volunteer bounties and convincing the Provost 
Marshal General’s Bureau to award extra credits. For both plans, however, the figures in dollars 
and credits involved dwarfed those seen since the war began, requiring greater efforts. New York 
County’s Committee on Volunteering, faced with a quota of 22,003 after subtracting excess 
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credits, saved its residents through the second tactic. In June, the county comptroller had 
borrowed two million dollars for bounties in anticipation of the coming troop call—a loan that 
had no legal backing and thus needed to be met through public subscriptions. The committee, 
under leadership that included gun manufacturer Orison Blunt and Tammany boss William M. 
Tweed, had little faith that such a subscription would raise the funds; previous such subscriptions 
promoted “solely on patriotic grounds” had fizzled. Moreover, they were authorized to offer a 
maximum bounty of three hundred dollars—hardly competitive by the summer of 1864. Raising 
just a portion of the loan money occupied nearly a month. A special committee took on the 
county’s efforts and got over nineteen thousand previous naval enlistments credited to the county 
thanks to recent amendments to the draft law. With an election looming, the national government 
wished to avoid another round of draft riots; Gotham got the credits and avoided the draft. Blunt, 
Tweed, and their fellow special committee members proudly reported that their endeavors had 
met the local quota and “saved to the County the enormous sum of over twenty-one millions of 
dollars.” Yet they had procured only 733 volunteers for the Union ranks.146 Across the East 
River, supervisors in Kings County made hundreds of corrections to their enrollment and adding 
similar numbers of naval credits. Brooklynites were “jubilant” when “the dreaded fifth of 
September” arrived and they avoided a draft.147 In New York City and Brooklyn, the system 
developed by 1864 kept a large majority of eligible residents out of military service. Some, 
however, believed community honor suffered when residents prioritized credits over supplying 
actual soldiers for their country’s cause.148 
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Most of the Empire State’s counties could not rely on naval enlistments to meet their 
quotas, and the southern recruiting scheme achieved very modest results. These localities faced 
the seemingly impossible task of securing sufficient volunteers. Counties levied future taxes 
upon their residents and borrowed funds for bounties that typically reached one thousand dollars 
for a year’s service. Newspapers and letter-writers at the front urged every loyal citizen to act as 
a recruiting sergeant and addressed countless enquiries about enlisting and finding substitutes. 
Militia regiments advertised for recruits in order to fill up for active duty.149 And many 
thousands, white and black, native-born and immigrant, old and young, enlisted and reenlisted. 
“Never were enlistments more rapid than now,” one paper noted, “elicited by the enormous 
bounties offered” as well as fears of a draft.150 Mass volunteering under the July 18 call got 
underway in late August and reinforced the field armies from September on, making an 
immediate impression. Soldiers, like many civilians, believed the army’s manpower situation 
would be just as decisive a factor in the war’s outcome as would the coming presidential 
election. A Syracuse native in the Army of the Potomac informed his hometown paper that the 
rebels “have robbed the cradle and the grave, to fill up their shattered ranks,” while in the North 
“all we need is to have our armies filled up, (as they are now being filled up, rapidly) to crush the 
rebellion.”151 Some towns and counties endured a draft that fall, but a majority gained sufficient 
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credits. In New York’s most impressive showing in two years, the state exceeded its huge quota 
and put several new regiments in the field.152 Like the arithmetic that helped New York City and 
Brooklyn escape a draft, these decisive, communal efforts among Empire State citizens to raise 
so many troops demonstrated that—even after a year and a half of federal direction under the 
Enrollment Act and its amendments—mobilization still depended on local networks and 
autonomy.  
 If the troop-raising campaign that summer and fall proved the strength of northern 
resolve and community spirit, it also indicated to many that ugly aspects of mobilization had 
gotten only uglier. There seems to have been no consensus on whether the recruits of late 1864 
made good soldiers. A Jefferson County editor believed the new local regiment was “made up of 
splendid material, as is the case generally with our volunteers” under the July call, and some 
veterans agreed that the new men proved themselves in the field.153 But many others did not 
consider these recent additions reliable or equal to those who came earlier. Their huge bounties 
and one-year terms angered men who had enlisted for longer and for less.154 Officers had to 
remain vigilant to ensure new recruits actually reached their regiments before deserting or being 
assigned to other units.155 While many substitutes and high-bounty men served well, thousands 
shirked their duty or deserted to the enemy in late 1864.156 By December, a veteran who had 
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once opposed drafting now spoke in support of it because he wanted the “solid men of the north” 
to join him in the field rather than the “miserable lot of trash” who had arrived that fall. 157 In 
many cases, such attitudes drew from ethnic and class prejudices, but laxness and corruption 
clearly brought more unfit recruits into service than ever before.  
Ever-present controversies over class also marred the enlistment drive. Historians have 
long differed on whether the draft, especially commutation and its repeal in July 1864, placed a 
disproportionate burden on any segments of northern society. But Russell L. Johnson’s study of 
wartime Dubuque, Iowa, revealed that “local war supporters placed particular emphasis on 
pushing working and poor people into the army” throughout the conflict.158 This would not have 
surprised New Yorkers in the conflict’s last summer. In August, Governor Seymour reiterated 
his claim that the draft was a “terrible affliction” to working-class people unable to survive on 
low, irregular military pay, a notion supported by some soldiers. Antiwar elements in New York 
City viewed want of work among the poor as the main enlistment motive among local 
volunteers.159 Far to the north, a Jefferson County editor who supported Lincoln’s war policies 
also accepted the primacy of economic motives, noting that although “we shudder at the 
thought” of the recent county tax of one million dollars to provide bounties, the money was not 
leaving the county but being transferred to another class of residents. “One thousand of the poor 
young men of the county are getting a good start in the world” thanks to the generosity of 
wealthier taxpayers who provided bounties for war service. In this symbiotic relationship “[t]he 
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wealthy and those who go to war are both abundantly provided for …”160 In late August, 
prosperous attorney and Sanitary Commission advocate George T. Strong spent eleven hundred 
dollars at a provost marshal’s office procuring “a big ‘Dutch’ boy of twenty or thereabouts” to 
serve as his “alter ego” (substitute) for the pending draft.161 Whether accurate or not, the 
impression was strong in the second half of 1864 that service had become the preserve of the 
poor. 
 The draft occupied much attention even as elections neared and Union forces gained 
further triumphs in the Shenandoah Valley.162 Democrats in New York and nationally tried to 
capitalize on fears of conscription in portraying Republicans as the party of war and forced 
service. “A vote for Lincoln is a vote for more drafts,” the Albany Atlas and Argus declared on 
October 25.163 But the latest draft had proved less burdensome than many originally predicted, 
while Democrats suffered from internal divisions between peace and war factions. The 
Republicans joined with War Democrats and rebranded themselves the National Union Party. 
Election Day came on November 8. After a state campaign that attracted nearly as much 
countrywide coverage as the presidential race, Seymour suffered an extremely narrow defeat at 
the hands of Union Party challenger Reuben E. Fenton, a speculator and consummate politician 
hailing from Chautauqua County. Lincoln gained victory in the Empire State with the help of the 
state’s newly enfranchised soldiers, but it was a much closer contest in New York than 
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nationally.164 The election results seemed to ensure Lincoln’s administration a free hand in 
bringing the war to a successful close.  
 Events in December and onward, however, indicated the march to victory would not 
enjoy a smooth path at home. By this point, state and local officials had somewhat refined their 
methods for tabulating quotas and credits. The year before, Adjutant General Sprague had begun 
employing discharged veterans in copying muster rolls for every New York regiment since the 
first call in April 1861. After ponderous printed editions were released in 1864, politicians and 
communities prized them for determining local quotas.165 Meanwhile, the public in New York 
and elsewhere evinced both concern for fair apportionment and growing frustration mixed with 
indifference. From New York City, a German immigrant who had become a successful merchant 
told his parents back in the old country that the war was causing great suffering. “As long as 
we’re not personally affected, we’ll be able to get through any difficulties,” he added.166 Then 
Lincoln announced a call for three hundred thousand men on December 19. As Fry explained, so 
many excess credits had been allowed on quotas under the July 18 call that numbers of troops 
actually provided fell short, making another call imperative. The Provost Marshal General also 
disseminated new formulas designed to bring forth men, not merely credits, in every district, and 
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sought only infantrymen to fill up regiments in the field.167 Lincoln’s unexpected call, Fry’s new 
calculations, and the resulting draft fell like bombshells on the northern populace, sparking 
widespread resistance that lasted until recruitment finally halted the following April. New York 
State Adjutant General William Irvine called that winter the period of greatest anxiety since July 
1862.168 
  New York faced a quota of 61,076 under the December 19 call. Soon after taking office 
on January 1, Fenton challenged New Yorkers to show patriotic devotion and adherence to 
American principles by filling their state quota. “Let there be a rally of the People in every city, 
village and town,” he urged.169 The governor hoped to avoid a draft in his state, and Fry 
authorized him to form five new regiments and fifty companies to reinforce old regiments or be 
consolidated.170 But difficulties immediately developed because the people Fenton had 
harangued mostly refused to rally. Widespread exhaustion and disgust toward both the brokerage 
system—which had only grown in corruption since mid-1864—and Provost Marshal General Fry 
left New Yorkers and other northerners hesitant to contribute funds for bounty subscriptions, 
much less enlist. This attitude prompted counties to levy higher taxes, but bounties still remained 
inadequate and recruitment stalled.171 In New York City, where dissent over draft quotas and 
recruitment fraud ran hot, Blunt, Tweed, and the Board of Supervisors demanded an 
investigation into how their quotas had been determined. Lincoln and Stanton felt compelled to 
authorize it. In early February, members of the state legislature and the editors of the Times and 
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Tribune independently, and unsuccessfully, called for the beleaguered Provost Marshal General 
to be dismissed.172  
More consequential developments at this time brought victory to the friends of 
emancipation while indicating how New York’s white majority remained divided on the issue 
and committed to state sovereignty. In late January, Congress ratified an amendment to the 
Constitution banning slavery and then passed it to the states for voting. On February 3, New 
York’s Senate and Assembly ratified the measure despite strident objections from Democrats in 
both houses. (Only one Democratic assemblyman voted in favor of the amendment.) Unlike their 
colleagues in Washington, Democrats in the state capital refused to drop long-running opposition 
to black equality and “the regulation of affairs purely internal and domestic by the votes of other 
states.”173  As the votes were counted in Albany, state senators and members of New York 
County’s special committee met with Lincoln in Washington and convinced him to reduce troop 
quotas in all the state’s districts by one quarter.174 But a new round of conscription could not be 
delayed. On March 1, Fry ordered a draft to begin on the 15th in each of New York’s three 
divisions.175 Immediately after the order, some drafted men in Western New York (and probably 
elsewhere) paid $1,500 for substitutes. That grim month also saw more cases of abduction and 
enlistment of minors and “fictitious mothers” who impersonated legal guardians of underage 
recruits for a fee.176 Enthusiasm for volunteering had reached possibly its lowest ebb yet. “In fact 
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it is almost impossible to get a man to go,” a woman in the Western New York town of Albion 
informed her husband at the front. “Neither patriotism or money can induce them.”177 On the 
battlefield, the war seemed moving inexorably toward a Union triumph. At home, however, 
anxiety over wartime issues—mobilization not least among them—persisted. 
A minor corner was turned by mid-March as communities played to their strengths in 
redoubled efforts to find volunteers and get their quotas reduced. When the draft was announced, 
residents of Brooklyn’s Green Point neighborhood met straightaway, raised twenty thousand 
dollars, and exceeded their quota in two weeks. Citizens in the Twentieth Ward met “to devise 
means to mitigate the hardships of the draft,” forming a family aid association, and Brooklynites 
deposited funds into the Draft Insurance Company for similar purposes. Several National Guard 
regiments around the state volunteered for active duty so that their district quotas would be 
met.178 In response to Fenton’s requests and reports of renewed activity, Fry on March 11 agreed 
to delay the draft in New York “as long as and wherever recruiting is progressing reasonably 
fast;” in areas where names had already been pulled, “the men will not be called for as long as 
men are fairly recruited at these points.”179  
Attempts to bring long-overdue order to the brokerage system had mixed results. This 
was seen in the third Amendatory Act passed, coincidentally, on the two-year anniversary of the 
Enrollment Act, though reforms in the latest law were minor. In February, state legislators had 
finally addressed the problem of skyrocketing local bounties and substitute prices when they 
passed an act granting funds to draftees who procured substitutes. Another state law in late 
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March authorized a loan to provide for state bounties.180 On April 1, Orison Blunt told Fenton 
that New York County would meet its volunteering goals if given funding, and the governor 
assured him the state would pay bonds for the purpose.181 Even as remaining Confederate forces 
collapsed in late March and early April, ensuring an imminent Union victory, quotas still had to 
be met. On April 6, Fry and State Assistant Adjutant General J. B. Stonehouse implored Fenton 
to keep the recruitment machinery running. Six days later, the tattered survivors of the Army of 
Northern Virginia formally surrendered their arms to Union troops at Appomattox Court House, 
effectively ending the war. On the same day and some four hundred miles to the north, a 
committee of the New York City Common Council wrote the Secretary of War with a request to 
suspend the coming draft. This was not due to the popular notion that no more men were needed, 
the committee added, and they acknowledged the government’s right to conscript. Rather, they 
wished time to fill the city’s quota with volunteers and thus avoid an event calamitous to the 
city’s economy, workers, and middle class. The very next day, April 13, Stanton issued orders 
for all provost marshals in the country to “discontinue the business of recruiting and drafting;” 
within two weeks, the War Department followed up with a round of cost-cutting measures that 
included discharging unassigned recruits.182 The increasingly unwelcome policies of 
mobilization were finally over, having drawn fire from New Yorkers up to the very end. Up to 
that point, the Empire State had contributed nearly thirty-three thousand men toward its 
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December quota.183  With manpower procurement halted, the War Department immediately 
began the process of dismantling the large citizen army and discharging its members.184 
During the bitter days of early March, a new Acting Assistant Provost Marshal General, 
Edward W. Hinks, had taken charge of the bureau’s work in New York City. “I found the whole 
business of obtaining volunteers and substitutes in the hands of an irresponsible committee of 
citizens,” he reported in reference to Blunt’s group, while city residents were “utterly careless 
and apathetic, leaving the whole matter of their quota to this committee.” Hinks’s efforts to 
strictly enforce the draft in the waning days of the war failed, doomed by an uncooperative 
public and the ease of bounty jumping in a major city. “The stoppage of recruiting and drafting is 
looked upon as a special triumph of New York,” the disgusted AAPMG explained.185 All things 
considered, it was fortunate for the Union that the war ended when it did, for the recruitment 
system as it had developed over the previous two years sparked growing exhaustion, disinterest, 
and resentment from the public. In these trying times, as they had for decades, New Yorkers 
counted on the leadership of their associations and rejected compulsion. Citizens of city, state, 
and nation had endured a four-year conflict to bind the Union into a closer compact, but they had 
also fought to preserve their local communities and values.
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During the Civil War, New Yorkers and their federal officials argued incessantly over 
manpower policies and the numbers involved. Perhaps inevitably, they differed when the time 
came to compile statistics about the Empire State’s involvement. Mobilization of northern forces 
had occupied almost exactly four years, from Lincoln’s first call for troops on April 15, 1861, to 
Stanton’s termination of recruiting and drafting on April 13, 1865. War Department figures for 
total United States enlistments during the war came to 2,778,304. This does not indicate the 
actual number of servicemen, however, as many enlisted for more than one term; estimates for 
individuals who served usually hover around two million.1 Federal clerks finally calculated New 
York’s quotas at 507,148; the state was credited with 448,850 troops furnished and 18,197 
individuals who paid commutation. As befitted New York’s large population, its quotas and 
credits far exceeded numbers for any other state.2 Decades after the war ended, New York’s 
official historian of its wartime services found a total of 503,765 enlistments in all military 
branches and for terms of service ranging from thirty days to four years. Just under four hundred 
thousand New Yorkers or men credited to the state served during the war. The historian arrived 
at these figures, however, with the help of careful estimates.3 Securing the services of these men 
had not come cheaply. In late 1865, an incomplete report on “amounts paid for bounties, fees and 
expenses, interest on loans, and for the support of the families of soldiers” by New York’s 
counties, cities, and towns put the amount at over 105 million dollars. State-level bounties were 
calculated at nearly thirty-five million dollars and the state’s total war-related expenses at 
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roughly two hundred million.4 These figures of troops and dollars dwarfed New York’s 
commitments in any previous conflict. 
As discrepancies in federal and state records indicate, statistics are slippery things. They 
also do not give us a reliable sense of the war’s true costs and impact. Private and communal 
outlays for bounty subscriptions and related expenses did not necessarily represent a permanent 
sacrifice, as the state legislature authorized reimbursement for some of these costs after the war.5 
But the economic impact on New York was nonetheless considerable. Public works and other 
expenses of peacetime were not put on hold during the war; the addition of bounty outlays 
“doubled the state debt immediately after the war,” as one historian notes, which in turn spurred 
conflict over taxes and other responses to this debt. Debates and policies regarding federal 
reimbursement for states’ war expenses began early in the conflict, continued for decades, and 
spurred more growth in the national government’s duties and influence.6 Even less calculable 
was the influence of four years of military mobilization on New Yorkers and their communities. 
The number of Native American state residents who served and the total casualties they suffered 
were not remarkable in the grand scheme of the war, for instance, yet these losses had 
devastating effects on their small, tightknit populations.7 When Albany officials planned the state 
census of 1865, public fear of the draft prompted them to change the title of census takers from 
“marshals” to “enumerators” and to instruct them to assure people the count was not intended for 
draft or militia enrollment.8 In some specific cases, the culture of corruption that recruitment and 
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troop quotas had inspired haunted the postwar decades. Major John A. Haddock, who had served 
as Acting Assistant Provost Marshal General in Western New York late in the war, went on trial 
in May 1865 for an astonishing amount of collusion with brokers. He was found guilty of all 
charges, sentenced to imprisonment, and ordered to pay a ten-thousand-dollar fine. Before it 
ended, Haddock’s trial sucked in two powerful congressmen, Roscoe Conkling and James G. 
Blaine, who took opposite sides on the matter and began one of the most celebrated, longest-
running rivalries in American political history.9 
For many New Yorkers, however, personal involvement in the war engulfing their nation 
had not extended much beyond fear of the draft; the Empire State’s citizens helped ensure that 
traditions of social choice and voluntarism would survive the crisis. Their state, though in debt, 
emerged from the war with a robust economy, growing public education system, and other 
indicators of prosperity. For Lockwood L. Doty—the man who had served as Governor 
Morgan’s secretary, delivered his annual message to legislators in 1861, and now headed the 
state’s war records office—these facts brought extra honor upon his fellow New Yorkers. “The 
ability of our people to conduct a long war, and yet successfully to prosecute the vast enterprises 
of peace, is truly marvelous,” he reflected in 1865, “and this generation well deserves that no fact 
should be lost which goes to illustrate the spirit, the patriotism, the liberality, and, most of all, the 
heroism of this period.”10 But the crowded years of the Gilded Age softened memories of the 
1860’s. “It has become a habit to say that the War of the Rebellion is forgotten, because the 
minds of the people are occupied with new incidents and events,” an historian of the state’s war 
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experiences noted in 1889.11 Many of the war’s lessons in mobilizing and caring for large bodies 
of troops certainly appeared forgotten by 1898, when war with Spain led federal authorities to 
rely once more upon the states for volunteer forces. Once again, much time was wasted and 
many lives unnecessarily lost to camp diseases and supply failures thanks to inefficient 
oversight.12 The situation had changed dramatically by 1917, however, as the United States 
entered the First World War. The comprehensive spirit of reform that marked the Progressive 
Era, along with years of calls to improve state and national military readiness, led Woodrow 
Wilson’s administration to reject the old model of voluntary mobilization that had sparked 
tension and inefficiency in past conflicts. Selective Service, introduced in 1917, revolutionized 
mass mobilization by dropping the volunteer principle and redefining compulsory service as 
honorable and patriotic. Voluntarism remained a potent force among the public but diminished as 
government policy discouraged it.13 For New Yorkers and their fellow Americans, freedom of 
choice and the volunteer impulse had prompted stirring episodes of valor and dedication during 
the Civil War but could not be counted on in the twentieth century.  
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